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ABSTRACT
Developing countries emerging from conflict often feature enduring, destitute
poverty amid often fast-growing economies at the national level. This dissertation
explores a critical question: What accounts for variation in human development
levels across similar communities in conflict-affected countries? In particular it
explores how some equally poor, indigenous, highland communities in Guatemala
have made advances in health and education, while others have stagnated or
regressed. These results are demonstrated through a quantitative analysis of all of
Guatemala’s 334 municipalities, utilizing difficult to access data from myriad
sources, combined with the results of qualitative field methods – including over
250 key informant interviews and focus group participants across 6 paired
communities throughout the Western Highlands – which aided in process tracing
the implementation of a widely acclaimed government anti-hunger program at the
village level. The principal finding is that, contrary to an emerging recognition of
the role of “ordinary citizens” in peacebuilding and violence reduction, human
development requires complementarity of citizen mobilization and government
resources. When state actors at the local level coordinate with traditional leaders,
and gain the cooperation and support of the mayor – giving meaning to
complementarity –local governance allows for measurable gains in human
development at the local level. By highlighting stark differences in local
ii

governance and development outcomes across otherwise similar communities in
the highlands of Guatemala, this paper raises important questions about: the role
of durable social forces at the local level and their ability – if not taken into
consideration – to thwart what are otherwise award-winning development
schemes designed abroad or in the capital city; the complications of “local
ownership” and local legitimacy with respect to development in complex
environments of state-society discord; and the limitations of our knowledge of
local forces on human development outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Guatemala’s thirty-six year long civil war, unfulfilled land reforms, unimplemented
peace accords, and its drastically high rates of criminal violence and subsequent impunity
each contribute, and intertwine, to hinder more equitable development gains nationally.1
These factors – along with what some call a dysfunctional state apparatus, ongoing
security concerns, and a structural racism that severely disadvantages the large
indigenous population – remain critical to explaining Guatemala’s stalled prosperity.
This dissertation, however, diverges from the more common narratives concerning
the trajectory of development in Guatemala. In fact, it probes a somewhat different and
mostly overlooked phenomenon altogether – why communities of otherwise similar
historical, geographical and demographic backgrounds in Guatemala have diverging
experiences with, and outcomes from, twenty years of post-war development.
Specifically, some communities are doing better in reducing infant mortality, or illiteracy
rates, while otherwise very similar communities continue to struggle to survive under
conditions of widespread poverty and hunger. Rephrasing the question: what explains
spatial variation in human development in rural western Guatemala?
This heretofore unexplained, and generally overlooked, phenomenon is significant for
several reasons. First, Guatemala has received significant external assistance since the

1

A concise synopsis of human rights and security setbacks from 2013, by Professor Mike Allison,
University of Scranton, is available here: http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2013/10/in-whatworld-are-these-businessmen.html

1

1996 Peace Accords were struck – through the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), World Bank organizations,2 foreign NGOs and through bi-lateral aid.3 Despite
outside assistance and capacity enhancement programs, however, and despite an alphabet
soup of ministries and a revolving door of anti-poverty and development initiatives,4 in
fact poorly-understood local conditions thwart well-intentioned and even comprehensive
development programs – squandering resources and limiting both scope and impact.
Development studies and poverty reduction scholarship, nevertheless, remains principally
concerned with the comparative effectiveness of different social assistance or lending
programs, and their influence on individual incentives,5 rather than how village-level
politics might affect outcomes. This paper explicitly addresses the implementation of
development programming over similar communities, underscoring its complexity, and
striving to tease out which local factors explain differing development outcomes.

2

Including $1.758 billion in IRBD Loans as of 5/31/2012 (http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala)

3

Including an average of approximately $95 million in recent years from the US government, consisting
of$28 million dedicated to “health” in 2012, $9 million in education and social services and another $19
million for economic development for a country of almost 15 million people , see:
http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=205&FY=2012&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Planned&t
abID=tab_sct_Peace_Planned (accessed 7/5/2013). OECD DAC official development assistance (ODA)
totaled an additional $289 million in 2011 – second only to Haiti in the region
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A).
4

A frequent complaint expressed in my interviews with each local, regional and even ministerial-level
officials concerned the discontinuity of social and development programs between successive
administrations. Citizens I interviewed were frequently unclear as to whether they participated in Mi Bolsa
Seguro, Mi Familia Progressa, or Bolsa Solidario (or which one currently existed, because most did not
participate in any government program). Each is a variation of programs promoted by different
administrations, which have tenures of only 4 years maximum.
5

This includes the vast array of literature devoted to the study of microfinance, conditional (and even
unconditional) cash transfers by governments, and more recently “cash-on-delivery” models of aid. Each of
the above models tinker with how small disbursements of cash to families spurs changes in the individual
pursuit of education, through increased attendance, for example, or health, through increased visits to local
doctors. The principal critique of such models is that they ignore “supply-side” constraints like the quality
or availability of schools and hospitals. The politics of disbursement are generally omitted from analysis.

2

Second, spatial variation in development outcomes confounds basic assumptions of
development – that rural regions, or all indigenous groups, for example, share identical
needs and/or identical obstacles to development. Spatial variation, as this project
demonstrates, also calls into question the efficacy of top-down statebuilding projects that,
again, assume a uniform level of state legitimacy and efficacy throughout a territory,
when in fact state-society relations themselves differ spatially, and considerably, with
important development implications. Comparing across similar communities with
diverging outcomes, as is done here, helps clarify which local conditions directly affect
human development, and how.
Emerging literature supports the notion that locally-specific factors – whether a
individual community’s social cohesion (Kaplan 2012) or deeply-entrenched resistance to
state authorities (Pugh 2005) – can significantly influence post-war outcomes across
space, upending a conventional wisdom of the state’s preeminence, and endowing the
“local” with far greater agency than has traditionally been granted. This is especially
relevant in a country like Guatemala, where the breadth and scope of state presence is
notoriously limited, and where indigenous governance and “legal-pluralism” have had
observable influence on local outcomes (Yashar 1998, Godoy 2006, Larson 2008). But
whereas local communities might have leeway in affecting peacekeeping, conflict
resolution, or local forest management, this paper also explores the limitations that local
actors face when the dependent variable is something as complex as human
development.6

6

Human development is rooted in the philosophy of development articulated by Nobel laureate economist
Amartya Sen (1992), whose “capability approach” argues that an individual’s capacity (her capability set)
to achieve well-being, to be well-nourished, or to avoid preventable morbidity (her functionings), will

3

None of the communities under investigation in this paper experience excellent
outcomes in development, as they each continue to face severe challenges, and are
generally low-income.7 Nevertheless, the variation across similarly poor communities is
stark. Figure 1, for example, illustrates widespread variation in infant mortality rates
across communities in the southern tier of El Quiché (see also Appendix C and D).
This paper argues that one important factor explaining this variation is the degree to
which state actors, with important material resources, work with and even defer to the
authority and local legitimacy of both official and informal authorities at the community
level in order to mobilize citizens and distribute resources equitably and more
transparently. Crucially, this paper finds that development gains are best when informal
authorities are expressly incorporated into the implementation of a key development
program. This is a rare occurrence, and the toxic combination of state mismanagement,
deep distrust of state authorities, and increasingly local political divisions and rivalries
thwart this “state-local complementarity” routinely.
Guatemala is particularly compelling in this regard. At the national level, the country
has experienced modest gains in development. Its national-level human development
index (HDI) score, for example, has steadily increased over the past two decades,
drastically affect whether or not she prospers in society. Illness contracted through dirty drinking water, for
example, or weakness from malnutrition, limits an individual’s actual achievements, and furthermore,
curtails her opportunities to achieve well-being. She may not be able to take advantage of work
opportunities, or will otherwise be less productive in her work, resulting in less income, whatever the
opportunity. Similarly, a lack of education limits her capabilities, effectively excluding her from
opportunities, and limiting both her intellectual and fiscal horizons, or what Sen might call her “freedom to
achieve.” Income is not abandoned from this perspective, but using it as a metric for “achievement” is. In
other words, income should represent the means, on a minimal level, with which to achieve functionings
like well-being, securing appropriate shelter and maintaining good health. It is not an adequate measure of
achievement by itself.
7

Limited economic generation, natural disasters and a severe drought in 2014
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-centralamerica-drought-idUSKBN0GT2NK20140904) are
examples of sustained challenges to development throughout rural Guatemala.

4

indicating improvements in health and education levels and, more certainly, income
(UNDP 2014: 2).8 These gains have not been uniformly distributed, however, and
Guatemala has obtained the unfortunate distinction of becoming Latin America’s most
unequal society, with alarming rates of chronic poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition,
despite moderate economic growth, and even while regional neighbors make
advancements in these same areas.9 Deep social cleavages continue to separate
Guatemala’s large, indigenous population from its ladino counterpart, broadly speaking,
and socio-economic indicators confirm massive inequalities in health, education and
opportunity across this divide (Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine 2013).10
Guatemala, in fact, has been somewhat of a leader in missed opportunities. A recent
project to rank-order 40 developing countries from around the world in their political
commitment to ending hunger and malnutrition placed Guatemala at the top of its list,
ahead of fast-growing African powerhouses and wealthier emerging countries.11 Yet

8

Guatemala has followed a global trend with steady improvements in HDI scores, though it remains well
below the Latin America average, and is ranked 133 out of 187 countries. The country has experienced
GDP growth, meanwhile, of 5 and 6 percent in certain years since the civil war. It was hampered by the
global recession in 2009 (.5% growth), but has since rebounded and has reported growth of 3 and 4 percent
the last two years (see: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG ). These articles
discuss the prevalence of the ultra-wealthy in Guatemala: http://elmundo.com.sv/fortuna-de-los-ultra-ricosde-el-salvador-suma-20000-mll and http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2013/09/you-want-richwe-got-rich.html
9

“Latin American Wealth Gap Climbing, Despite Progress Against Poverty,” Available at:
http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-wealth-gap-climbing-despite-progress-against-poverty-un-752885
(accessed August 30, 2012)
10

The country as a whole loses an additional 31.6 percent of “potential human development” due to
inequality according to the UN’s inequality-adjusted HDI (or IHDI). Guatemala scores equally poorly
when the UN calculates its multidimensional poverty index (MPI), which identifies “multiple deprivations
in the same households in education, health and standard of living.” (United Nations Development Program
2011). Alternative measurements of inequality also confirm Guatemala’s backwards slide:
http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inequality-debate/A-post-2015-development-goal-forinequality#comment_9739 with the pertinent document available here: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7155.pdf
11

See: http://www.hancindex.org/

5

despite the apparent commitment in the form of progressive laws and various programs,12
results have lagged considerably, with rates of poverty and extreme poverty, and more
specifically chronic and seasonal hunger and childhood stunting, ranking among the
worst in the hemisphere.13 Guatemala is also the only country in the region where its poor
are getting poorer.14

Figure 1. Variation in Infant Mortality Rates Across Select Guatemalan Highland Communities (2011)

12

See: http://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/guatemala and
http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/paises/guatemala/noticias/pacto-hambre-cero/ and
http://www.mides.gob.gt/noticias/item/204-pacto-hambre-cero
13

A series of news stories makes that abundantly clear:
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Alta-inversion-reducido-desnutricion_0_982701757.html
and http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/familias-alimentos_0_979102114.html
14

“Guatemala’s Poor Getting Poorer.” Available at: http://www.dw.de/guatemalas-poor-getting-poorer/a17917809 (accessed September 12, 2014).

6

Guatemala, in fact, has been somewhat of a leader in missed opportunities. A recent
project to rank-order 40 developing countries from around the world in their political
commitment to ending hunger and malnutrition placed Guatemala at the top of its list,
ahead of fast-growing African powerhouses and wealthier emerging countries.15 Yet
despite the apparent commitment in the form of progressive laws and various programs,16
results have lagged considerably, with rates of poverty and extreme poverty, and more
specifically chronic and seasonal hunger and childhood stunting, ranking among the
worst in the hemisphere.17 Guatemala is also the only country in the region where its poor
are getting poorer.18
Justification: Local Factors in Development Analysis
The chasm between an objectively measured “political commitment” by central
authorities to combat hunger, and yet poor results, suggests the potentially important role
of local actors, or at least local-level factors, in influencing development outcomes at the
community level, with national-level implications. While the role of local elites, tribal
authorities or religious leaders in influencing peace and security outcomes after conflict
has been explored in the peacebuilding literature (discussed more in Chapter Two), the
role of informal actors as either “spoilers” or heroes of development is much less well
15

See: http://www.hancindex.org/

16

See: http://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/guatemala and
http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/paises/guatemala/noticias/pacto-hambre-cero/ and
http://www.mides.gob.gt/noticias/item/204-pacto-hambre-cero
17

A series of news stories makes that abundantly clear:
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Alta-inversion-reducido-desnutricion_0_982701757.html
and http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/familias-alimentos_0_979102114.html
18

“Guatemala’s Poor Getting Poorer.” Available at: http://www.dw.de/guatemalas-poor-getting-poorer/a17917809 (accessed September 12, 2014).
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understood, and is in fact only just emerging.19 Given that improving living conditions
and well-being in post-war societies is an explicit goal of UN Missions and other external
agencies in a post-war context, it is peculiar that little in the literature examines post-war
human development outcomes more explicitly. Moreover, as global development and aid
agencies increasingly embrace a “Do No Harm” position on projects and assistance, an
awareness of subtle, local (even “street-level”) political dynamics is essential.20
In Guatemala, decentralization following the 1996 Peace Accords, which ended the
36-year long civil war, was designed in order to improve both the practice of democracy
(Torres-Rivas and Cuesta 2007), and the delivery of basic resources for development.
Community-level development councils (consejos comunitarios de desarrollo, or
COCODES) are legally responsible for articulating pressing local needs, and then
securing government resources with which to tackle the problem at hand.21 In this
19

For example, see: http://participationpower.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/whose-legitimacy-the-spectrumof-authority-in-conflict-settings/ (accessed October 30, 2013). There is otherwise only sporadic evidence of
non-state actors influencing development, specifically, including the role of Hezbollah in supplying basic
services in Lebanon for example (see: “Habitat for Hezbollah” by Melani Cammett (2006), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/16/habitat_for_hezbollah). Other examples include the role
of informal lending networks between Mexican women (see for example:
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/04/01/292580644/lending-circles-help-latinas-pay-bills-andinvest) Much of the literature exploring non-state service delivery, however, does not consider how
populations fair under these conditions, and if health and education measurably improves.
20

“Do No Harm,” as articulated in the 2010 OECD-DAC document, “Do No Harm: International Support
for Statebuilding,” has been increasingly embraced by post-conflict statebuilding actors and the broader
development community as part of a wider effort to encourage more local (national) influence over
outcomes.
21

The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed by
representatives of the rebel umbrella group, the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), and the
Alvaro Arzú administration on 6 May 1996. Among the details, which included a commitment by the
government to ensure availability of primary education and a 70% literacy rate by 2000, was the
‘potentially transformative’ commitment by the government to increase spending on health and education
by 50% compared with 1995 levels, measured by percentage of GDP (Stanley 2013). In part to accomplish
these goals, the 2002 Ley de Consejos de Desarollo Urbano y Rural (Urban and Rural Development
Councils Law) was passed, following previous back-and-forth iterations, thus establishing the community
development councils and formally recognizing the role of the indigenous population in public policy
decision-making.

8

system, legal-formal actors (COCODE presidents, local mayors, and council members,
for example) are easily identified by the architects of new development initiatives and
programs – whether those in the central government or foreign NGOs – and are thus
those recruited to act as conduits between aid agencies, material resources, and the
targeted community. Development– according to the formalized blueprint of community
councils – is intended to take place in a programmatic fashion that clearly articulates
needs upwards, and disperses resources downwards through the dedicated channels, or
persons and their offices, all the while soliciting the input of community members.
In reality, myriad actors, each endowed with varying degrees of local legitimacy,
credibility and influence – not formally recognized by any code or law – complicate what
is effectively local-level governance, and therefore outcomes, at the community level.
Some communities, for example, where non-state actors leverage deep-seated community
sympathy and influence, have resisted implementing the COCODES altogether – viewing
them as a threat and a form of state control, deferring to traditional mechanisms of
governance based loosely on Mayan traditions of “service” already in place,22 or more
radically stamping their own authority, and demands for autonomy, over the local
territory (Klick 2013, Seider 2011, Ekern 2010). These organizations and actors are
frequently overlooked by government offices and non-governmental development
agencies alike with respect to development governance, thus overlooking a potentially
critical variable influencing the implementation, impact, and outcomes of any program or
assistance.
22

Totonicapán municipality, for example, is extremely well-organized at the local level, including the
powerful “48 Cantones of Totonicapán” organization, which frequently clashes with department and state
offices. Because of its opposition, there are no local level development councils in Totonicapán, which is
highly unusual (based on interviews, October 2013).
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That is not to say that if only local conditions were embraced, or that if local actors
with robust legitimacy were deferred to over central authorities always, that things would
be better. In fact, this project is quite clear that “the local” can be overly-romanticized
when scholars assume that customs, norms and traditions must be more inherently just, or
always result in policies and outcomes which resonate more deeply with local
populations. At least with respect to development, “the local” – in all of its various
manifestations – can perpetuate as much harm as good when attempting to convert
resources into development gains, or by actively resisting cooperation with state entities
with valuable development resources (Klick 2013).23 This possibility remains widely
overlooked by development practitioners and policymakers alike, to their detriment, and
to the detriment of targeted populations and their well-being. More important for the
process of development to unfold locally, and to result in measurable gains in health or
education, I argue, is complementarity between state offices and local actors.
Complementarity reflects a situation in which state actors with important resources
(from food aid to medicine to cash) work in harmony with more locally-trusted, non-state
actors in order to deliver basic services more equitably, or to distribute resources more
efficiently. Crucially, complementarity includes, on the part of state actors, recognition of
the predominance of, and deference to, local authorities – formal and informal – by state
23

Though I argue that, in our effort to embrace local contexts and conditions as starting points for more
effective aid and development, local actors and conditions can sometimes be deleterious to the well-being
of the community, there is a much more developed scholarly community devoted to correcting what it sees
as a systematic dismissal of local conditions from scholarly work. This community has largely blossomed
through a study of peace, peacebuilding and post-conflict statebuilding – arguing that conventional, liberaloriented missions, in their effort to reconstruct an ideal OECD-type state, misunderstand the persistence,
and resistance, of local orders of authority and informal rules. Outcomes instead are “hybrid” in nature. The
hybridity literature, discussed more in Chapter Two, explicitly recognizes the coexistence and interaction of
state institutions and a multiplicity of non-state actors and sources of legitimacy (see in particular Boege et
al. 2009a, 2009b; Clements et al. 2007; Kraushaar and Lambach 2009, Wiuff Moe 2011), and emphasizes
the “existing” local, or “everyday” conditions that influence outcomes (see Richmond 2010, 2011).
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actors (Klick 2013). A complementary governance arrangement stands in contrast to
“competitive” ones, in which local actors utilize their influence to rebuff state influence
or action (see footnote 18).
This study demonstrates, in fact, that when the legitimacy, credibility and authority of
local non-state actors is coupled with, or “complements,” the resources and expertise of
state offices, development outcomes are indeed better, though this is rather rare. It is
particularly challenging, on the one hand, for the state to strike a balance between
building capacity, and imposition, especially in areas with strong indigenous identity and
where the state may be perceived as a threat. On the other hand, a lack of human capital,
corruption, racism, mismanagement or simple neglect plague many official government
offices at the local level, including those observed in this study, and this project does not
absolve the state or local officials of necessary reform.	
  In fact, there are perverse forms of
complementarity as well, in which central authorities utilize local networks to undermine
local (official) government – complicating any linear notion of complementarity and
underscoring the extent of heterogeneity in state-society relations in Guatemala, even
among similar communities.
My findings nevertheless suggest that local, semi-formal institutions are most
effective at influencing development outcomes when their legitimacy is coupled with
resources that only the state can provide, and currently monopolizes, or when local
institutions complement their state counterparts. This, however, hinges most frequently
on whether individual actors representing the state in each community show a respectful
deference of local/traditional authority, and an ability, or desire, to work with local
authorities to achieve development-oriented policy implementation. Of course, in return,
11

official entities – like the mayor’s office in particular – are key to establishing
complementarity, and are well-positioned to thwart any likelihood thereof, which is also
observed in this study.	
  
Significance
This project offers an important contribution to both the scholarly and practitioner
understanding of development and its conundrums. First, by exploring the complex
processes of development at the community level – where disbursements of resources
need take place, but also where the official, local authorities confront various brands of
civil society, competing political parties with active grudges, and informal actors with
significant local credibility – this project is an important contribution to our
understanding of how policy implementation and service delivery is manipulated at the
micro level, and to a degree not readily apparent even to monitoring and assessment
specialists back in Guatemala City, New York City or Geneva.
Second, despite its local focus, this study also adds to the global development
discourse, which is currently at an important juncture. The academic and development
practitioner communities are increasingly preoccupied with what will follow the current
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after 2015. Much of the debate has surrounded
the role of inequality,24 while other components concern the value of measurements and
indices, human rights, and how crime and violence should be accounted for in post-2015
objectives. Ultimately, however, the post-2015 debate centers on connecting development
theory with practice, resulting in well-defined and measurable targets (like reductions in
poverty, premature deaths, etc.). The results of this study, therefore, which observes a
24

See, for example: http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inequality-debate (accessed September 30, 2013)

12

breakdown between centrally-articulated development programs and intended outcomes
because of largely overlooked social forces, raises a certain cautionary red flag with
respect to the current approach to development assessment.
Third, the findings that stem from this study also shed light on the complexities of
development in the most intractable cases globally, addressing directly the wider universe
of cases commonly referred to as “fragile” or “vulnerable” states – or those 30-40
countries that experience recurring bouts of violence and instability, weak capacity on the
part of central authorities to deliver basic services, and which have retained stubbornly
high poverty rates.25
While other countries throughout the world, and certainly in Latin America, have
made significant advancements in reducing poverty and delivering basic services under
difficult conditions, Guatemala has failed to achieve its MDG targets, and continues to
lag behind the rest of the region – with the highest rates of poverty, chronic hunger and
inequality in all of Latin America. A more thorough examination of what thwarts
development gains in a potentially prosperous middle-income country, in a region that
has made measurable strides, is thus key to understanding what complicates development
elsewhere. In so doing, this study also emphasizes the complexities that potentially await
other, more recent, post-conflict states and societies, underscoring the limitations of a
conventional top-down statebuilding approach for development.

25

See: World Bank, “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY11” (presentation, World Bank, New York,
2010),http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/5117771269623894864/FS_List_FY11_(
August_8_2010).pdf, as well as: OECD-DAC, “Resource Flows to Fragile States” (Paris: Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), 156, and finally, for a discussion of vulnerability, see:
Hughes, Moyer and Sisk, “Vulnerability to Intrastate Conflict: Evaluating Quantitative Measures”
(Peaceworks, No. 72, 2011).
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While Guatemala cannot be considered indicative of what awaits Sierra Leone or
Liberia, per se, the findings here do suggest that, even in the medium to long-term,
human development is particularly handicapped by the legacy of conflict, distrust of state
authorities, and dysfunctional state-society relations. Guatemala, therefore, might serve
as an important lead indicator of what awaits other post-conflict countries, twenty years
forward, without a more thorough re-thinking of development policy.
Finally, a fourth significant contribution of this project is its emphasis on state-local
complementarity. As in many fragile states, Guatemala confronts the reality of
communities traumatized by war, and by demographic fault lines. These factors,
combined with the state’s own shortcomings with respect to security, human rights and
justice, make the state an unwelcome entity throughout much of rural Guatemala,
particularly where indigenous groups have organized thoroughly and directly influence
governance and local politics. The grievances of local populations cannot be ignored, nor
should they be taken lightly. However, from a strictly development perspective, neither
local resistance nor local legitimacy is sufficient for making measurable gains in health
and human development, and the agency of the most poor should not be overstated.
Though elusive, “best” outcomes are achieved when state actors tread thoughtfully,
threading the needle between their responsibilities and their limitations in a local context,
and deferring, and indeed cooperating, with local, formal and, crucially, informal nonstate actors to deliver resources efficiently, and to begin the long process of development
in places long-neglected.
With these factors in mind, I argue that more emphasis in the post-2015 policy must
be placed on the micro-politics of development, and thus consider the largely hidden
14

barriers to progress out of poverty, and in combating hunger, that escapes even the most
politically committed central governments. These micro dynamics, I argue, have macro
consequences.
Project Background and Description
This project seeks to explain variability in human development outcomes across
similar communities. Human development, as opposed to economic development,
strictly, or national development of industrial policy, for example, places greater
emphasis on measuring the well-being of citizens, as opposed to assuming that income
will necessarily generate a higher standard of living by itself. From this perspective,
indicators of health and education are added to income metrics in an effort to better
capture the quality of life of citizens. And indeed, the most interesting cases in this study,
discussed in more detail below, are those that reveal strong swings in health and
education outcomes, after development indicators are disaggregated, despite little or no
changes in income over time.
Human development is rooted in the philosophy of development articulated by Nobel
laureate economist Amartya Sen (1992), whose “capability approach” argues that an
individual’s capacity (her capability set) to achieve well-being, to be well-nourished, or
to avoid preventable morbidity (her functionings), will drastically affect whether or not
she prospers in society. Illness contracted through dirty drinking water, for example, or
weakness from malnutrition, limits an individual’s actual achievements, and furthermore,
curtails her opportunities to achieve well-being. She may not be able to take advantage of
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work opportunities, or will otherwise be less productive in her work, resulting in less
income, whatever the opportunity.
Similarly, a lack of education limits her capabilities, effectively excluding her from
opportunities, and limiting both her intellectual and fiscal horizons, or what Sen might
call her “freedom to achieve.” Even cash transfers, or other mechanisms of augmenting
income,26 for instance, will be of minimal value from a human development perspective
if access to health and education remains limited. If large swathes of a country’s
population are structurally excluded from access to health and education – either out of
racism, neglect or incapacity – then economic development as measured by GDP growth
will again be limited in reducing poverty or increasing opportunity, and the freedom to
achieve well-being will be similarly constrained. This disconnect between income and
development is particularly relevant to the Guatemala case, which has the largest
economy in the region but among the lowest health and education achievements in
aggregate.
Income, however, is not abandoned from this perspective altogether, but using it as a
metric for “achievement” is. In other words, income should represent the means, on a
minimal level, with which to achieve functionings like well-being, securing appropriate
shelter and maintaining good health. It is not an adequate measure of achievement by
itself, however.

26

See footnote no. 5
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Combining income with health and education opportunities into an indicator of
development, as the UN has done with the Human Development Index (HDI),27 provides
a crude, but nevertheless augmented glimpse into the capability set, or the resources and
degrees of freedom, with which to pursue well-being, while also providing a snapshot of
general health and well-being of citizens of a country or sub-region.
This project proceeds by first comparing the most recent HDI scores from across all
334 municipios in Guatemala.28 This initial survey reveals stark spatial variability in
human development across all communities, and most surprisingly, even within rural,
mountainous and largely indigenous departments (See Table 1).29
Table 1. Summary of Human Development Scores in Guatemala

Variable
HDI_2005
HDI_2005,
where elevation is
>6500 ft above sea
level

Obs
331

Mean
.591

Std Dev.
.089

Min
.306

Max
.828

85

.571

.103

.306

.784

This peculiar outcome is made yet more puzzling when, after a regression analysis,
no statistical relationship (P=.238) is found between the presence of the state in a given

27

The HDI was the collective effort of Sen and Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, who spearheaded the
UN’s annual Human Development Reports as well, partly as a counterweight to the World Bank’s World
Development Report.
28

Municipios are much like counties in the United States in that there is a “urban” head or seat (usually
with the same name), where the local government and its offices are located, which is also responsible for a
designated area consisting of several much smaller villages (aldeas or cantones). Collectively they make up
the entire municipio. In Guatemala, data was available only as low as the municipio administrative level for
statistical analysis (n=334). During fieldwork, I visited surrounding aldeas in my three primary municipio
cases as well, and conducted focus groups with villagers, in order to gather data from across the municipio
itself.
29

Departments are the next administrative level up from municipios. There are 22 in Guatemala.
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community30 and HDI scores and other development indicators, suggesting a disconnect
between state capacity, service delivery, and development outcomes – while
simultaneously leaving open the question of what better explains this variation, if not
levels of state presence (See Figure 2). These early steps, along with a more thorough
analysis of all quantitative data, are described in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.

Figure 2. Scatterplot of Changes in Chronic Hunger Rates
Across State Density Scores (2009)

Ultimately, I argue that it is those communities which organize in such a manner as to
effectively partner with state actors that are demonstrating the best returns from
development programming thus far, including Guatemala’s now internationallyrecognized anti-hunger initiative, El Pacto Hambre Cero (or the “Zero Hunger Pact”). It
is in these communities where basic resources can be distributed effectively and
impartially, and where trust can be engendered between state-level resources (like the
local medical clinic) and rural citizens. It is in these same communities where citizens are

30

State Density Index (SDI) scores were crafted and produced, at the municipio level, for the 2009/2010
Guatemala Human Development Report, and based on indicators of the level of state offices, bureaucracy
and redistributed tax revenues per capita for each municipio. A more detailed description is available in the
Statistical Annex of the UNDP report (UNDP Guatemala 2010: 410), while a translated reproduction of the
index’s components is available in Appendix B of this paper.
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mobilized to make the trek to area clinics as well, and get needed supplies, education or
vaccinations. This happens because local leaders have been endowed with a level of
respect, deference and autonomy, by state actors and the municipal mayor, which has
resulted in their active participation and project “buy-in.”
Unfortunately, most communities exhibited the opposite tendencies, and each petty,
personal as well as electoral grievances deepened rifts within the community and pitted
state actors against municipal authorities. In these cases, no amount of local-level,
indigenous authority or even self-organization could overcome such divisions. Indeed,
electoral politics and party affiliation, combined with confessional divisions, were
becoming increasingly salient at the village level,31 and also factored into which
communities fostered partnerships and complementary relations between local authority
structures and state service delivery.
Testing my hypothesis was not an easy task, requiring thorough familiarization with
the country of Guatemala, with the communities and regions under scrutiny, their
histories, and the confluence of literatures that have already explored the topics of locallevel governance, post-conflict societies, poverty reduction, development,
decentralization and participatory development. This paper is therefore structured in
order to guide the reader through the step-wise progression of important background
material and through a detailed explication of the study’s experimental design, case
selection criteria, and ultimately its case studies, before a thorough analysis and
discussion of the findings.

31

This is based on interviews in all six communities, and an almost unanimous consensus among
interviewees, regarding the role of parties and politics on local cohesion and government relations.
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Structure
Chapter One provides important background into the Guatemala context, including a
brief overview of the armed conflict which officially ended in 1996. This section includes
a discussion about why Guatemala, for multiple reasons, is an ideal case study for this
project. I also discuss what insights a country like Guatemala might provide scholars and
practitioners, concerned not only about development conundrums more broadly but also
post-war reconstruction and development, despite almost 20 years after the official end of
fighting and with minimal risk of a return to large-scale conflict.
Chapter Two relates the current project to an array of literature. As hinted at above,
the Guatemala case was originally situated within the larger debates surrounding “local
ownership” and “hybridity.” Indeed, this project can sharpen what are conceptual loose
ends in both, and contribute to the debates surrounding local ownership and post-conflict
peacebuilding and development. But as the study progressed, it is apparent that the
Guatemala context diverges from the focus of hybridity scholars, concerned mostly with
the interaction of either state or local actors and the international community (frequently
UN peacekeepers or UN civilian staff). This project is more concerned, ultimately, with
state and society, and the influence of informal actors and institutions on human
development outcomes. First, by expanding the dependent variable to something more
complex (like development, and well-being, versus the very narrow achievement of a
negative peace, for example), this project inherently concerns itself with more complex
socio-political dynamics and governance processes. The project also includes an
unvarnished and in-depth examination of micro-level politics at the community level,
also touching on a level of complexity that, as argued already, needs to be more
20

thoroughly considered by state and external officials alike when considering development
programs and policy. Though this is a relatively nascent focus of study, important extant
literature on local-level governance, including studies from Guatemala, provide important
points of reference and help orient this project conceptually. Other literature under focus
includes that of informal institutions, the political geography of development, political
culture, state service delivery and the intersection of state and society in fragile conflictaffected states. This diverse array of literature is framed according to a rubric of statecentric, state-society, and society-centric approaches to politics and development. The
chapter concludes with a more in-depth discussion concerning the puzzle under
examination and an explication of the research design.
Chapter Three provides an exploratory quantitative analysis of available data. Though
the quantitative analysis here, given data constraints, is insufficient by itself to facilitate
conclusive findings, it nevertheless serves an important function. First, the analyses
presented in Chapter Three demonstrates surprising relationships between myriad
development indicators and diverse independent variables, like the level of official
denunciations of formal actors for abuse of power, filed per community, for example, or
conflict intensity – which is calculated at the municipal level here for possibly the first
time. As well, the distinct lack of a relationship between state density at the municipal
level, and development outcomes, challenges conventional wisdoms regarding
statebuilding for development, and makes room for alternative hypotheses while
justifying case selection.
Chapter Four provides crucial background into the six case study communities that
are at the heart of this study’s qualitative analysis. They are all communities from
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Guatemala’s western highlands region, but spread across three different departments (the
administrative level between municipal and state). Collectively, these three departments
are the worst performing with respect to development, but the experiences of the six
communities themselves vary considerably. This chapter specifically explores the array
of formal and informal actors influencing governance at the community level, and myriad
conflicts that impinge on development outcomes, and constrain state-society relations.
In Chapter Five, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) structures the analysis
and findings from each community in order to draw out how complementarity, rival
hypotheses, and development outcomes relate in each community. This chapter probes
deeper into the puzzle at the local level than what is possible through a quantitative
analysis, and provides critical context necessary for scrutinizing causality. Chapter Six
utilizes process-tracing, through the examination of how the country’s acclaimed antihunger program is implemented in each community, in order to even more deeply
uncover the causal chain between governance and development outcomes.
This paper concludes with a re-examination of state-society relations and human
development, including policy recommendations aimed at each national and community
leaders, development agencies and their field workers, and even global development
policymakers, who continue to overlook just how micro-level dynamics hinder billion
dollar development campaigns, including the effectiveness of the Millennium
Development Goals. This study is also directed at the scholarly literature, however, that,
while correctly highlighting the capacity of local actors to resist state incursions or to
influence local outcomes, overlooks “the local’s” limitations, particularly when it regards
the health and well-being of post-war societies. More strongly, this paper calls for a
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reorientation of post-war scholarship. It argues that development and peacebuilding
scholarship remain largely “siloed” in their respective search for “what works,”
overlooking the inherent overlap.
This paper muddies these waters, intentionally. Robust state authority is empirically
rare, and indeed governance of innumerable processes and actors fills this void. But
development, unlike self-policing or internal-sanctioning, for example, requires material
resources and basic services. State actors need acknowledge the extent of their
limitations, while local leaders need acknowledge the depths of their needs. A marriage
of the two, however fraught, is critical to human development in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 1: THE GUATEMALA CONTEXT

Much has been written concerning Guatemala’s civil war, which unfolded over thirty
six long years, but which also included both spikes and lulls in intensity, a democratic
transition of government despite ongoing hostilities (and despite abysmally low electoral
participation in rural areas), as well as shifting rebel ideologies, coordination and
leadership. Perhaps more peculiar than the episodic nature of the civil war itself,
however, is that – despite nearly four decades of conflict resulting in an estimated
200,000 dead, a million displaced, and another 100,000 disappeared (the overwhelming
majority of which, 93 percent in fact, being the result of state military operations)32 – the
overall political and socio-economic divisions that were the principle drivers of conflict
remain largely intact today (Fuentes 2011, Schneider 2012, Segovia 2005).
Guatemala remains, as noted in the introduction, the most unequal country in Latin
America, a region already synonymous with class divisions and disparities in wealth.
Somewhat more shocking, however – given relatively robust rates of economic growth
and, additionally, millions of US dollars (USD) in remittances – Guatemala has the
highest rates of chronic malnutrition and hunger in all of Latin America, and is in fact
one of the most undernourished countries on the entire planet, despite abundant
resources.33 It also experiences persistently high rates of poverty and extreme poverty34
32

Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) 1999

33

The World Bank ranks Guatemala third in the world in chronic hunger in children under age five, using
stunted growth as its primary indicator. It also notes Guatemala’s exceptionally poor performance in this
regard in comparison with countries around the globe with similar incomes, and argues that the country
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while simultaneously experiencing absurd crime rates – compounded by a feeble justice
system of questionable political independence with reported impunity rates of over 90
percent.35
Despite a government elected in 2011 on a platform of civilian security (or perhaps
because of it, according to some wary of the President’s personal history as a military
officer during the civil war, with responsibility for operations in Quiché department
specifically, which experienced the greatest share of conflict intensity), 2013 saw a rash
of murders of media personnel,36 indigenous community leaders37 and union leaders,38
reminiscent of the tactics of a political elite-military alliance during the civil war which
threatened and killed peasant and union organizers (Costello 1997: 13).
Guatemala, in fact, despite its middle income status, is a regional and even global
development laggard, and is emblematic of both the disconnect that exists between
loses as much as USD 300 million to “vitamin and mineral deficiencies.” See:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPNUT/Resources/Guatemala4-20-10.pdf
34

The most recent statistics (2011) from the country’s National Living Conditions Survey indicate that
40.38% of the population lives under conditions of non-extreme poverty with an additional 13.33% living
under conditions of extreme poverty (ENCOVI 2011).
35

Guatemala, as part of Central America’s “northern triangle” is considered one of the most violent
countries in the world. Its homicide rate has hovered around 40 per 100,000 over the past several years, or
roughly ten times the U.S. murder rate (see: http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/estadisticas/compendioestadisticas/compendio-centroamerica/compendio-centroamerica-politico or
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html ). The country is also host to the
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG in its Spanish acronym), which was
established because of Guatemala’s glaring judicial inefficiencies and failure to prosecute reported crimes.
The impunity rate for homicides was at 95% as late as 2010, though recent reports claim this has been
slashed to 70% in 2012 (see: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204664.pdf)
36

http://en.rsf.org/guatemala-another-journalist-shot-dead-in-20-08-2013,45078.html (accessed October 23,
2013).
37

http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Indigenous-leader-killed-in-Guatemala_TuesdayMarch-12-2013 (accessed October 23, 2013) and http://frontlinedefenders.org/node/26913 (accessed
August 22, 2014)
38

http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/As-trade-unionist-attacks-continue-Guatemala-facestough-decisions_Thursday-October-17-2013 (accessed October 21, 2013)

25

economic growth and inclusive development, as well as how a combination of state
fragility and durable social forces hinders human development in an otherwise
prosperous context.
Exploring Guatemala’s persistent underdevelopment, despite its relatively strong
economic performance, is therefore valuable for several reasons: for understanding
underdevelopment in fragile and conflict-affected states more broadly – which remain the
most intractable cases of development globally and to which the evolving post-2015
development debates increasingly speak, and in order to more systematically probe the
largely obscured and overlooked mechanisms that complicate even well-designed and
well-financed development schemes. Understanding what allows extreme poverty and
underdevelopment to persist, and even flourish, in a middle-income country like
Guatemala, provides important insights into what complicates poverty reduction and
development everywhere.
This chapter begins with an overview of the civil war and subsequent peace accords,
which on the one hand continues to reverberate throughout society, particularly in the
areas which experienced the most intense episodes, but which on the other hand is
increasingly fading into the past as a wave of young people39 seek education, a middle
class lifestyle, or concern themselves more with smartphones and Spanish League soccer
than past injustices. This chapter proceeds with a brief exploration of some of the longerterm complications of the war, with special focus paid to the resulting tapestry of local
governance dynamics, including the diverse set of actors – formal and informal – that

39

See “Demographic Indicators” here: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemala_statistics.html and
a more general discussion of Guatemala’s youth boom here: http://matthewklick.com/2013/09/15/youthboom-or-bubble/
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influence the nature and scope of governance at the local level, and the varying nature of
state-society relationships across communities throughout Guatemala. It is this diversity,
I argue, that is a key part of the Guatemala story, and likewise an important variable in
explaining the variations in opportunity and development that exist across otherwise
similar communities.
1.1 A Civil War Overview: From Marxism to Massacres
It is first worth considering the context immediately preceding the start of the
Guatemalan civil war. The October 20th, 1944 revolution first brought down the military
dictatorship of Jorge Ubico, and ushered in what has probably been the most progressive
era in Guatemala’s history to date or since – introducing for the first time a veneer of
modern social welfare programs and anti-feudal laws that promised education, land for
all citizens, including poor campesinos and indigenous peoples, while formally
abolishing indentured servitude for the first time. The revolution came to a swift end in
1954, however, when the CIA and Guatemalan military elites toppled the Jacobo Árbenz
administration after it decreed the turnover of uncultivated land in private holdings for
redistribution, which disproportionately affected the American-owned United Fruit
Company and which, through a Cold War prism, was interpreted as a lurch towards a
communist ideology. The 1954 “counterrevolution,” however, according to many
Guatemalan scholars,40 cemented both social inequalities and a political oligarchy – out
from under which the country is still trying to progress – while snuffing out a flicker of
opportunity for Guatemala’s peasants.

40

http://www.s21.com.gt/edelberto-torres-rivas/2013/10/20/ula-injusticia-me-indigna-tanto-como-hace-69anos (accessed October 20, 2013).
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After a tumultuous interim, the armed civil conflict itself began when left-wing junior
military officers rebelled in 1960 over fraudulent elections orchestrated by the civilmilitary regime. Having lost, the leaders of the uprising fled to the central and western
highlands where, over time, grievances related to the systematic discrimination and social
exclusion of the majority Mayan population became the driving force behind the efforts
of anti-government forces in the 1970s and 1980s, though such a simple depiction of their
leading role is regularly contested (Smith 1990, Nelson 2009).
Various iterations of the war and interpretations of the role the indigenous people
themselves during this period are under some scrutiny. David Stoll (1999, 1993), for
example, recognizes the fury with which the state army reacted to uprisings, but generally
disputes the notion of a “popular” insurgency, and blames rebel forces for exaggerating
the plight of poor farmers in order to garner international support. This interpretation has
been widely condemned, however, and consensus – after vast amounts of social science
research, the unarchiving of police records, and even ongoing forensic work – has rather
definitively recognized the asymmetries between rebel and state forces, and the
disproportionate response of the army that included over 600 separate massacres – the
overwhelming number of victims (83 percent) being poor, indigenous peasants, including
women and children, and concentrated in the Guatemalan highlands and northern Ixil
region (Brett 2007, Streeter 2000, Steinberg et al. 2006, Jonas 1991, CEH 1999).41
The rebel movement was itself weakened by internal divisions – between Marxistinspired intellectuals, for example, as well as between ladino leaders and Mayan leaders.
These divisions resulted in multiple rebel factions, which included the Guerrilla Army for
41

See, for example: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/pressrelease/pbs-newshour-reports-on-how-forensicscience-is-being-used-in-guatemalan-genocide-trial/
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the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and finally the Guatemalan Worker’s Party (PGT) – which
only united under the single flag of the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca or URNG) in 1982.
Violence and oppression during the civil war reached its zenith between 1980 and
1984, under the administrations of General Romeo Luca García and the notorious
General Efrain Ríos Montt, who is currently on-and-off trial in Guatemala for genocide.42
In fact, one of the case study locations for this project (Zacualpa, in the department of El
Quiché) was a focal point of the “scorched earth” policies of Ríos Montt. Government
forces there killed over six hundred civilians and even commandeered the Catholic
Church – turning it into a detention and torture center while unceremoniously disposing
bodies throughout the Church grounds and its wells.
Given the disproportionate effect of the violence on the young (ages 16-45), students
and traditional community leadership, some authors have argued that the war, and its
most intense episodes, “attacked the core of Guatemala’s human capital and dismantled
its potential for social leadership,” the effects of which still reverberates today (Flores,
Ruano and Fuchal 2009: 39).
The landmark report by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH 1999)43
documents how community leaders – whether rural teachers, traditional health promoters
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Ríos Montt was convicted of genocide in May 2013 – the first former head of state to be convicted in his
own country for such crimes – but the conviction was annulled shortly thereafter and his status remains in
limbo. See: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/latam/justice-on-trial-inguatemala-the-rios-montt-case.aspx (accessed 10/24/2013)
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The CEH (1999), or in its full Spanish-language title, “La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico de
las Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos y los Hechos de Violencia que han Causado Sufrimientos a la
Población Guatemalteca,” emerged from the peace process itself, and a specific accord (signed June 23,
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(midwives with traditional community leadership roles), or priests – were associated with
“subversion” by the state and were thus specifically targeted and frequently executed.
The forced participation of community members in “civil defense patrols” (Patrulla Civil
de Autodefensa, or PACs) designed to limit the incursion of guerillas into rural villages,
divided communities further – pitting patrol members against traditional leaders, and
allowing patrollers to arrest and use violence against suspected collaborators within their
own communities. “Local indigenous authority,” argues Flores et al., “no longer rested
with a council of elders, but rather with the head of the patrols … These fractures
affected systems of authority, norms of community relations, and even elements of
identity” (2009: 41). Indeed, as Tania Palencia Prado (1996) observes, the Army used
PACs and other “military commissioners” to actively suppress Mayan identity, exalting a
homogenous Hispanic, or ladino, culture instead.
Some observers (Duque 2009) have expressly linked contemporary distrust of state
institutions among Guatemalans (Azpuru 2011) to experiences with violence and
repression during the war. Indeed, in a surprising moment, one of my interviewees linked
former PAC members to a particular political party active in her community currently,
and to specific delinquencies that have resulted from political turf-battles since.44 Other
observers explain limited political participation by citizens in Guatemala as another
outcome that can be directly traced back to the civil war era in which any institutional
organization could be construed as political, and potentially subversive (del Valle 2009).

1994 in Oslo, Norway) which both approved the commission and solicited an objective report, organized
by the UN and its peace process mediators, on all violations and war crimes perpetrated over the course of
the conflict (CEH 1999: 23).
44

Interview in Zacualpa, department of El Quiché, with key informant (October 15, 2013).
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It is unclear, however, whether the legacy of civil war outweighs even more recent
experiences with heavy-handed government treatment of indigenous protestors, or a
backlog of unsolved and unprosecuted murders throughout the country (International
Crisis Group 2010, International Crisis Group 2011). This is discussed in more detail
below.
1.2 The Peace Accords: Victors or Vanquished?
By the end of the state campaign of terror of the early 1980s, the rebels were unable
to protect civilians in areas where they operated, nor muster any sort of significant
military threat to state forces. Despite their relative weakness, however, their small
numbers and flexibility allowed them to persist and cause sporadic damage, indefinitely.
This factor, combined with the scaling back of military operations and the 1985 elections
that brought to power a civilian president, opened the door for a political settlement
(Arnault 1999). It would take ten years, many separate processes and negotiations, and
ultimately the influence of the United Nations, which established MINUGUA (the UN
Mission for the Verification of Human Right and of Compliance with the Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala), before comprehensive peace accords were
signed on December 23, 1996 in Guatemala City.
The rebels could hardly claim victory, but given the military asymmetries between
the two parties, the ability of URNG to make their key grievances the center of debate,
and ultimately negotiate a settlement, is a remarkable feat (Stanley 2013). URNG,
combined with the participation of a diverse array of civil society actors, was able to
make human rights, the electoral regime, and access to land and rural development
central tenets of direct talks. (Ibid: 20). Despite this achievement, however, the
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implementation of the Peace Accords since has been a stunning disappointment (Brett
2013, Godoy 2006: 44).
Since the 1996 conclusion of the Peace Accords process, the state of Guatemala has
been unable to effectively address the country’s greatest social challenges, nor implement
some of the most basic agreed-upon components of the Accords themselves. In part, this
reflects what some have called Guatemala’s “permanent state of fragility,” and a
statebuilding project “in crisis,” given the state’s consistent inability to coalesce a
powerful economic elite around badly needed fiscal reforms, and the instability of
Guatemalan politics itself, which has experienced continuous political turnover and
spontaneous political party generation and disintegration (ASIES 2012, González 2014,
Schneider 2012, Jones 2011).
For example, a key component of the Peace Accords was a government obligation to
increase social spending in poor regions – a goal which remains largely unmet (Schneider
2012, Stewart and Brown 2009, Kurtenbach 2010, Fuentes 2002).45 Instead, Guatemala
has the lowest tax revenues in Central America (and second lowest in all of Latin
America). The notably regressive nature of Guatemalan taxes, as well, combined with a
confusing policy patchwork and ad-hoc reforms, have resulted in state revenues that are
unable to adequately fund even the state’s paltry commitments to public goods provision
(Schneider 2012: 172, USAID/ICEFI 2009). Thus despite the formal end to hostilities
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The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed by
representatives of the URNG and the Alvaro Arzú administration on May 6, 1996, in Mexico City. Among
the details, which included a commitment by the government to ensure availability of primary education
and a 70 percent literacy rate by 2000, was the “potentially transformative” commitment by the government
to increase spending on health and education by 50 percent compared to 1995 levels, measured by percent
of GDP (Stanley 2013).
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and the disbanding of rebel groups,46 contemporary Guatemala continues to cope with
many of the same social grievances and inequalities that fueled the civil war. General
consensus, in fact, is that Guatemala’s miserable development performance is the result
of a constellation of a weak state, inchoate political parties and, crucially, a fundamental
social cleavage dividing indigenous groups from Ladinos.
1.3 Contemporary Guatemala: A Continuum of Violence?
Scholars like Frances Stewart and Graham Brown (2009) argue that, regardless of
revenues, the largest bilateral, multilateral and even domestic development initiatives
have articulated so-called poverty reduction strategies without adequately addressing
what are severe “horizontal inequalities” in Guatemala. From their analysis, disparate
rates of poverty, HDI scores, levels of education, housing conditions and access to basic
services between Guatemalan regions reflect a structural exclusion of the large
indigenous population from post-conflict economic growth (Stewart and Brown 2009:
55).
Roddy Brett (2013) argues that the relatively robust indigenous movement that
emerged from the peace process, at the time bolstered by local and international civil
society pushing for collective and cultural rights, was ultimately sidestepped after the
conclusion of the Accords. “Entrenched racism,” the economic and political weakness of
progressive sectors, and a “return to normal” after the conclusion of the peace accords –
whereby industrial and military elites returned to dominate politics, particularly as
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The URNG in fact would formally enter the political system as a party with the end of the civil war, and
remains active, if generally uncompetitive as a political force (Allison 2009).
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international influence and interest waned – spelled a quick end to the more emancipatory
ambitions of indigenous rights leaders.
Another legacy of the civil war is a culture of violence that continues to afflict the
populace. As noted above, Guatemala has experienced increasingly high rates of violent
crime over the last decade, reflecting what some observers have called the country’s
“continuum of violence” – an evolution from state-sponsored terrorism and insurgency to
organized crime and street criminality (Erlyck 2001).
Some of the violence is notably the result of turf battles between drug cartels in what
has become a principal thoroughfare in North-South trafficking, and a renewed mano
dura (“iron fist” literally, or “security-first”) government response.47 Gangs have also
been cited as the sources of much criminality in urban centers. According to a 2011
World Bank report on crime and violence in Central America, Guatemala ranks among
the highest in the region in homicide rates, with measureable, negative effects on
attitudes of state institutions (World Bank 2011, López 2010).48 One unanticipated result
of this explosion in crime, and the apparent impunity of criminals in the vast majority of
cases49 has been a rash of a form of vigilante justice referred to as “lynching”
(linchamientos) resulting in yet more bloodshed, crime, and impunity (Godoy 2006).
State violence has recently re-entered the discourse as well, with the UN condemning
deadly clashes between military forces and protesting indigenous groups in the Western
47

The Guatemalan state has, under Pérez-Molina, increased its purchase of military and police weaponry,
as well as new vehicles for its national police force, whose increased visibility (and effectiveness in curbing
crime) is a central goal of the administration.
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According to the World Bank (2011) “Violence and Crime in Central America: A Development
Challenge,” urban areas in and around Guatemala Department (Guatemala City) have experienced crime
rates that are among the highest globally.
49

See Footnote 24
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department of Totonicapán, which as many as six dead and thirty injured on October 4,
2012.50 Even more recently, clashes over mining in San Marcos department, as well as
over the future of new dams in Barillas, Huehuetenango were at times extremely violent,
leaving both citizens and police officers dead, and requiring the President to personally
intervene.51 The forced disappearance of local activists, union leaders, and even radio DJs
openly critical of the government and police tactics, has been routinely reported by
human rights groups throughout 2013 and 2014.
Though these events have made little in the way of international headlines, they have
created a toxic mix of fear, distrust and anger throughout much of the indigenous
community, though this too varies from location to location, and competes with more
immediate concerns and needs, from income to surviving natural disasters like 2014’s
exceptional drought in Central America.52
1.4 Puzzle – Spatial Variation in Governance and Human Development
Perverse discrepancies in human development between indigenous-majority and the
most urban departments clearly exist. But after drilling down more deeply, greater
variation between rural communities (and the many different language groups) reveals
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“UN Human Rights Teams Head to Scene of Deadly Clashes in Western Guatemala,” Available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43218&Cr=&Cr1=#.UIDJxVEsGvs_ (accessed on
October 18, 2012). This event hardened opposition to the state within the municipality of Totonicapán, in
particular, whose well-organized, indigenous-led and inspired 48 Cantones de Totonicapan continue to
memorialize this event, while also remaining perhaps the most vocal and outspoken critic of perceived
injustices, and actively resisting the “incursion” of the state and state offices in its community (based on a
combination of public information as well as fall 2013 interviews with 48 Cantones leadership. I attended
the first anniversary events of the 2012 shootings and interviewed leadership. See Appendix E).
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Regarding Barillas protests: http://americasquarterly.org/node/3656 (accessed September 22, 2014);
regarding other mining activities: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27678668 (accessed
September 25, 2014).
52

See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-centralamerica-drought-idUSKBN0GT2NK20140904
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itself as well. Even after controlling for population size, a preliminary comparison of
municipalities reveals surprisingly drastic variation in Human Development Index scores.
Plotting HDI scores against “state density” index scores similarly reveals that, for a given
density of state services/resources, HDI scores vary dramatically (See Figures 1 and 2
and Table 1, previous chapter). Other data, including illiteracy rates among children of
various ethno-linguistic groups, demonstrate additional, unexplained discrepancies in
performance.53
One possible explanation for these discrepancies includes the variability in local
governance from community to community, or more specifically the differences across
communities in who can influence decision-making at the local level, and the
relationships between municipio officials and non-state actors vying for influence. In
contrast to the narrative of more-or-less uniform oppression and depravity in rural
communities, some scholars have already highlighted the resilience of certain indigenous
communities – by resurrecting traditional alcadías idígenas (or “indigenous mayors”) in
order to make executive decisions that affect local municipal governance, or by selforganizing health services by recruiting traditional promotores (that were not long-before
the targets of government death squads for their leadership roles in rural communities)
(Flores et al. 2009, Danel and Forgia 2005). Rachel Sieder (2011), in her effort to
understand how local populations in El Quiché, Guatemala resolve a desire for
sovereignty (particularly over criminal matters) with the presence and demands of
formal-state institutions, provides special insight into the capacity and influence of one
53

A 2011 Procurador de los Derechos Humanos (PDH) report reveals stark variation in illiteracy across
different ethno-linguistic groups, and vastly different experiences between 2008 and 2011. The
Sipakapense group for example, largely concentrated in the Sipakapa municipio, experienced increased
illiteracy (from 40-68% of its children from 2008-2011), while the Sakapulteca virtually eradicated
illiteracy in the same time frame.
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indigenous organization in a single community. Though as her work also suggests, this
capacity and influence will inevitably vary, and thus conditions, from community to
community.
There is evidence, as well, that the 2002 Ley de Consejos de Desarollo Urbano y
Rural (Urban and Rural Development Councils Law), which created a tiered system of
increasingly local-level councils through which citizens could actively participate in
development planning, has positively impacted perception of the state in some locales
(Flores et al. 2009, Danel and Forgia 2005), whereas in other communities the system has
been captured by local elites and is perceived less positively (Torres-Rivas and Cuesta
2007).54 In certain communities, local, informal leaders have prevented the
implementation of COCODES altogether – citing them as a direct attempt by central
authorities to undermine their own role, and divide the indigenous community.55 In other
communities, locally-organized, semi-formal comités cívicos, or essentially non-affiliated
political campaigns for local offices, have influenced the local political and development
agenda in order to intentionally side-step national political parties and the formal system,
though these frequently dissolve after elections, or are otherwise ephemeral.56
Some scholars have argued that, more generally, indigenous rights movements
throughout Latin America, including in Guatemala, have gained in strength since the end
54

This notion was confirmed in interviews throughout this study. A description of this system is available
here: http://sistemas.segeplan.gob.gt/siscodew/ddpgpl$modulo.indice
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This was most obvious in Totonicapán municipality, where the 48 Cantones are well-established,
influential, and remain vehemently opposed to the idea of state-coordinated COCODES. This was
confirmed over several interviews throughout the Fall of 2013.
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See the following link for an example: http://www.deguate.com/artman/publish/noticias-guatemala/loscomites-civicos-alternativa-para-llegar-al-poder-local.shtml#.UUNfn1cl_0e. Comité Cívico candidates
amounted to 3.5 percent of all candidates running for office in the 2011 general elections, and, were
relatively effective in winning office (16.8% won their respective campaign – the fourth most effective
among all parties)(ASIES 2011).
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of the civil war – this being a perverse outcome of liberal statebuilding that
simultaneously threatened rural indigenous autonomy without compensatory
opportunities to participate in formal, democratic institutions (Yashar 1998). Whatever
gains might be made through such movements are called into question by others,
however, who observe a division between “culturalist” and “popular” wings of the
Guatemalan indigenous movements, with neither adequately penetrating the formal
political realm (Thorpe, Caumartin and Gray-Molina 2006).
Other scholars have focused on the role of civil society in post-war Guatemala,
documenting both qualitative differences in organizational type, function and
cohesiveness, with subsequent variability in “effectiveness” (Kurtenbach 2010, Birle
2000). Finally, others have attempted to document the role of “hidden powers,” or socalled “clandestine groups” that wield power through force and who exploit criminal
networks. This influence, as crime statistics indicate, also varies spatially (Peacock and
Beltrán 2002).
Collectively, the above accounts suggest that, to a yet undetermined degree, there is
variation in the constitution and capacity of local “societies” – or the constellation of
actors influencing governance at the local level – from local NGOs and official
development agencies to more traditional alcadías and even narco-traffickers.
While the state and its aid agency develop nation-wide service delivery programs,
local communities have mobilized themselves, in various ways and with varying
capacity, to address their own needs, or to assist in (or substitute entirely for) state
governance. Guatemala is therefore not a simple story of the effects of either state
capacity or decentralization on human development, but instead one revealing how a
38

patchwork of community-level responses, taking various institutional forms and varying
in credibility and local legitimacy, interacts with national level programming to effect
development.
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FROM A GLOBAL
PERSEPCTIVE

The global development community is currently at a crossroads. As the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) come to a conclusion in 2015, scholars and practitioners
alike are debating the impact and value of the current model and what, if anything, should
replace them. And though certain scholars praise the MDGs for, if nothing else,
reorienting global development from a strictly neoliberal foundation to a more human
development inspired orientation (Hulme 2010), others question the efficacy of the
MDGs, and the effectiveness of foreign assistance more broadly,57 given the rather
glaring oversight of the political dimensions of development in policy (Robinson 2010,
Langford 2010). These critics argue that the lack of a human rights component in the
MDGs, and the continued political disempowerment of the poor in different countries,
hampers more holistic, more robust, and more effective development practice. Others
more plainly wonder whether the capacity of fragile states will ever allow for measurable
progress (Figure 3).58
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William Easterly’s the Tyranny of Experts (2014) builds on his previous work highly critical of the role
of foreign aid in development, and cements his place among a vocal community, which includes Dambisa
Moyo (2009), author of Dead Aid, who actively challenge any connection between multilateral assistance,
foreign aid and development progress.
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Figure 3 was tweeted by Laurence Chandy of the Brookings Institution on December 18, 2013
(https://twitter.com/laurencechandy/status/413329238998011904)
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If there is an element of unity among the different camps, however – whether small
NGOs, think tanks, donor agencies or heads of state from the Global South – it is that
everyone wants (or claims to want) measurable impacts with minimal waste from foreign
aid or development investment, and that poor countries need to be involved more in
international development policymaking and development design.59
Despite calls for “local ownership,” however, and however vague, much of the debate
surrounding a revised development paradigm continues to dwell on either the
international or national dimensions of poverty reduction and development (the “good
governance” paradigm most notably), or legal-formal, policy instruments that overlook
the prevalence and weight of informal institutions.

Figure 3. MDG Progress in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (via Laurence Chandy)
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“Local ownership” has become arguably the normative cornerstone of international development policy
over the last decade – rhetorically through myriad UNDP, OECD and countless NGO policy papers, but
also enshrined in the OECD-brokered 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see, for example:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm). Poor countries have
more recently taken at least symbolic steps in demonstrating leadership – though the advent of the g7+, or a
loose intergovernmental organization of some of the world’s most conflict-affected and poor states
(http://www.g7plus.org/introduction), their work with the International Dialogue to craft a so-called “New
Deal” for aid and development, and now efforts by the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post2015 Development Agenda to solicit input directly from citizens and civil society that will theoretically
inform the drafting of Post-2015 goals (see http://www.myworld2015.org/).
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A diverse, only-just-emerging community has begun to explore the implications of
community level dynamics60 on development specifically (Alexandre et al. 2013, IDS
2010, Pugh 2010) including the role of locally-relevant informal institutions (Unsworth
2009, Hyden 2006). Much of this work remains anecdotal, however, or demonstrates
more the resilience and robustness of a given informal governance mechanism (Owusu
1992, Ake 1996, OECD 2009) rather than an analytical, or explicit, exploration of either
their influence on development outcomes, or how formal state entities and informal
institutions can be reconciled for more effective development governance. As Goran
Hyden writes about African countries, generally (though in this case he could be writing
about virtually any developing country), many are “caught between state and
community,” and that, “finding the right pathway to governance is not easy in such
circumstances” (Hyden 2006: 18). Indeed, the crux of reconciling informal with formal
institutions is oft-evoked, but rarely explored.
Given this crucial yet understudied, and indeed poorly understood dimension to the
conundrum of poverty and human development – combined with an acute desire by
international actors to develop more impactful, pro-poor development programming –
empirical research is essential to informing the current policy debates, as well as critical
for addressing a key, overlooked, knowledge gap in our understanding of the persistence
of poverty and poor human development at the local level. At the same time, a thorough
examination of local-level political dynamics also provides important insights into local
perceptions of, and/or active resistance to, the state – adding nuance to what “state
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Or what some might label “sub-state fragility.”
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fragility” means in rural communities, with implications for development outcomes
nationally.
This project is designed in order to address these specific knowledge gaps and begins
here by first reviewing the vast array of literature that considers governance, local
governance, and state-society relations – tying them to questions of development
whenever possible – before isolating the most resonant findings and situating this project
amongst previous contributions. I ultimately draw most from literature, written
principally as a critique of post-conflict peacebuilding operations, that questions the
preeminence of the unrivaled state as the most viable, durable, and legitimate actor in
development governance. While this project does not go so far as to argue for a “postWestphalian” conception of development, discussed below, it does arrange the state
horizontally alongside other actors – including informal, non-state actors like indigenous
leaders, church leaders and local government officials – as only one element constituting
local development governance, or the process through which key decisions are made and
implemented. The state’s influence, authority and local legitimacy, from this perspective,
can vary, as will the influence of more locally situated actors. However, the agency of
local actors, increasingly noted as influencing crime and violence in different contexts,61
is still limited with respect to human development. In order to analyze the literature
efficiently, I have organized the following review of scholarly contributions along three
dimensions – from state-centric schools of thought to state-society relations literature,
and finally, “society-centric” orientations.
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From semi-formalized community policing efforts in Jamaica, supported by USAID, to ad-hoc civildefense brigades in southern Mexico tackling drug violence, community members have been increasingly
cited as previously overlooked, but important, variables in influencing crime and violence at the
community level. This is increasingly reflected in scholarly literature as well, discussed in more detail
below.
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2.1 State Centric Theories
2.1.1 State Strength, Weakness and Development: State Actors Rule
A contemporary understanding of statebuilding among scholars and practitioners in
the peacebuilding and development field is most often in reference to the phenomenon of
“failed,” “fragile” or “vulnerable” states. These states, it is argued, have either been
dismantled or otherwise ravaged by civil conflict to a degree that their internal capacity to
conduct essential operations like collect taxes, or deliver even basic services – including,
especially, the provision of physical security – is undermined (Ghani, Lockhart and
Carnahan 2005). The diminished capacity of fragile states erodes the legitimacy of state
actors, instigating a negative cycle that, unless reversed, reinforces fragility (OECD
2010). In the aftermath of civil conflict, therefore, it has been increasingly accepted that
“statebuilding” is needed to complement otherwise minimal peacekeeping interventions
in order to establish a more sustainable peace, foster long-term development, and to
construct lasting institutions that help consolidate the central government’s popular
legitimacy.62
Thus despite direct challenges, the conventional wisdom surrounding development
(and even more specifically post-conflict reconstruction, development and peacebuilding)
remains a push to (re)constitute a viable “Weberian” state. In essence, according to Max
Weber, a modern state is a “political organization … [that] successfully claims a
monopoly over the legitimate physical coercion necessary for the implementation of its
laws and decrees” (as quoted in Kalberg 2005: 222). Though Weber, himself, never
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These ideas are evident, for example, tin hen Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace
(1992) which first evoked the term “peacebuilding,” to more recent calls for multidimensional
peacebuilding and “whole of government” approaches to state fragility (Patrick and Brown 2007)
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ascribed to his ideal-type of a modern nation-state any normative implications, it has been
taken by contemporary international agencies, and bi-lateral donors/advisors, to be the
desired endpoint for which to strive.
Specifically, a capable, or “strong” state will, apart from monopolizing violence,
cultivate an efficient public administration that “discharges official business precisely,
unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible” (Ibid: 199). The
“technical superiority” of a rational, legal-formal state apparatus facilitates the
functioning of the free-market economy, and crucially, conveys authority and, ultimately,
legitimacy.
Weber’s conception of the modern state also implies that the state – including “its
laws, statutes and legal procedures – possesses autonomy, despite the perpetual
influences exercised upon it by arrays of groupings with economic interests” (Ibid: 223,
emphasis added). This also implies that public and private spheres are mutually exclusive
and distinct: “States are embedded in society and can shape social relations in ways that
are supportive of state rule,” notes the OECD (2010), “but they are separated through a
relatively clear differentiation between the public domain of the state and the private
domain of the market, family and civil society, with different rules applying to each”
(2010: 17). Theda Skocpol (1979) and Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985) defend
the necessity of studying the state as a critical, autonomous actor in social science
analysis, noting that, “the state properly conceived is no mere arena in which
socioeconomic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing and
military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive
authority” (1979: 12). These attributes – including the conception of the state as an
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autonomous actor with robust agency, coupled with an increased demand by donors and
donor policy for the delivery of basic services throughout the state’s territory (Milliken
and Krause 2002) – make the (re)construction of the state an essential component of
development programming – whether economic, industrial, human, or social.
A focus on state capacity stemming from a Weberian concept of the state also
requires an analysis of rule of law and the use of state force to guarantee citizen security
and promote development. Either high rates of criminal violence, as we see in Guatemala,
or non-state actor use of violence, inherently reflects diminished state capacity, which
necessarily undermines state legitimacy. This leaves some observers to default to what
others call a “security first” perspective of statebuilding and development – whereby,
under conditions of state fragility, “statebuilders can secure a social order simply by
establishing a coercive presence within a fragile state that can protect people, defend
property and adjudicate disputes” (Lake 2010: 40). In fact, though Robert Rotberg argues
that state “strength” and “weakness” can be measured by a state’s ability to provide
crucial “political goods” across a range of dimensions,63 no political good “is as critical
as the supply of security, especially human security…The state’s prime function is to
provide that political good of security” (2003: 3).
Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005), who concern themselves principally with aid
and development, wholeheartedly embrace the most basic tenets of Weberian-based
statebuilding, including their implications for citizen security, noting that “the ultimate
marker (of state fragility) is a loss of the legitimate use of violence by the state and the
63

These include inter alia how states: “organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not
exclusively in furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and
influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between the
constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own internal economic,
political, and social realities” (2003: 2).
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emergence of armed groups that through recourse to violence openly mock the authority
of the state and gain control of various areas of the country” (2005: 1).64
Slightly more nuanced interpretations understand statebuilding outcomes as the
interconnection between state capacity in the realms of rule of law, public finance and
security, and the legitimacy of the state (which, in a circular fashion, depends in turn on
the capacity to adequately provide the above services) (Call with Wyeth 2008). From this
perspective, however, legitimacy varies only in accordance with the ability of the state to
effectively deliver on a range of public and “political” goods, including, more recently,
the provision of “legitimate representation” and “wealth and welfare” (Milliken and
Krause 2002: 754). Indeed from this perspective, the Guatemala statebuilding project
scores quite poorly, which is confirmed by quantitative indicators of state capacity.65
Capacity, however, is but one attribute of the “developmental state” concept of
statebuilding – a dimension of statebuilding in which Guatemala also scores poorly.
Political will, is also essential. The developmental state and its state apparatus, most
obviously embodied by Japan (Johnson 1982), first, and later the East Asian “Tiger”
countries before enacting liberal reforms, marshals resources and coordinates finance in
order to develop a competitive industrial base. It also marries industrial development and
employment growth with human capital investments in education and job training
(Leftwich 1994, Onis 1991, Evans 1995, Woo-Cummings 1999). The developmental
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In the most dire circumstances, the conventional wisdom of statebuilding as presented thus far motivates
some scholars to defend what they perceive to be the significant benefits, if temporary, of the most overt
forms of external assistance including “neotrusteeships” (Fearon and Laitin 2004) and a “shared
sovereignty” (Krasner 2004) of failing states, in order to provide both the security and capacity of state
institutions during what are imagined to be temporary episodes of state weakness.
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These include the 2009/2010 UNDP Human Development Report on Guatemala, Inter-American
Development Bank statistics and the World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators” for Guatemala
(1996-2010). Metrics largely reflect the institutional capacity and effectiveness of the central government,
including scores of corruption, rule of law and regulatory capacity.
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state in any sense – between an economic oligarchy, demonstrated unwillingness to pass
land or economic reforms and a violent social cleavage – is utterly absent in Guatemala,
and major source of the country’s ongoing development failures (Schneider 2012).
Despite minor amendments, however, statebuilding for development continues to
hinge on assumptions that conflate state capacity with legitimacy and citizen security. A
narrow conception of the Weberian state, in fact, continues to dominate policymaking
and practice. From the DRC, where the UN continues to strengthen the offensive
capabilities of regional peacekeepers while explicitly calling on the government to reform
its security sector for development purposes,66 to Guatemala, where the current
government has invested heavily in armament and vehicles for its police force, and
military helicopters for drug interdiction, state security remains at the center of
development policy, and state capacity the telos.67
2.1.2 Decentralization and Development: The State Goes Local
Another important element of statebuilding concerns institutional and state design, or
“organizational arrangements.” For example, “whereas capacity refers to the ability of the
police or the government’s tax collectors to discharge their responsibilities, state design
refers to where and how these state powers are allocated or arranged” (Call with Wyeth
2008: 9). This has special resonance in Guatemala, where, as in much of Latin America,
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See: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2098.pdf (accessed December 5, 2013).
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UNSC resolution 2098 created the “force intervention brigade” for DRC in the most recent effort to
increase the offensive capabilities of peacekeeping forces there, and to encourage security sector reform by
state forces. Language in the resolution directly links these efforts to long-term human development.
Similarly, Guatemala’s recent state purchases of arms (see: http://www.insightcrime.org/newsbriefs/guatemala-to-invest-$28-million-arming-national-police) and vehicles (see:
http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_Announces_Purchase_of_700_Police_Car
s) is at the core of its country’s development policy.

48

strong “centralist” systems of state authority have been increasingly decentralized, either
in hopes of perceived fiscal efficiency, or more effective democratic governance (BrinkHalloran 2009, Escobar-Lemmon 2001, Torres-Rivas and Cuesta 2007).
Decentralization, in fact, has been as fundamental to the global contemporary
development paradigm as free-market reforms or secular-democratization, with it now
having been implemented in a diverse array of countries simultaneously throughout the
1980s and 1990s (Badhan and Mookherjee 2006, Manor 1999, Brosio 2000).68
Decentralization’s contemporary roots69 are in public economic thinking and fiscal
federalism literature,70 which theorizes public goods being distributed more efficiently
based on comparative social welfare functions, or the diverging needs of citizens from
different sub-regions. From a democracy-building and fragile-state perspective,
decentralization should additionally “promote a sense of autonomy in citizens, enhance
social order by promoting the legitimacy of the state, and limit pressures for separatism
by diverse regions or ethnic groups” (Badhan and Mookherjee 2006: 4).
With respect to human development policy, specifically, strengthening local
governance71 is at the cornerstone of UNDP practice because “it enhances people’s
68

The World Bank has regularly cited decentralization as a fundamental component of effective pro-poor
governance and improved service delivery to the poor. Examples include Chapter 5 of the 1999/2000
World Development Report (WDR), titled “Decentralization: Rethinking Government,” as well as Chapter
10 (“Public Sector Underpinnings of Service Reform”) in WDR 2004 and Chapter 7 of WDR 1997,
“Bringing the State Closer to People.”
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Arguments in favor of devolving power to subnational authorities can be found as early as Montesquieu’s
The Spirit of the Laws (1748) and The Federalist Papers (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1788).
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This includes the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), which models fully-informed agents with
heterogeneous tastes assessing variations in public good provisions between communities. Subsequent
work building on Tiebout includes Oates (1972, 1985), Elinor Ostrom and co-authors (Ostrom and
Whitaker 1973, 1974; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne 1993), and Dowding and John (1994).
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In this paper, strengthening “local governance” can be both an explicit goal of decentralization, or an
independent goal, for the purposes discussed above. These ideas are discussed concurrently in this section.
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capabilities to participate in decision-making” and is “instrumentally significant because
of the contribution improved local governance can make to service delivery and standards
of living” (UNDP 2010: vii, UN Millennium Project 2005). This link between human
development and decentralization has been supported by empirical studies as well. Habibi
et al. (2003) explain improvements in infant mortality rates and educational retention
with devolution of power to Argentine provinces. Shankar and Shaw (2003) observe a
decrease in regional inequality across 26 countries after decentralization allowed for
increased political competition. Johnson, Deshinkgar and Start (2005) find evidence that
regional decentralization efforts in India empowered the local poor through specific
programs including rice subsidies and micro-credit.
Jean Paul Faguet (2012) builds on over a decade’s work in Bolivia in his especially
thorough analysis of decentralization there. Faguet utilizes an econometric analysis,
combined with in-country, qualitative case studies in order to compare across Bolivian
communities after the implementation of dramatic decentralization reforms in 1994. His
findings are nuanced (discussed more below), but demonstrate a dramatic difference in
the nature of government spending after decentralization, including a “massive shift of
resources in favor of smaller, poorer districts” (2012: 25). He also finds that, following
the landmark reform, “local governments’ investment decisions were far more responsive
to local needs than central government’s had been before” (2012: 45). Numerous other
studies find a positive relationship between decentralization and varied outcomes
including pro-poor and democratic governance.72
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These include Parker’s (1995) examination of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, Rowland’s (2001) and
Blair’s (2000) documentation of improvements in democratic governance after decentralization in Bolivia,
Honduras, India, Mali Mexico, the Philippines and Ukraine. Campbell (2001) goes so far as to argue that
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Much of the literature is critical of decentralization’s ability to affect desired
outcomes, however. Local communities, for instance, need to meet basic prerequisites in
order for decentralization to benefit the poor. These include a “well-educated, politically
aware citizenry,” an absence of high inequality, “law and order” and the presence of both
formal (constitutional) and informal (civil society) oversight mechanisms that prevent
excessive advantage accruing to select electoral candidates (Bardhan and Mookherjee
2006: 9, Olowu and Wunsch 2004) – yet these criteria are rarely met at the local level in
developing countries (Saito 2008). Moreover, in the absence of any one of these
conditions, “the outcome of decentralization can be inferior to that of corrupt and
inefficient central bureaucracy” (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006: 9, original emphasis).
Francis and James (2003) argue that decentralization in Uganda facilitated elite capture
rather than responsive governance. Porter (2002) argues much the same for sub-Saharan
Africa more broadly. Several authors have argued that a lack of human capital and
technical capacity, along with local conditions including inequality, facilitate such elite
capture after decentralization (Crook and Sverrisson 1999, Smith 1985, Montero and
Samuels 2004). Thus even within decentralization literature, which does not
fundamentally challenge the authority, nor conception, of state actors as the principal
agents affecting development, the influence of local, informal dynamics on outcomes,
diverging from their theoretical script, emerges.
Faguet (2012), who as noted above demonstrates a positive relationship between
decentralization and local pro-development expenditures, generally, also observes how

decentralization throughout Latin America has revolutionized local governance, resulting in increased
political participation and more capable local leadership.
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local actors and political grievances can negatively influence governance in individual
municipalities. Specifically, based on extensive field work in two different communities,
he puts forth a theory of local governance distinguishing between “good” and “bad” cases
of local governance after decentralization, which he attributes to the quality and vibrancy
of each the local economy, local politics and local civil society. These factors are in part
influenced by historical trajectories and geography as well.
By explicitly demonstrating diverse outcomes across different Bolivian municipalities
from a single, national policy, Faguet raises (and indeed, entertains) the possibility that
local political dynamics affect national outcomes. He argues, in fact, that “the ‘outputs’
of decentralization within any given country are largely determined by local-level
political and institutional dynamics,” and that decentralization “sets into motion a
substantial number of largely independent processes” (2012: 200). His conclusions from
this, however, are unsurprising, and even tautological: that in essence good outcomes are
the result of good local conditions, and that bad outcomes result from bad governance.
Faguet’s study is nevertheless an important reference point for this paper, given its
explicit acknowledgement of how local political dynamics influence centrally directed
initiatives, and by acknowledging state limitations at the local level. The project
described in this dissertation, however, differs from Faguet’s in important ways:
First, where Faguet compares two very different communities, and subsequently finds
very different outcomes, the influence of potentially unobserved variables is not
explained, nor explored. This dissertation explicitly compares across similar communities
to more rigorously control for endogeneity. Second, whereas Faguet’s econometric
analysis uses local spending as its dependent variable, comparing the nature of spending
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before and after decentralization, this project relies instead on development indicators
themselves, or those reflecting the well-being of citizens – given skepticism of both
spending statistics themselves, and the indirect, sometimes erroneous, conflation of
money-spent with real development outcomes. Faguet’s insistence, however, that “within
a given country, some local governments are more responsive or effective than others,”
and that we lack a robust theoretical explanation for these differences (2012: 200),
provides one justification for the work pursued in this study.
To summarize thus far, both development theory and policy remain rooted in the need
to (re)construct strong, viable states – or those that most efficiently deliver basic
resources and provide security and safe environments for its citizenry. Even
decentralization is less a critique of the state capacity notion per se, but instead extends
the reach, territorial penetration and predominance of the central state, crowding out the
influence and legitimacy of non-state actors, if in theory responding to the needs of local
citizens more efficiently.
Indeed, states do matter for development, and Guatemala’s state apparatus is in need
of reform, but scholars have begun to question both the theoretical and practical
implications of a Weberian state for development – under the context of globalization on
the one hand, but also given the persistence, durability and influence of non-state actors –
from organized criminal networks to tribal leaders – in diverse settings. The notion that
states can be outmaneuvered by local actors was hinted at above, in literature that
nevertheless conceptualizes the state as an autonomous agent with direct influence over
sub-national outcomes. The following literature challenges this conception more
profoundly, with important implications for the research described in this paper.
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2.2 State-Society Relations
Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994) explore the nature of state-society relations explicitly,
arguing that local vectors of domination, and local conditions – whether religious, illicit,
or violent – shape the state as much as the state shapes society. They underscore both the
mutually constitutive component of state-society relations and introduce the key elements
of time and history in the statebuilding process. In demonstrating how social forces can
act upon the state, communities and individuals are also assigned agency, with which
they can influence outcomes.
2.2.1 Bringing State-Society Back In: Influencing State Outcomes From Elites to
Villages
The state, in this depiction, is neither a black box, nor the autonomous Skocpolian
institution that coerces or redistributes resources unilaterally. Instead, states grapple with
diverse social forces inconsistently while they attempt to establish authority and
domination. State-society relations, according to Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994), fall
somewhere between two extreme ideal types – total domination by the state on one end
of a spectrum, to “disengagement,” or when the state altogether fails to penetrate local
social forces and civil society.
Scholars have since documented how complicated state-society relations operate
empirically. Kenneth Menkhaus, for example, describes “hinterland” state failure, or the
phenomenon of “ungoverned” peripheral regions that a strong central authority might
intentionally neglect for fear of the political cost of imposition (Menkhaus 2010).
Elsewhere, Menkhaus (2008) describes a “mediated state” in northern Kenya, where
peace and security was informally (but with Nairobi’s blessings) sub-contracted to a local
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women’s organization that had previously brokered a cease-fire between warring clans.  
The notion that the state might informally devolve power to non-state actors is further
substantiated by Acemoglu, Santos and Robinson (2012), who observe an electoral
symbiosis between political parties and paramilitaries in Colombia, whereby preferential
policies are targeted at paramilitaries in hopes that they will help deliver votes from their
controlled territory.
In a post-conflict statebuilding context, Zürcher et al. (2012) demonstrate the
limitations of externally-led democratization efforts. The extent of a transition to
democracy, these authors argue, is less about outside expenditures and capacity-building,
but hinges instead on the in-country “demand for democracy” among local political
actors and elites. Though stopping short of calling for “local ownership” as much
development literature ambiguously demands, the authors nevertheless demonstrate that
local demands, and context, can overwhelm the resources and programming of external
interventionists. Other scholars have repeatedly argued that the intrusive nature of
externally-programmed statebuilding discredits local officials, undermines development,
and inhibits more legitimate outcomes (Chopra 2002).
State-society relations have been conceptualized altogether differently, however –
from North et al.’s (2007) “limited access orders” to DiJohn and Putzel’s “political
settlements,” which in essence depict the state not as an autonomous and largely
unrivaled actor, but rather “founded on a historically determined balance of power
between contending interests” (2009:14). DiJohn and Putzel, in fact, explain stark
differences in the developmental trajectories of Costa Rica and Guatemala since 1948,
including their contemporary welfare and tax bases, based on political settlements – in
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Costa Rica between a revolutionary political party and a newly empowered countryside
which disbanded an oligarchic elite, versus an alliance of landed elites in Guatemala
which continues to hamstring the state’s taxing powers and inhibit a social welfare policy
(Schneider 2012).
Development, and even state fragility itself, from this conceptualization of
statebuilding, depends on the quality and durability of foundational “elite bargains.”
These underpin political settlements and are frequently “durable and adaptable to
challenges over time, allowing the state to establish and maintain control over coercive
power, administrative authority and popular allegiance (e.g., state resilience)” (Ibid: 15).
Additional research suggests that when bargains are “inclusive of the major contending
elites and protect their shared economic interests,” they have the best chance to endure
over time (Wood 2000, Acemoglu et al 2003). These broad trends that determine
statebuilding trends regionally, or sectorally, however, do not address the microvariations under investigation in this study.
Another conception of state-society relations also characterizes statebuilding and the
institutions that result as being highly tense political processes. Catherine Boone (2003),
for example, employs a choice-theoretic model in rural Africa in order to explain
institutional choice, or “variation in state-making patterns” (2003:20). Though Boone
does not explicitly refer to elite bargains, she does underscore the role of local elites, and
the legitimacy of communal hierarchy, as being key determinants in what explains
institutional outcomes. Specifically, “the extent of rural social hierarchy determines rural
elites’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the state: the more the hierarchy, the greater the rural
elite’s bargaining power” (Ibid: 23). In addition, greater dependence upon the state (or
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the degree of economic autonomy of said rural elites) “creates structural conditions
conducive to collaboration between rural elites and the center” (Ibid). These factors in
combination, according to Boone, help explain institutional outcomes across time and
space, from power-sharing at the local level to “usurpation,” “administrative occupation”
or “non-incorporation” (Ibid: 32-33).
For the purposes of this paper, Boone’s focus on formal and informal relations
between governmental and non-governmental entities is essential. Though her work,
along with that of DiJohn and Putzel’s, focuses squarely on the role of elites, she also
recognizes more generally that “decisive struggles take place within rural society, and
between rural interests and the state.” Borrowing from Mahmood Mandami (1996), she
also argues that the state-society approach has overlooked political tensions within the
countryside, that state authority depends upon everyday village politics or uneven
distributions of power within rural society, and that previous assumptions of state
autonomy have overestimated the capacity of outsiders to shape local politics (Boone
2003: 32). Boone strives to explain variations in state-society relations across space in
Africa, but she also helps underscore the value and necessity of studying communitylevel politics in order to understand national-level developments, while beginning to blur
the otherwise neat distinction between state and society.
2.2.2 Governance and Post-Westphalian Development
Increasingly, in fact, scholars are questioning both the conception of the modern state
as a “democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law” on both normative and
analytical grounds (Risse 2011, Migdal and Shlichte 2005). Thomas Risse, for example,
argues that “such conceptualizations of statehood … obscure what we consider the most
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relevant research question: Who governs for whom, and how are governance services
provided under conditions of weak statehood? (Risse 2011: 4). Indeed, reconceptualizing
the problematique as one of governance under conditions of “limited statehood,”73 versus
state fragility or state failure, per se, is more analytically fruitful at the local level, in
particular, where “various combinations of state and nonstate actors ‘govern’ in areas of
limited statehood” (Ibid: 11). This has significant implications with respect to
development studies given that projects and resource delivery is ultimately tested at the
village level. The concept of limited statehood, and the governance thereof, has particular
relevance to this study and its cases under investigation.
Governance, or the “interactive processes of multi-stakeholders (including
government) in order to resolve common problems” (Saito 2008: 6), acknowledges, but
otherwise de-emphasizes the exclusive role of the state in coordinating or producing
binding rules, or collective goods – the “governance without government” conception of
coordination and decision-making (Risse 2011: 9).74
A “governance approach” thus discards the dichotomous depiction of strictly state
and society, or public and private, incorporating into the analysis, instead, the influence
of “different constituent members including public, private, and civil organizations in
order to resolve common political, economic and social issues” (Saito 2003: 6, Risse
2011, Ladwig et al. 2007). This approach also underscores the interactive processes
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By Risse’s definition: “While areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognized
states…, it is their domestic sovereignty that is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood concern
those parts of a country in which central authorities lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and
decisions…” (Risse 2011: 4).
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Though Risse rightly notes that governance can, even under conditions of limited statehood, include
“steering by the state” (“governance by government”) and governance “via cooperative networks of public
and private actors” (“governance with government”) (2011: 7). I am intentionally highlighting how a
“governance approach” opens the door for analyzing the role of a wider set of actors, especially at the
community, or village, level.
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between stakeholders – which include semi-formal and informal actors, as well, as this
study demonstrates – that constitute decisionmaking.
A governance approach can cause analytical problems, however. First, as Risse
(2011) points out, and as is already suggested above, implicit assumptions of a “publicprivate” distinction are less meaningful under conditions of limited statehood, where nonstate actors, for example, can simultaneously provide public services and undermine
security.75 Risse calls on researchers, therefore, to “investigate empirically who serves as
a governance actor – irrespective of a formal position in the political system or in
society” (2011: 15). This provides yet additional justification for the empirically-based
investigation this study pursues.
Second, a “governance approach” under conditions of limited statehood assumes that
governance actors are working for the collective good, when frequently public services
are transformed into club or private goods, or steered towards certain groups – ethnic,
tribal, religious, or for vote buying in the cases detailed below in this project – while
others are excluded. Risse argues that the more inclusive the social group for which
goods are provided, the more that this is “governance” and not “racketeering” (Chojnacki
and Branovic 2007, 2011). By isolating, in this paper, how communities and governance
actors respond to a well-documented and pressing public need – high local rates of
chronic hunger, poor schooling and poor basic health services in this case – this project
again accounts for this potential conceptual challenge.
Finally, Risse frets that a governance approach overlooks the fact that, under
condition of limited statehood as in Guatemala, non-state actors frequently substitute for
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Risse uses the example of Hamas.
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government’s absence – by providing security or vaccines, etc. – rather than compliment
for them under a consolidated state’s “shadow of hierarchy” (or the implicit threat of
regulation and sanction by a strong, capable state, which is mostly absent under
conditions of limited statehood). Risse’s answer is to suspect that a “functional
equivalent” of the shadow of hierarchy – from international norms, legal standards and
even international or weak state presence – helps explain why we nevertheless see
governance in areas of limited statehood.
In the case studies detailed below, however, such factors are largely absent at the
village level, and indeed the state’s coercive influence is minimal. Though state offices
and clinics exist in each community, there is virtually no international presence that
might constitute a functional equivalent of the “shadow of hierarchy.” This makes the
following case studies yet more important, as exploring the scope and nature of
governance without such a “shadow of hierarchy” should thus augment our analytical
insights into the influence of non-state and informal actors on local governance for
development.
This section strongly suggests that “governance with a small-g” exists in remote
territories where state influence is lacking. In contrast to an assumption of anarchy in
conventional statebuilding wisdom, with clear implications for development, local
communities can instead actively “forge systems of security, law, deterrence of crime,
conflict management and mutual support” (Menkhaus 2010: 182-183). Local norms,
customs, perceptions and history can mandate outcomes at the local level that frequently
resist, or otherwise complicate technical statebuilding “formulae.”
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This realization has lead certain scholars to advocate for a yet broader understanding
of the plurality of institutions, communities and overlapping perceptions of authority and
legitimacy that complicate statebuilding as conventionally conceived (Albrecht et al.
2011). The following section builds on Risse, Saito and the governance approach, and
explores how “society-centric” literature informs this study, before the paper turns
specifically to the puzzle under investigation.
2.3 Society-Centric Perspectives on Development: Agency, Resistance, Social Cohesion
and Outcomes
Departing from a post-Westphalian concept of statehood, which questions the
autonomy of states in local contexts, a diverse set of literature has increasingly refocused
the level of analysis to social groups, communities and even households and individuals.
Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2004), for example, prefer an analysis of governance
“networks” that better captures the plurality of actors, variety of mechanisms, and
temporal dynamism in determining governance outcomes:
“The venerable and conveniently simple notion that
governance is the province of the independent state and its
subdivisions operating through formally established,
universal and reasonably stable legal modes is plainly
insufficient to deal with the practical and conceptual tasks
associated with good governance” (2004: 3).
“Nodes” of governance are entities where ways of thinking about governance
(“mentalities”), methods (“technologies”), resources and structure coalesce to form a
somewhat unavoidable conduit through which governance is conducted.
“It need not be a formally recognized or legally constituted entity,” the authors note,
but it must have enough durability and structure to channel resources, mentalities and
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technologies and effect outcomes. Through diverse cases studies,76 the authors contend
that nodal governance better explains outcomes than top-down legal-formal regulation,
state coercion, or market efficiency. Governance can therefore take place separately from
the state, though at times interacting with the state as noted above, or by channeling
certain state resources through a more powerful node. Nodal governance helps underscore
the complexity of interactions and actors that produce governance outcomes, including at
the local level. But the variability of capacity, power and influence that nodes exhibit
over time and space makes using “nodal governance” as a theoretical explanation rather
difficult.
A failure to account for the role and influence of non-state and customary actors in
post-conflict statebuilding, specifically, according to Albrecht et al. (2011), will continue
to result in sub-optimal (or plain broken) state-legal punitive justice systems, fail to
account for local needs and desires, privilege a normative understanding of the unitary,
rational state (coupled with an assumption that it will dominate all other political orders),
and reinforce a dichotomous understanding of the “right” and “true” state, versus the
“non-state” (Ibid: 14). This perspective does not disabuse the importance of the state.
Instead, “the challenge is to substitute the notion of statebuilding in the narrow sense of
building the capacity of state institutions and of centralizing authority in one single unit
with a more flexible concept that can encompass the pluralism of local norms and
institutions (Ibid). As applied to Guatemala, Albrecht et al.’s arguments would account
for at least some of the persistent levels of crime, impunity, poverty and hunger in post-
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One being the agreement on the WTO’s Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
and the other a community level peace committee in South Africa.
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war Guatemala, 18 years after the Comprehensive Peace Accords,77 and despite
surprisingly robust foreign assistance and aid flows.78
Another emerging strand of literature, formed mostly as a critique of the “liberal
peace” and modern peacebuilding and post-conflict statebuilding operations, explores the
notion of “hybridity.” Hybridity in political science is borrowed from anthropology,
where scholars are attempting to understand how different elements of globalization
impact diverse, non-Western communities (Kraidy 2005, Hutnyk 1997, Bhaba 1994). In
political science, a “hybrid peace” and “hybrid political orders” incorporate elements of
customary and indigenous practice and understanding, and are both routine (if
unanticipated) outcomes of even large-footprint external peacebuilding operations
(Clements et al. 2007; Mac Ginty 2008, 2010), and preferable outcomes (Richmond
2010, Pugh 2006). Routine – because as already observed – history, local agency, and
understanding is not passively paved over by liberal statebuilding or centrally-located,
standardized legal-formalism; preferable – because liberalism has failed to deliver
adequate peace and development, and because the inclusion of local “rights, needs,
customs and kinships” brings with it the potential to “enable political mobilization to deal
with everyday issues (and) to build representative institutions and locally-resonant forms
of statehood” (Richmond 2010: 668-669). In the best cases, hybridity is an uncontensted
order of governance that blends locally resonant forms of traditional leadership (chiefs
for example), with formal-legal systems of representation and legislation that provides
sustainability and durability (Brown 2006, Boege et al. 2008).
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See footnotes 6 and 7.
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See footnotes 11 and 12.
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Whether scrutinizing the relationship between external statebuilders and the “liberal
peace,” or the plurality of local actors and their overlapping customs, traditions and
power, hybridity considers the degree and capacity to which local  actors can resist,
control, or adapt to exogenous statebuilding projects and the emerging central (formal)
authority that is being constructed. This is both context-specific, and depends in part on
the degree to which the autonomy of local agents survived civil conflict – an important
consideration for this project as it investigates governance in Guatemalan  communities
with varying experiences during the civil war (Mac Ginty 2010: 402).
The “institutional plurality” and “hybridity” revisions of modern statebuilding after
civil conflict, therefore, refer implicitly to qualitative differences in state-society
relations, but crucially, endow local actors (at the village-level) with greater levels of
agency than other conceptions of state-society relations, even as they endure tremendous
pressure to conform and embrace alien forms of authority and regulation.
The customs, traditions, and locally-based understandings of authority and legitimacy
can, even unintentionally, thwart the most well-funded and well-implemented,
internationally-assisted statebuilding projects from achieving their objectives of
establishing a unitary state that dominates politics and security throughout its territory.
It was hybridity literature that first informed this project in its early stages, in fact,
because of its thorough re-thinking of state-society relations, and its emphasis on “the
local.” Hybridity, however, remains largely theoretically-inspired – borrowing especially
from critical theory in order to deconstruct the motives of Western powers in peace
operations, as well as a perceived over-reliance on both market and electoral reforms for
stability in post-conflict states (Pugh 2010). As illustrated above, hybridity literature is
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also principally concerned with the interaction between national and international actors,
reducing differences between regions or communities to a rather superficial discussion of
the “everyday” political practices across post-conflict countries like Kosovo, or East
Timor for example, as a whole (Richmond 2010). Moreover, while hybridity focuses on
peacebuilding, and the quest for an “emancipatory” rather than liberal peace, it says little
about human development, and improving the living conditions of the world’s poorest – a
trait curiously in keeping with the wider “post-conflict reconstruction and development”
literature that frequently bundles “post-conflict reconstruction” with “development,” but
with little substantive follow-through on the development dimension of post-conflict
society. Indeed, as seen above, the literature, and empirics, has steadily complicated the
notion of a unitary state in complex settings, but curiously, only with respect to peace and
conflict, with virtually no connection between this emerging consensus and its
implications for sustainable human development.
This paper takes from hybridity the notion that local customs, and resistance to state
encroachment, can be incredibly durable, and that the modern state will frequently lack
credibility and authority in a village context where competing values persist.
The durability of resistance is taken up by other scholars not bound by the goals of
hybridity literature specifically. James C. Scott (2000), for instance, has long examined
why modern states have consistently failed, historically, in some of their most strategic
plans to simplify, codify and impose order on otherwise complex natural and civic
ecologies. Specifically, when state efforts at “legibility” combine with high-modernist
ideology, an authoritarian state and a “prostrate” civil society, hegemonic social ordering
projects – from agricultural projects to village resettlements – are doomed to failure,
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largely because they “exclude the necessary role of local knowledge and know-how”
(2000: 5).
In the context of modern Guatemala, in many respect Scott’s four conditions remain
intact! Between its conscious effort to dam northern rivers, sell controversial mining
rights and subsidize heart of palm plantations, the Guatemalan state continues to
commodify natural resources that local indigenous groups find sacred. Guatemala’s
steadfast adherence to the most ardent laissez-faire social policies reflects the state’s
ideological commitment to market economics. Guatemala, despite consolidation in terms
of elections, remains semi-democratic at best. Finally, civil society, while symbolically
robust, remains marginalized in the wider policymaking discourse. Moreover, the state’s
values clash diametrically with the traditional values in many Mayan communities,
explaining in part the gulf in trust that separates state and society.
In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott (2009) convincingly argues that the historic
“hill peoples” of Burma – long stigmatized as “primitive,” “backwards,” and “stateless”
by the state itself – are in reality “’barbarians’ by design.” “Most, if not all, the
characteristics that appear to stigmatize hill peoples,” Scott writes, “… far from being the
mark of primitives left behind by civilization, are better seen in a long view as
adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation” (Scott 2009: 9).
From this historical perspective, resistance to the state, or a fervent and entrenched
distrust of state, is in fact the “real” and natural disposition of rural populations, whose
culture and values clash diametrically with state goals of usurpation and order. Indeed
even the subsistence farming and religious practices that characterize so many of the
indigenous communities of Guatemala today are, according to this perspective, long66

standing and conscious practices – however discredited by the rhetoric of state authorities
past and present (Lovell and Lutz 1996).
Alas, only recently has empirical work attempted to embrace these society-centric
notions and tie them to development policy specifically. Contributors to Cammett and
MacLean’s (2014) The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare, collectively catalogue the
diversity of actors, and the myriad contexts, in which non-state actors, from oil
companies to terrorist organizations, provide health and other basic services. Their work,
however insightful and crucial, does not examine the impact on well-being of individual
populations, however, outside of a public policy-like considerations of equity. In An
Upside-down View of Governance, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 2010)
argues in favor of a recasting of the analysis of state-centric governance for development,
much in line with Risse’s views above, or what they call a “public authority” approach.
“In short,” the report argues that, “‘public authority’ focuses on functions rather than on
form, and is more neutral about the processes and actors involved – inside or outside the
formal state, and across the public-private divide” (IDS 2010: 10).
Drawing from comparative work in Pakistan and India, a chapter dedicated to the
affect of “Informal Local Governance Institutions” (ILGIs) on local development
outcomes finds that ILGIs are “persistent and influential,” that they can provide goods
and services, but also that they can “entrench the interests of dominant groups and
perpetuate poverty” (IDS 2010: 51). ILGIs themselves vary in form and function –
ranging from informal village councils to an elected officer of land-owning elites – and
perform differently based on their historic origins, iterations, as well as their interactions
with state actors (an observation substantiated in Guatemala by Klick 2013). More
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generally, however, “their relations with the formal state are ambiguous, variable and
often contested” (Ibid).
The Institute of Development Studies therefore embraces the Risse notion that diverse
actors influence governance, with implications specifically for the well-being of citizens,
but while also recognizing the potential diversity of local informal arrangements
including potentially detrimental ones for the poor – dispensing with a tendency to overromanticize the local while also further justifying the need for further research into the
influence of ILGIs on development. As the report itself concludes: “The research moves
the discussion away from the emotive issues associated with ‘traditional’ institutions, and
offers a more neutral approach to thinking about the bewildering diversity of informal
local governance” (Ibid).
Finally, acknowledging the local institutional and customary influence on governance
underscores both the potential for variability in outcomes when formal rules confront
different local contexts, and the necessity of compatibility between formal rules and
informal institutions for development effectiveness (de Soysa and Jütting 2006). As de
Soysa and Jütting observe, “the point here is that changing formal (macro- and microlevel) institutions that might be compatible with particular structural forms might yet not
fit very well with informal institutions given underlying cultural factors that remain
resistant to change” (2006: 5). Specifically, development may depend greatly “on how
informal institutions moderate formal ones as they affect outcomes” (North 2005, as cited
in de Soysa and Jütting 2006).
This notion has been converted into a typology of informal institutions by Helmke
and Levitsky (2004), which depicts plausible outcomes from formal-informal institutional
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interactions (see Figure 2.3.1). As Figure 2.3.1 indicates, informal institutions can
augment the performance of formal institutions, as well as accommodate, substitute, or in
the worst cases, “compete” with formal institutions.

Figure 4. Helmke and Levitsky's (2004) Typology of Informal Institutions

As discussed in the Introduction, this project borrows the notion of competition and
complementarity between informal and formal rules in order to frame the interaction
between state and local forces at the community level. This notion is adapted in order to
understand development outcomes.
Specifically, this project demonstrates that state-local complementarity – or when
local-level institutions, both formal and informal, are able to cooperate with state actors
in order to meaningfully distribute resources – is a crucial determinant in improving local
human development outcomes.
2.4 Additional considerations – Political Culture, Trust and Geospatial approaches to
development
Other literature does not fit neatly into the rubric of state or society-centric
approaches to development, but are nevertheless relevant to the research question. This
includes questions of political culture, trust and, finally, geospatial analyses.
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2.4.1 Political Culture and Trust
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba ushered in the behavioral revolution with The
Civic Culture, which endeavored to explain differences in levels of democracy and
industrial development across countries with respect to the “degree to which cooperative
interpersonal behavior” is valued (1963: 284). Almond and Verba were widely criticized
for assuming that a supposed “culture,” based on rudimentary surveys, operated
unidirectionally on institutions and politics (Pateman 1970, Barry 1978). Inglehart (1990)
has since revised this position within political culture theory, allowing for the causal
pathway to operate in both directions, however analytically unhelpful this might be
(Johnson 2003). In contrast to what is under investigation in this study in Guatemala,
political culture theory even in its most modern iterations79 uses sample surveys from
which to draw conclusions about entire countries and prevailing attitudes. Raw data from
culture surveys in Guatemala were unhelpful for this study, given the small samples from
each community that were utilized to draw conclusions regarding the whole of
Guatemala.
More directly related to this project, given its within-country comparisons, is Robert
Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993). Putnam argues that varying levels of
democratic performance across twenty different Italian regional governments is best
explained by social capital – or the collective influence of civic values, local norms, and
crucially, informal networks. The robustness of these networks relies on levels of
interpersonal trust, which in turn, according to Putnam, lower transaction costs and
“facilitate cooperation.” But, again, without a clear causal pathway connecting “broad
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Including the World Values Survey, for example.
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social benefits” from a social practice, the value of trust as an explanatory value is
undermined, and even lacks “intellectual merit” (Farrell 2009: 7). Moreover, social
capital as a social science enterprise lacks definitional clarity and scope, too frequently
“explaining-away” the otherwise unexplained (Fine 2010). Indeed as this study
demonstrates as well, perverse forms of complementarity are also possible, breaking the
overly-simplified notion that ‘all things good hang together.’
Trust, nevertheless, remains an important element of development literature,
particularly with respect to industrial development (Burchell and Wilkinson 1996, Lane
and Bachman 1997). Farrell (2009), after contrasting competing Italian industrial clusters
and the Sicilian mafia, argues that “thicker” forms of trust grow out of a context of robust
informal rules, which themselves proliferate in the absence of formal institutions. Others
argue that such a tidy correlation between informal institutions and trust overlooks a
more dynamic interplay between formal and informal institutions, and that “good” versus
“bad” governance is a more appropriate starting point (Rothstein 2011, Rhodes 2011). As
Rhodes notes (citing Rothstein 2011), “social trust and quality of government institutions
‘hang together’” (Rhodes 2011: 4).
A plausible argument could be made that, between the “good” and “bad” cases under
examination in this study, either trust in local government or between state and local
actors explains differences in development outcomes. But if, as Rothstein notes, trust is
more the result of the interplay between informal rules and formal institutions, which
ultimately result in either “good” or “bad” governance, we are no better equipped,
analytically, to interpret what is happening in Guatemala. It remains unclear from where
trust emerges, nor the sequential steps linking trust and development. In essence, each of
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the communities investigated in this study operate under conditions of “bad governance”
– with distrust in local government pervasive everywhere.80 Expectations, however,
which are key component of trust, and the result of more robust informal institutions
(Farrell 2009), might indeed help us understand the effect of emerging norms in certain,
more “successful” communities. As is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Four,
an indicator of “social cohesion” is included in the quantitative component, though the
order of cause and effect remains uncertain.
2.4.2 Geospatial Analyses of Within-Country Development
In 1889, Charles Booth (1902) created a map depicting the relative prosperity of
Victorian London by city block, color coding each block on a scale ranging from “vicious
poverty” to “wealthy,” or the “servant keeping class.”81 But contemporary work on subnational variation in development and its drivers is generally limited. Possibly the most
ambitious effort has been conducted by Gennailoi et al. (2011), who analyze a database
of 1569 subnational regions spanning 110 countries. In a cross-regional analysis of
geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants on regional
development, the authors find that human capital, in particular education, is most
associated with “regional development” – which is unfortunately reported as GDP per
capita. Among their more interesting findings, the authors note that,
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Or, there is a disconnect between social values and development outcomes. In Guatemala, raw data from
the LAPOP survey revealed some very positive responses regarding local government, even in
communities that demonstrate, according to my fieldwork, very bad governance and development
outcomes. The results from each community are too few to make any reasonable conclusion, and are
subsequently aggregated to yield a national-level “political culture” synopsis (which I find misleading,
given the wide spatial variability in experiences across space in Guatemala).
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See http://booth.lse.ac.uk/static/a/4.html
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“We do not find that culture, as measured by ethnic
heterogeneity or trust, explains regional differences. Nor do
we find that institutions as measured by survey assessments
of the business environment in the Enterprise Surveys help
account for cross-regional differences within a country.”
(2011: 4)
While the results of this study are useful in underscoring the high returns on
investment in human capital, they shed no additional light on how governance affects
outcomes, nor why some communities within a sub-national region would, as we see
within Guatemala, diverge. Moreover, as has already been discussed, income per capita is
an inadequate proxy for development per se. Within equally poor sub-regions of
Guatemala, certain communities have made striking improvements in health and
education that would not be predicted by income.
Other examples of efforts to understand spatial variation in outcomes include
Bollens’s studies of peacebuilding in urban environments (1999, 2007), though his results
mostly result in cross-national comparisons in urban planning (between Spain and
Bosnia) rather than the individual cities. Bollens (2007) nevertheless underscores how
local governance is a crucial determinant of national outcomes. While cities, as key
economic and cultural hubs, will be more essential to influencing national trends,
Bollens’s argument that “challenges regarding identity, citizenship, and belonging need
to be addressed and worked through most immediately at the local level,” and that, “our
degree of progress at this grassroots level will either fortify or confine the ability to
address these issues at broader geographies,” (2007:250) is an essential justification for
this project.
Finally, and more recently still, work deriving from global mountain regions,
frequently driven by geographers drawing explicit links between environmental
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conditions and socio-economic well-being, have begun to influence development
thinking. Examples include UNDP’s most recent human development report for Nepal,
Beyond Geography (UNDP 2014), which explores the links between caste, isolation,
environmental change and human development. Herman Kreutzman (2001) had already
isolated mountain and highlands communities as requiring unique development
indicators, and using Nepal again, demonstrates dramatic variation in human
development between even mountainous regions there. Burken (2010) suggests that the
resiliency of mountain communities, with a focus on those in Mexico, will depend on
local institutions and their relative autonomy. Within-country spatial variation remains
relatively underexplored then, but utilizing this approach provides important insight into
how differing governance conditions influence development outcomes. Finally, it also
complicates what are too frequently cultural and political generalizations of entire
countries which, as this literature review demonstrates, are diverse, and whose subregions experience vastly different state-society relations and development outcomes.
2.5 Summary: New Directions for Local Governance and Development
This chapter highlights literature that challenges what has been the conventional
wisdom behind post-conflict statebuilding and statebuilding-for-development: that human
development requires “stronger” states with the capacity to provide security and
coordinate basic service delivery. Beginning with decentralization literature, which
otherwise adheres to the core concepts of a “state-centric” logic, both theoretical and
empirically-grounded literature simultaneously justifies shifting the level of analysis from
states and state institutions to village-level and informal (non-state) institutions, while
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also underscoring the need for more empirically informed studies of governance, and
specifically, how locally-based governance influences development outcomes.
That a state with the capacity to administer its basic functions efficiently, including
raising sufficient revenues to supply the most basic public goods equitably, would be
welcome – in Guatemala or in any post-conflict context – is not in question here. Instead,
this paper challenges the premise that conventional state building is sufficient for
development purposes. It also challenges the persistent notion, joining myriad literature
already undermining it, that the state will be perceived uniformly across its territory.
Implicit in statebuilding logic is an assumption that its “society” counterpart is
monolithic, and in essence waiting to be governed for its betterment. As the above
literature clearly demonstrates, the empirical reality of many communities, spread across
the developing world, is that the state is a force of usurpation, extraction, and
homogenization, whose values are anathema to local customs, and thus distrusted, and
resisted.
“Society-centric” approaches bring us closer to understanding the persistence and
empirical reality of limited statehood, as well as the breadth and depth of governance that
occurs in the state’s absence. The process of governance can be messy, and involve a far
greater number of stakeholders, or de facto governors that are arranged horizontally,
rather that hierarchically, as predicted by legal-formal institutions. Indeed, the process
itself might be governed by unwritten rules, which may themselves be in flux as political
parties or state actors challenge local norms. This opens the door for a spatial variation in
the form and function of local governance under, again, conditions of limited statehood.
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But even society-centric literature is fraught with analytical gaps that limit its usefulness,
particularly with respect to development studies.
First, much of society-centered literature consists of either individual cases –
examples from Kenya, Somaliland or small island nations states, and individual
communities within, most notably. Much of the rest consists mostly of theoreticallybased work challenging the notions of the Weberian state. Finally, almost none of what
this project labels society-centric literature, with the exception of the recent IDS report,
examines development outcomes specifically. This is a glaring gap in development and
local governance literatures – particularly given the policy world’s proclivity to co-join
post conflict “reconstruction” with “development.”
Hybridity literature, in particular, which has done much to challenge standard
conceptions of the “liberal peace” and its implications for local communities, fails to
adequately capture community dynamics while all too frequently glorifying, and
romanticizing, “the local” and its capacity for change. This paper embraces hybridity’s
challenge to the key liberal pretenses of an otherwise helpless local citizenry in need of
rescuing, and in ready acceptance of foreign, wide sweeping political and economic
reforms. This paper also embraces the core hybridity tenet that communities resist these
changes through daily, informal, and even invisible practices. But hybridity’s reverence
for the local’s strength and resistance overlooks the social divisions, competition, and
petty grievances that dominate local political dynamics in some communities under
limited statehood. These dynamics have meaningful impacts on daily lives, and the
prosperity of local people, but hybridity, along with much of state-society and societycentric literature, is incapable of processing this reality. Moreover, when human
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development becomes the dependent variable in question, as is the case in this paper,
hybridity’s starkly dichotomous state-local conception loses analytical value entirely.
This project therefore adds important empirical rigor to the exploration of local
governance under conditions of limited statehood, including the role of informal actors,
and crucially, how these factors influence the well-being and quality of life of citizens
from community to community. The following section introduces how this study is
organized in order to draw out its key findings.
2.6 Research Design and Guatemalan Case Studies
This project is designed in order to specifically investigate whether there is a causal
relationship between the nature of village-level governance arrangements and both
human development outcomes based on HDI scores as well as other development metrics
including illiteracy, chronic hunger rates and changes in each over time. In order to do
this, this project unfolds over three overlapping, complimentary stages. They are
introduced below and then expounded upon in following chapters.
2.6.1 Quantitative Dataset
The project begins with a quantitative overview of each of Guatemala’s 332
municipalities. When available,82 data has been compiled at the municipal level across a
range of variables including descriptive variables (mean elevation, population, etc.) as
well as variables reflecting the state of development at the municipal level (poverty and
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Data at the municipal level – which is the smallest administrative level for which data is ever reported –
is reported inconsistently, and irregularly. For example, despite obtaining HDI scores for 2000 and 2005, it
was not reported below the department level thereafter. National reports change with changing
administrations and thus include different statistics over time. I obtained data from myriad national reports,
UNDP country reports, and received the generous assistance of experts in Guatemala data and their sources
from the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (the Central American Institute of Fiscal Studies,
ICEFI) after meeting with them in Guatemala City (November 2013).
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extreme poverty rates; chronic hunger from 2002 and 2008; infant mortality, illiteracy
and homicide rates; and human development index scores as well as HDI scores
disaggregated into their respective health and education components). The original
dataset includes additional values from individual national reports on “unsatisfied basic
needs” as additional development metrics.
This component also includes data for potential explanatory variables. These include
an index score from 2009 representing “state density,” a binomial “electoral alignment”
variable (where “1” reflects alignment in party affiliation between the local mayor and
president – or Partido Patriota (Patriot Party) currently, and “0” reflects a discrepancy
between local and national level party rule, based on the 2011 statewide elections. Other
potential explanatory variables include a “conflict intensity” variable, which has to my
knowledge never been calculated before at the municipal level. This score is the result of
summing the total number of violent events – murders, tortures and kidnappings most
notably – recorded in the landmark 1999 Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio report issued
by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH 1999) after the signing of the Peace
Accords, for all 332 municipalities. This report is the most detailed account of specific
violent events that occurred throughout the armed conflict, and identifies the nature of
each event, the perpetrators (the army or guerillas for example), victims’ names if
available, and the specific location of the event. This required many hours of diligent
coding, but ultimately permits a more fine-grained analysis of “conflict intensity” at the
municipality level. This is important because departmental trends suggest that, for
example, Totonicapán was generally unaffected by the war, while Quiché was
disproportionately, and negatively, impacted. Municipal level data, however, reveals a
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more variegated pattern where some communities in Totonicapán indeed suffered above
average levels of violence, mostly perpetrated by the state on civilians. Similarly, some
communities in Quiché were left relatively unaffected directly. These outliers include
some of the case study communities, so this data is critical for analysis.
Finally, from the 2012 Procurador de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights
Ombudsman for Guatemala) annual report, the database records the number of
“denunciations” per 100,000 citizens across each municipality. This variable, however
crude, is the best and only option representing municipal levels of “social cohesion.”
Despite several studies examining civil society in Guatemala (ICA/FLACSO 2006,
NORAD 2008, Falise and Sanz-Corella 2009), there is no index of civil society at the
local level. Stemming from fieldwork observations, however, the number of registered or
operating NGOs does not correlate with social cohesion. Certain communities had many
civil society actors, but they were severely curtailed in their scope of influence, while the
community itself was increasingly divided between new and old religious orders as well
as politics – discussed in more detail below. A hypothetical “civil society density” score
therefore would not necessarily reflect social cohesion in any meaningful way.
Denunciations, at the same time, might reflect either a level of frustration with public
officials and the police (and thus social discord) or the freedom/organization of
individuals to protest (and thus a level of social cohesion). This component of the project
operates under the assumption of the latter, or that a high level of denunciations on some
level higher social cohesion.83
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I made this conceptual leap, for the purposes of interpreting my quantitative data, based on observations
in Guatemala. For example, the well-documented and highly-organized community of Totonicapán
registers much higher in denunciations (548) than surrounding communities, and even for rural
communities throughout Guatemala. Chichicastenango, however, where local, relatively less organized
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The variable that is not available for analysis in my quantitative component is the one
explicitly representing the principle independent variable under investigation – or the
complementarity between local, non-state and informal institutions with state actors –
which would indeed be difficult to construct. Exploring and testing the strength of any
relationship is instead reserved for the fieldwork described below. What the quantitative
component does instead is underscore is the nature of the puzzle itself – the spatial
variation in development and hunger across similar communities, and the independence
of HDI and hunger from state density – while, crucially, justifying my case selection as
well, as discussed in the Introduction.
2.6.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis
With the six case study communities identified, it is then possible to begin the process
of coding the presence or absence of theoretically-informed conditions, as well as
outcomes, through a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).
QCA, as developed by Charles Ragin (1987), is intended to correct for some of the
core concerns plaguing John Stuart Mill’s qualitative methods that remain the
cornerstone of much social science research. In a sense, this project utilizes Mill’s
method of difference by isolating similar communities (each rural, overwhelmingly
Mayan, and poor) but which differ across the main dependent variable, or “human
development.” I do this in order to control, as best as possible, for the macro-structural
determinants of development – from access to basic resources including schools, public
resources and airports (as might exist in Guatemala City for example) to prevailing
indigenous groups have been in a volatile and highly public dispute with the mayor registered a scant 56
denunciations per capita. As is demonstrated later, denunciations are also inversely related to other crude
metrics of social discord, like homicide rates for example.
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industries (whether export-oriented palm production or light manufacturing, etc.) and
even climate (all communities are considered “Western Highland” communities and
reside between 5456 and 7545 feet above sea level, or within one standard deviation of
elevation based on the country’s mean, calculated in Chapter 4).
For the purposes of isolating causation, however, Mill’s methods requires strict
adherence to three fundamental assumptions – that of the “deterministic regularity” of a
causal relation, that all causally relevant variables be identified prior to analysis, and that
cases represent the full range of all possible paths (George and Bennett 2005: 165), which
amount to overly strict, unrealistic assumptions. Mill’s comparative method thus relies
exclusively on the logic of causal inference and does not account for equifinality – or the
possibility that outcomes can result from altogether different, unobserved mechanisms.
The QCA method, most importantly for the purposes of this project, acknowledges
and accounts for equifinality. This method allows the investigator to more finely detect
the presence of not only multiple causal conditions (or independent variables), but
configurations of causal conditions and even multiple configurations and how they
interact. Using QCA to reveal otherwise unclear configurations of causal conditions also
provides insight into the more nuanced and relative influence of individual conditions,
including the presence or absence of conditions that are necessary, sufficient, both or
neither, and still more complex combinations (or INUS causes – insufficient but
necessary parts of a configuration that is unnecessary but sufficient).84
QCA does not obviate methodological concerns entirely, however (George and
Bennett 2005: 165-166, Bennett and George 1997). It still requires that all causally
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As noted here: http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/qualitative_comparative_analysis (accessed
4/28/2014).
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relevant conditions are included in the set of cases under study in order to minimize the
likelihood of spurious inferences. As George and Bennett note, “the logic of causal
inference for small-n comparisons is highly problematic if the phenomenon being
investigated has complex, multiple determinants” as is the case for local variations in
human development across rural Guatemalan communities (Ibid: 156). For this reason
QCA is considered “unstable,” in that the addition of a new case, or the dropping of a
single condition, can dramatically change the implications of QCA results (Ibid: 166).
Crucially, as well, in this project I make binary decisions regarding the presence or
absence of the theoretically and purposefully-chosen, potential causal conditions
influencing development outcomes across each case. This leaves open the possibility that
more nuanced interpretations of the causal conditions, and their presence/absence, could
influence initial results based on the QCA.
This concern is at least partially accounted for though the use of strict coding
parameters that guide the completion of a “truth table” (see Table 2, page 80) that in turn
informs the initial findings derived from this component of the investigation. The specific
explanatory variables under investigation in this section are discussed in length in the
following chapters, but consist of principally the long-term effects of localized conflict
intensity, the observed level of either social discord or harmony, and institutional
questions – in the form of social spending by municipal governments and the capability
of locally-based civil society. I also code for my theorized driver of change – state-local
complementarity.
Coding for either the presence or absence of these characteristics is based on a
combination of available quantitative metrics, as well as the results of in situ observation
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and key informant interviews in each community. Specifically, I conducted interviews
with key elites in public office (from mayors and their councils to the heads of individual
government administrations), in party offices, churches, civil society organizations and
with other informal or semi-formal leaders and organizations. I also attended key
monthly meetings between stakeholders in which important decisions were made
regarding policy and practice – most often with respect to a centrally-organized program
intended to reduce hunger and malnutrition (El Pacto Hambre Cero, discussed below).
Table 2. QCA Coding Criteria

Presence of:

Coding Criteria:

Social Spending?
(A=high, a=low)

ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total
budget per inhabitant spent on “social functions” = above (high)
or below (low) mean (234.54 Quetzales/person)

“Strong” local
civil society?
(B=high, b=low)

Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the presence and
density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or traditional
authority? How effectively can they mobilize popular issue support

Social discord?
(C=high, c=low)

Qualitative observations and interviews: What are the extent and
nature of social divisions within a community, if any? How do they
manifest?

Conflict affected?
(D=high, d=low)

Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below
(low) the mean conflict intensity “score”(96 victims/community)

Complementarity
(E =high, e=low)

Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working,
or not, with government officials to implement anti-hunger
program elements.

For the reasons stated above, the QCA component of this project is integral to my
methods, and to the investigation of conditions influencing human development
outcomes in rural Guatemala. This component, by design, reveals complex relationships
between conditions and key insights into how a range, and combination, of variables –
from structural and historical to epiphenomenal – relate to outcomes. At the same time,
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however, the QCA is only a rough sketch of potentially causal relationships, and the risk
of endogeneity – or that of either unobserved variables or an unseen causal link between
explanatory variables themselves – remains relevant.
In order to account for endogeneity and omitted variable bias, this project ultimately
hinges on an additional methodological component: a process-tracing stage with the
express purpose of observing the sequences and processes that constitute local
development governance. This stage naturally overlaps with fieldwork that informs the
QCA, and the coding of different variables.
2.6.3 Process-Tracing
As David Collier writes, “process tracing … is an analytic tool for drawing
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood
as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (2011: 823). In this vein, I
expressly visited three of the six original communities – each still demonstrating
variation in my dependent variable – in order to trace the sequential steps, and processes,
of implementing a shared, government-backed anti-hunger program in each locale.
Process-tracing requires significant time and dedication in order to appropriately
document the micro-level, or “agent-to-agent” linkages, in a potentially vast series of
events in a causal chain that connects independent and dependent variables (Checkel
2005). Identifying, or at least clarifying the links in such a chain, however, reduces the
dependency on drawing potentially erroneous causal inferences. When, additionally, the
observable implications of competing theories are taken seriously – in this project it
could be either the toil of more dedicated mayors, the absence of past violence or the
entrepreneurship of civil society that better explains development outcomes in my
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selected communities – the theory of state-local complementarity is tested more robustly,
and must withstand verification through process-tracing.
No communities are perfectly similar, however, despite my efforts to control for
macro-structural and even climactic and geographic differences. As Bennett and George
note, nevertheless, “process tracing can test whether each of the potentially causal
variables that differ between two closely but imperfectly matched cases can or cannot be
ruled out as causal” (1997). Finally, process tracing diminishes the inherent degrees of
freedom, or the “too many variables, too few cases” conundrum of small-n qualitative
research. “These many predicted observations,” write George and Bennett (1997), “may
provide sufficient ‘degrees of freedom,’ or many more observations than variables, even
when the researcher is studying a single case and using several independent variables.”
For these reasons, I explicitly incorporate process-tracing in order to complement the
quantitative overview and QCA components of this project, and in order to try to correct
for their respective methodological gaps in causal analysis. Though on some level
process-tracing is incorporated in all of the six communities visited, in order to make
judgments informing the QCA component for example, and in order to understand
chronological linkages in development decision-making and implementation, I scrutinize
three communities more closely still.85
This step required attending meetings in which diverse development stakeholders
interacted, and utilizing interviews in order to build a chronological timeline, and a
picture of the mechanics, of policy implementation at the village level. In order to
increase observations, I visited remote aldeas (even smaller villages that, along with the
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These include Santa María Chiquimula (Totonicapán department), Zacualpa (Quiché department) and
San Pablo la Laguna (Sololá). See Table 3.
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“urban center,” constitute the municipio). In these remote locations I interviewed
“ordinary citizens” (including, for example, agricultural workers, subsistence farmers and
homemakers – or those most targeted by government programs) and conducted focus
groups when more feasible, in addition to conducting the usual key informant interviews
described above. The focus groups and “citizen” interviews provide rich material for
description as well as a decisive opportunity to test the observable implications of statelocal complementarity, and the competing implications of social discord, harmony,
legacy of conflict and civil society (Table 3).
Table 3. Summary of Non-Elite Interviews and Rural Focus Groups

Community Name, and aldeas in each
municipality
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC)
Xecaxelaj
Xesana
Xesana I
Pajojchiyats
Joesefina
Centro
Zacualpa
Pasajoc I
Chuchuca (Chuchuca is site location, with
attendees from the following: Xejoc,
Xextorian, Xemosche, Chojiomquiej)
San Pablo la Laguna
Center*
Total

Number of non-elite interviews and/or
focus group participants
n=54
7
10
10
12
5
10
n=81
25
56
n=27
27
n=162

*Note: San Pablo has no aldeas, largely because of topographical constraints, and is condensed into one “urban” zone.

Organizing these focus groups and gaining access to the villages themselves, and then
conducting interviews/focus groups in a safe environment, with ready access to accurate
translation (from the Mayan dialects of K’iche and Tz’utujil into Spanish), required
diligence and persistence, but also patience and tactfulness. Given either pre-conceived
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notions of the intentions of foreigners – as well as the potentially sensitive nature of my
questions concerning local political dynamics and basic service delivery – particularly in
remote, poor villages with little to no regular outside visitation, it was essential that I
partner with local actors already conducting work in these areas in order to be welcomed,
and in order to assemble community members.86
Table 4 lists my local partners in each municipality. In two out of the three localities I
was able to partner with, in my judgment, impartial actors. In Santa María Chiquimula,
for example, I accompanied volunteers from the local Jesuit diocese on their semi-weekly
visit to rural aldeas distributing food, weighing and measuring children, and conducting
short classes on reproductive health. Though I stated my role as an independent
researcher, by arriving alongside Church volunteers, I was warmly received, and was able
to conduct many, small focus groups (from 3-10 women at a time) across multiple
communities. Of course, I was unable to reach non-church affiliates in this sample.
Participants – all women I should note in Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) – were very
forthcoming in sharing their experiences concerning local political actors and the
implementation of Hambre Cero. The volunteers provided regular translation help, and
shared their own perspectives on separate occasions as well.
In San Pablo la Laguna (San Pablo hereforth), which is largely a singular, urban87
community on the shores of Lake Atitlán, I worked with a young, local tuk-tuk88 driver
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All interviews were conducted in a safe environment that guaranteed confidentiality, without coercion,
and only after securing permission for participation with the interviewee’s right to end the interview at any
point. This study was granted authorization to conduct interviews by the University of Denver’s
Institutional Review Board, and was conducted under its provisions (Protocol # 2013-2552).
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“Urban” in this context refers to a central community with organized streets and plaza. Each municipality
has an “urban center,” where the municipal offices and main church are located, and where weekly markets
are held, and where some small businesses might exist. San Pablo given physical restrictions between the
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who, with the help of his uncle, helped organize a focus group of 12 women, followed by
individual interviews over following days with 10 men traveling between town and
surrounding coffee plantations. I exchanged grape or orange sodas for the participant’s
time, and occasionally relied on my acquaintance to translate from Tz’utujil to Spanish. I
paid my tuk-tuk driver for his transportation services as per usual, but padded these
haggled-for fees for his generous assistance.
Table 4. Field Work Partners

Community (Municipality)

Partner Organization or Individual
Local Catholic (Jesuit) dioces –
specifically its organized women’s health
and nutrition outreach programs
NutriSalud via the local Woman’s Office
(OMM)
“Felipe” the teenage tuk-tuk driver

Santa María Chiquimula
Zacualpa
San Pablo la Laguna

In Zacualpa, surrounding villages were very remote, and access was difficult via very
bad, mountainous roads. Here I took advantage of a formally independent nutrition and
health program organized by NutriSalud,89 with partial funding from USAID, which
consisted of conducting workshops in certain remote aldeas. Concerting my efforts with
theirs again provided me transportation to remote villages, and local partners that
enhanced my personal safety, credibility and access (as well as translation help and the
ability to speak with large groups of local citizens in an organized setting).

lake and steep hillsides, does not have the usual aldeas surrounding its urban center. “Urban,” however,
does not resemble the more familiar, densely-populated, sense of the word.
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Tuk-tuks are three-wheeled motorized taxis typically driven by teenage boys, ubiquitous in town centers
throughout Guatemala.
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See: http://www.urc-chs.com/project?ProjectID=243
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In Zacaualpa, however, the NutriSalud organizers partnered, themselves, with the
local Oficina de la Mujer, or “Woman’s Office” (OMM) that by law now exists in each
municipality. But the OMM, under the direct control of the mayor, meant that the villages
chosen to receive the NutriSalud programs were not arbitrary, but intentional. This
reality, on the one hand, arguably interfered with my goals of impartiality for the purpose
of qualitative investigation. On the other hand, this process itself was informative, and
OMM personnel were surprisingly forthcoming about their own selection criteria
(communities which are considered mayoral strongholds), and my experiences and
insights into governance in Zacualpa were in some ways enhanced by this experience,
though I was unable to meet with groups from villages that do not support the mayor.
2.7 Conclusions
From daily insecurity to extreme rates of poverty and hunger, rural Guatemalans
continue to struggle under much of the same conditions that promulgated a civil war
lasting 36 years. Since the Peace Accords, however, local, informal authorities have
confronted a semi-democratic central authority and ill-articulated and muddled
statebuilding project with peculiar results. The persistence and legitimacy of local,
informal actors sometimes mixes, and other times clashes, with formal systems of
governance. This process is different across space, and might explain peculiar differences
in development outcomes across communities.
With the express purpose of testing this hypothesis, I have articulated a research
design that combines a quantitative analysis of Guatemalan municipalities with a
qualitative comparative analysis, determined largely by field work in six communities, in
order to explore how theoretically informed variables relate to one another, as well as
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with the dependent variable – human development. Finally, and critically, I spent
additional time in three of the six communities, meeting with both key informants and
“ordinary citizens” in order to trace the implementation of the current government’s
marquee social welfare program – a globally-recognized anti-hunger program (Hambre
Cero) – in order to identify stakeholders, their influence and role, and the processes
involved that determine the actual delivery of basic resources to citizens in need.
This design is intended so that each component overlaps but also complements one
another, and in such a way as to robustly test the observable implications of my theory,
and identify causal mechanisms that influence variation in development rather than rely
on only inference. The following chapters proceed through these methods systematically,
beginning with a chapter devoted to the statistical analysis, and a discussion of the
relationships detected between variables and their implications for this project.
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CHAPTER THREE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
IN GUATEMALA
This chapter is a “first glimpse” into the relationships between possible drivers of
human development across Guatemala, and variations thereof. Utilizing a novel database
that combines data from the municipal level across all 332 communities – which
originates from highly dispersed and sometimes obscure sources90 – this component
utilizes ordinary least square (OLS) regressions in order to explore the relationship
between a diverse set of variables and different dependent variables that represent a range
of human development indicators.
The explanatory variables under investigation in this chapter are in essence rival
hypotheses to my theoretical proposition – that better development outcomes are the
result of state actors working in harmony and coordination with more legitimate local
actors at the village level in order to deliver basic services more equitably. They also
reflect state-centric, state-society and society-centric theories of development, and thus a
combination of theoretical propositions discussed in the previous chapter, but also factors
specific to the Guatemala context – like the lingering influence of the armed conflict91 as
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Many indicators required coding from pdfs and assorted reports, where data was otherwise unavailable.
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The “Conflict Intensity” variable is possibly the first time that violent events from the civil war have
been tabulated for the municipal level. I coded conflict intensity based on the number of victims tied to
each community as recorded by the 1999 Memoria del Silencio report, published by the Historical
Clarification Commission which was established by the 1996 Peace Accords, and which is still the
authoritative source on civil-war related violent events. I counted all victims, regardless of perpetrator
(guerilla or army) or crime (whether arbitrary execution, torture, or sexual violence) that took place or
originated in each community.
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well as an effort to capture how variation in local organization across space relates to
development. In essence, the model under investigation is reflected by the following
equation:
Yi (human development) = ai + β1x1(state presence) + β2x2 (local spending) + β3x3
(conflict intensity) + β4x4 (local social organization) + ei
Where ai = the intercept and ei = the residual error.
Importantly, both dependent and independent variables can be measured and
represented differently. Human development, for example, is represented in the
quantitative component of this study by HDI scores at the municipal level, first. But
hunger and illiteracy rates, as well as positive and negative changes in each over time,
help reflect different elements of the more rich sense of human development that this
project seeks to explore. Regressing against an array of human development indicators
also provides a robustness check for the relationship between independent variables and
my greater goal of exploring development from a more holistic perspective. Similarly,
independent variables can be captured through different metrics, with different
implications. A summary of the different metrics is listed in Table 5.
This chapter compares five (5) models that vary in their deployment of predictor
instruments in order to weigh the competing explanatory power of different variables. For
example, elevation is a geographical instrument, yet simultaneously captures on some
level the degree of remoteness, and likelihood that state presence is minimal (Callel
2014). A model that incorporates both SDI and elevation might diminish the respective
explanatory power of each, and thus different models incorporate different explanatory
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indicators in an effort to find a “best fit.”92 These same models are then run against a
series of different indicators for human development (or the explained variable),
beginning with HDI and progressing to changes in hunger and illiteracy over time.
Table 5. Municipal Level Data Utilized for Regression Analysis
Human
Development
§
HDI 2011
(extrapolated)
§
§
§
§
§
§

ΔHDI
HDI subindices
Illiteracy
Infant
Mortality
Chromic
Hunger
Δ Chronic
Hunger

State-Influence
State Density
Index (as
reported by the
UNDP’s 2009
Human
Development
Report for
Guatemala)
§ Elevation (from
fallingrain.com)
§ Electoral
Alignment
§

Local Authority
/ Spending
Municipal
Spending on
“social services”
(in local currency
/ municipal
population)

Legacy of
Armed Conflict
Conflict Intensity
(based on the
number of
victims from
violent events
recorded by the
1999 Memoria
del Silencio
report).

Locally-Based
Social Forces
§ 2012
Denunciations
(as reported to
the Guatemalan
Human Rights
Ombudsman)
§ Homicide rates

The results of OLS regressions, discussed below, yield some puzzling relationships.
In so doing they also elucidate both the puzzle under investigation, as well as the gulf that
exists between the state and local development outcomes. The results, finally, open the
door for the role of still unobserved mechanisms influencing outcomes, which are
explored in subsequent chapters.
3.1 Global Model One: Testing Variation in Human Development
The quantitative component of this study begins by regressing key variables against
2011 HDI levels (HDI_extrap), which is a figure extrapolated from HDI scores from two
previous years (2000 and 2005) as calculated by Microsoft Excel, but which has not been
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For example, regressing municipal elevation (elev, as reported by www.fallingrain.com) against 2009
State Density Index scores (SDI_2009) reveals a significantly negative relationship (N=330, P=.006). In
other words as elevation increases state density decreases (though by a somewhat unimpressive -4.44x10-6).
Incorporating both into a single model, therefore, will diminish respective explanatory powers, and thus
apart from Model 2, are not run together in regressions.
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reported at the municipal level since.93 A first “global model” therefore tests the
relationship between human development (HDI_extrap) and state density (SDI_2009),
local government spending (the level of local spending on social services per inhabitant,
Gasto_Mun), conflict intensity (Conf_Intens), social organization (as represented by
official denunciations of public officials and police by citizens in each community
according to the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, relative to population,
Denperpop) and finally electoral alignment (Elect_Align, or whether a municipal mayor
is from the same party as the President as of the 2011 elections, where 1=alignment and 0
= no alignment). Before running the regressions, I first log transform SDI_2009,94
creating the variable log_SDI in order to more normally distribute the otherwise clustered
nature of state density figures (see Figures 5 and 6 for comparison). The following
figures also illustrate the degree of variation in HDI across communities with similarly
low state presence.

Figure 5. Extrapolated HDI (2011) Scores Plotted Against State Density Scores
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This was done in order to overcome the potential endogeneity when regressing 2009 state density figures
and 2005 HDI levels. The extrapolated HDI figures represent approximate 2010 numbers.
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Log transforming consists of multiplying all SDI_2009 scores by 100, then taking the log of these new
values and creating the new variable log_SDI using Stata.
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Figure 6. HDI plotted Against the Log-Transformed State Density Variable

Table 6. Ordinary Least Square Regression: Variation in HDI_extrap

Model 1
(N=278)

Model 4
(N=325)

Model 5
(N=325)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

.046398*
(.0218491)

.0587264**
(.0212306)

-.0000919**
(.0000226)

-.0000884**
(.0000224)

-.0000903**
(.0000192)

1.805071*
(.9214902)

1.956041*
(.9274082)

2.644132**
(.7782323)

2.475925**
(.0086536)

.0060596
(.0130156)

.0095903
(.0130458)

3.48x10-6
(2.35x10-6)

2.44x10-6
(2.34x10-6)

Model 2
(N=277)

Model 3
(N=277)

Predictor
Variable

Coefficien
t
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

log_SDI

.0497943*
(.0229995)

.0562005*
(.0233884)

Gasto_Mun

.0000268
(.0000237)

.0000287
(.0000212)

.0000314
(.0000239)

Conf_Intens

-.0000918**
(.000217)

-.0000953**
(.0000225)

Denperpop

1.867374*
(.9201119)

Elect_Align

.0054443
(.0130069)

Elev

.0009367*
(.0004267)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)

.5011801
7.28 (5)

.4670603
6.44 (6)

.6401602
6.46 (5)

.510152
13.10 (4)

.4770062
15.67 (3)

.1018

.1507

.1570

.1300

.1196

Adjusted R2
Note: p<.01**; p<.05*
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This first model, as a whole, is statistically significant (p=.000), but otherwise
substantively insignificant, or at least limited in substantively explaining variation in HDI
across communities (Table 6). For example, though several variables in this model
(log_SDI, Conf_Intens and Denperpop) are statistically significant, coefficients in general
are very small (Model 1). Subsequent models add elevation (Model 2), leave elevation
but drop SDI (Model 3), and then key in on the most significant variables – state density,
conflict intensity, denunciations and the changes in homicide rates in Model 4, while
Model 5 regresses only SDI, conflict intensity and denunciations. These models are each
significant and progressively more robust. But they only tinker with the strength of each
explanatory indicator, as coefficients remain generally quite small. It is worth noting that,
for the moment, state density is positively correlated with HDI, and significant, across all
of Guatemala, though again the effect is quite small. It is also worth noting that
Conf_Intens is negatively correlated with HDI (and statistically significant with 99
percent confidence in each of the models). Local social spending is never a significant
variable.
Finally, Denperpop – or the officially recorded denunciations of public officials and
police officers submitted to the Procurador de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights
Ombudsman), relative to population size – has a positive effect on HDI which is both
statistically significant (p<.05 in Models 1, 2, and 3, p<.01 in models 4 and 5) and by far
the strongest of any variable.
It is my contention that denuncias indicate on some level an element of “social
organization.” I argue this, first, based on the logic that in a culture of fear and distrust, as
is widely reported to permeate Guatemala (Azpuru 2012), higher reported denuncias
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represent more the determination of local actors to organize and protest rather than actual
levels of official abuse (which is arguably high everywhere). Secondly, a simple
bivariate regression reveals a negative correlation between denuncias per capita
(Denperpop) and the difference in homicide rates between 2003 and 2012 (Hom_Diff).
As the number of denunicas per capita increase across communities, in other words,
homicide rates decline slightly (Coefficient = -.034), though this not a statistically robust
relationship (n= 331, p=.8253). Nevertheless, denunciations are not related to violence,
and are thus a response to something other than crime.
Denuncias are an imperfect reflection of social organization, certainly, and open to
different interpretations, but there is no instrument or data at the municipal level that
better represents this concept for the quantitative component, and it is therefore included
in the study. Finally, the strong, positive, statistically significant relationship between
denuncias and HDI is a noteworthy observation.
3.1.1 Accounting for Population Size
In Model 4, an increase in homicide rates is robustly correlated with higher HDI
scores (n=277, p=.012) – a result which more likely than not reflects the effects of urban
areas, where access to services and markets improves HDI generally, even if crime is also
higher (Table 6). This realization means that, when regressing variables across all of
Guatemala, the relative size of a community may disguise effects that influence results.
The same models as above are therefore run again, but this time only after excluding
larger municipalities (or those municipalities with a population greater than 25,000
inhabitants). The models are again significant, but important changes take place (Table
7).
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First, a climbing homicide rate is indeed no longer significant. But other more
peculiar relationships emerge: Municipal spending, for example, becomes significant
within a 90% confidence interval in Models 1 and 2, suggesting its greater influence in
smaller, likely more remote communities, though its significance drops below this in
Model 3. Meanwhile both the Conf_Intens and Denperpop variables remain statistically
significant, with conflict intensity particularly robust (p<.01 in each of the models) if
small, while the effect of denunciations remains the most dramatic – with coefficients
raging from 1.77 – 2.59 (Table 7). After excluding the most populated communities,
therefore, the most dramatic relationships with human development (at least as
represented by HDI) are the negative legacy of conflict, even if subtle, and more
positively, some element of social organization and protest as suggested by the amount of
official denuncias.
Also important – if puzzling – is that the state density sign changes from positive to
negative in this test while becoming dramatically stronger as well, though it no longer
remains statistically significant. In the very least, the density of state offices and
resources has no bearing on the human development outcomes of smaller municipalities
in Guatemala – upending the most basic premise of statebuilding and forcing a
reexamination of just what does influence local outcomes.
The same tests are repeated yet again, across all municipalities as well as only smaller
communities, but only after changing the explained indicator – from 2011 HDI levels as
above to changes in HDI over time from 2005-2011 – in order to capture any dynamics
effects of the local characteristics under investigations. The models as a whole, however,
are not statistically significant and are thus not reported here.
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Table 7. HDI_extrap When Population<25,000: Ordinary Least Square Regression

Predictor
Variable
Log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

Model 1
(N=138)

Model 2
(N=137)

Model 3
(N=137)

Model 4
(N=138)

Model 5
(N=163)

Coefficient

(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

-.0829566
(.051696)
.0000533*
(.0000279)

-.0855112
(.0535125)
.0000525*
(.0000282)

-.0195352
(.0425373)

-.0094573
(.042135)

.0000401
(.0000272)

-.000218***
(.0000685)

-.0002169***
(.0000693)

-.0002148***
(.0000697)

-.0002142***
(.0000664)

-.0002174***
(.0000666)

1.894503*
(.000142)
.0090263
(.0188681)

1.908834*
(1.012271)
.009434
(.0190546)
-8.21x10-7
(3.63x10-6)

1.767816*
(1.014379)
.0067685
(.0190937)
5.09x10-7
(3.55x10-6)

2.57166***
(.900458)

2.594271***
(.9036133)

Elev

.0029894
(.0020327)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)
Adjusted R2

.88775961
4.65 (5)

.8987034
3.83 (6)

.6421548
4.04 (5)

.7081681
5.99 (4)

.680653
7.21 (3)

.1497

.1111

.1412

.1096

.1031

Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10*

3.2 Global Model Two: Testing Against Basic Development Indicators – Illiteracy
In this section, the same procedure is followed, but variables are instead regressed
against illiteracy (or lack of literacy, importantly) and infant mortality rates as a
robustness check of some of the initial findings from Section 3.1. The models for changes
in illiteracy over time in communities smaller than 25,000, and all models testing 2011
infant mortality rates, are not statistically significant and are therefore not reported below.
The effects on illiteracy throughout Guatemala (Table 8), across its smaller communities
(Table 9) and illiteracy over time (Table 10) are insightful, however. They also reinforce
the emerging findings that state density and development are disconnected in Guatemala.
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Table 8. 2011 Guatemalan Municipal-Level Illiteracy Rates: Ordinary Least Square Regressions

Model 1
(N=256)

Model 2
(N=256)

Model 3
(N=256)

Model 4
(N=300)

Model 5
(N=163)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

log_SDI

-.5.173085
(2.697058)

-4.376848
(2.734088)

-5.835469**
(2.741042)

-5.769269**
(2.5465)

Gasto_Mun

-.0013705
(.0028065)

-.0011194
(.0028021)

-.0012666
(.0028093)

Conf_Intens

.0140844***
(.0025791)

Denperpop

429.5074***

.0135695***
(.002591)
440.3999***
(112.1504)
-.1373022
(.0002789)

.0133564***
(.0025957)
445.6105***
(112.453)
-.3689073
(1.544989)

.013121***
(.0022661)
430.4998***
(100.0088)

.013117***
(.0022615)
430.9649***
(99.59223)

.0004472
(.0002789)

.0005283
(.0002751)

Predictor
Variable

Elect_Align

(112.2958)
-.2216438
(.0188681)

Elev

.0044964
(.0681496)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)
Adjusted R2

48.65554
11.95 (5)

44.42661
10.45 (6)

30.86702
11.96 (5)

50.70989
16.92 (4)

50.524
22.63 (3)

.1768

.1820

.1680

.1756

.1783

Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10*

Much like with HDI scores, for example, 2011 illiteracy rates across Guatemala are
most strongly correlated with high conflict intensity and denuncias per capita (p<.01
across all models for both variables) (Table 8). As before, the level of denunciations is
inversely related to illiteracy. Specifically, an increase of one denunciation per capita is
associated with a stunning 446 percent decline in illiteracy (Model 3). Both state density
and local spending are for the most part uncorrelated with illiteracy, though in models 4
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and 5 state density is significant (p<.05) and associated with 5 percent declines in
illiteracy when testing across Guatemala as a whole.
Table 9. 2011 Illiteracy Rates where Population < 25,000: Ordinary Least Squares Regression

Model 1
(N=128)

Model 2
(N=128)

Model 3
(N=128)

Model 4
(N=151)

Model 5
(N=151)

Coefficient

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

2.762708
(4.771261)

.4567894
(.4.792278)

Predictor
Variable

(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

log_SDI

3.433755
(5.612491)

6.370267
(.5.717079)

Gasto_Mun

-.0010112
(.0029575)

-.0004693
(.0029302)

-.0002829
(.0028542)

.0310563***

(.0071164)

.0297665***
(.00705)

.0295369***
(.007054)

.028844***
(.0070779)

.0293737***
(.00072238)

Denperpop

-354.5368***
(.000142)

-356.4175***
(109.9833)

-354.3001*
(110.0757)

-337.0204***
(104.0205)

-347.3542***
(106.1332)

Elect_Align

.9415009
(2.007523)

.761388
(7.982922)
.0007952
(.0003841)

.8456734
(1.983439)
.0006891
(.0003724)

Conf_Intens

Elev

-.5853974***
(.2175466)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)
Adjusted R2

20.65968
6.96 (5)

8.326414
6.67 (6)

27.62416
7.74 (5)

23.71136
10.00 (4)

30.13987
10.47 (3)

.1901

.2114

.2098

.1935

.1593

Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10*

When, as before, the potential effects of population size are accounted for by omitting
all municipalities with populations greater than 25,000 inhabitants before running
regressions, state density again becomes irrelevant (Table 9). In fact, its sign changes (to
positive, suggesting a direct relationship with illiteracy) but nowhere is it statistically
significant. Again, only conflict-afffectedness and denunciations have significant
relationships with illiteracy at the municipal level (p<.01).
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Table 10. Change in Illiteracy (2000-2011): Ordinary Least Squares Regression

Predictor
Variable

Model 1
(N=256)

Model 2
(N=256)

Model 3
(N=256)

Model 4
(N=300)

Model 5
(N=300)

Coefficient

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

4.484826***
(1.111933)

5.160828***
(1.037826)

(Standard
Error)
(.9064128)

5.295933***
(.913693)

Gasto_Mun

-.0002808
(.0009432)

-.0001589
(.0009364)

Conf_Intens

.0018427**
(.0008668)

-.0015927*
(.0008659)

.0017159*
(.0009193)

.0016749*
(.0009217)

Denperpop

2.614085
(37.73978)

-2.672386
(37.47907)

37.26648
(40.56965)

32.51798
(40.58879)

Elect_Align

-.406909
(.5212248)

-.3659755
(.5169728)

Log_SDI

4.909495***

.000217
.0000932

Elev

.0459143
(.0276456)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)
Adjusted R2

.88775961
6.96 (5)

-18.70969
6.81 (6)

1.28 (5)

-15.67795
8.04 (4)

-17.56895
9.74 (3)

.1046

.1202

.0055

.0861

.0806

Note: p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10*

Finally, when the independent variables are regressed against changes in illiteracy
over time (across all of Guatemala again), and assuming, as is appropriate, that state
density has been largely static over the same time,95 the role of state forces in
development becomes even cloudier (Table 10). The log-transformed state density
variable (log_SDI) is in fact statistically significant (p<.01), but is now directly

95

As noted earlier, interviews with Guatemalan public policy experts – including Jonathan Menkos,
Director of the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) – confirm that such an assumption
is indeed plausible and/or appropriate.
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associated with increases in illiteracy over time. In this case, state density is statistically
correlated with negative development results – only further undermining the premise of
statebuilding for development in this instance.
3.3 Global Test Three: Testing Against Chronic Hunger
Testing our same predictor variables against changes over time in chronic hunger
rates only further undermines the basic premise that a transfer of state resources will
benefit community health levels, at least from this more narrow proxy of health. Chronic
hunger rates are based on government statistics that are the result of two different reports
– the 2002 and 2009 Censo Nacional de Talla en Escolares de Primer Grado (or the
second and third National Height Censuses of Primary School Students).
Chronic hunger in these studies is measured by the severity of stunting (or height
retardation) in schoolchildren between the ages of 6 and 11 years old. Stunting is
determined by whether a student’s height falls below two standard deviations of the
World Health Organization’s (WHO) recommended mean height for a given age. A
student between two and three standard deviations below the mean is classified as
suffering from “moderate” chronic hunger, while students with heights below three
standard deviations are classified as suffering from “extreme” chronic huger.96 The
national censuses report both cases, as well as a total level reported as a percentage of
students per municipality. This is what is recorded in the database, and then separately
96

Chronic hunger, as implied, refers to sustained nutrient deficiency over time which results in stunting –
or a negatively skewed height/age ratio. Acute hunger is the result of hunger emergencies that result from
distribution breakdowns, or seasonal patterns that affect harvests and local supplies. It is more commonly
measured by plummeting weight/age ratios, or weight/height ratios (so-called “wasting”). Some regions of
Guatemala (including coffee growing regions and regions with two distinct growing seasons) are arguably
more affected by acute hunger, though chronic hunger, as already discussed, is prevalent throughout
Guatemala. Chronic hunger is discussed in more detail still in Chapters 4 and 5, when comparing
experiences across case studies.
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changes in reported percentages between reports were calculated with Stata, creating the
variable “Cron_Hun_Diff.” I begin by regressing the same models against this new
dependent variable (see Table 11).

Table 11. Difference in Chronic Hunger (2002-2008)

Model 1
(N=279)

Model 2
(N=278)

Model 3
(N=278)

Model 4
(N=326)

Model 5
(N=326)

Coefficient

(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

2.362724*
(1.286329)
-.0019976
(.0013256)

1.956537
(1.305827)
-.0021079
(.0013267)

1.974551
(1.234109)

2.057491*
(1.190307)

-.0020133
(.0013282)

Conf_Intens

.0024055*
(.0012494)

.0026269**
(.0012544)

.0027448**
(.0012548)

.0027783**
(.0010797)

-.0027659**
(.0010771)

Denperpop

-169.8314***
(.51.45253)

-166.0358***
(51.46353)

-160.728***
(.51.45882)

-180.5699***
(43.94241)

-181.6888***
(43.66712)

Elect_Align

.4716094
(.7269776)

.4320683
(.7263941)
-.0002198*
(.0001311)

.5565181
(.723793)
-.0002554
(.0001292)

Predictor
Variable
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun

Elev

.0062565
(.0241011)

Hom_Diff
Constant
F(df)
Adjusted R2

-.13.53678
5.86 (5)

-11.37744
5.36 (6)

-5.355074
5.96 (5)

-12.54552
7.14 (4)

-12.76723
9.52 (3)

.0804

.0863

.0987

.0702

.0729

Note: p<.01***; p<.05*, p<.10*

Though these regressions cannot capture the effects of the current Hambre Cero
program under study in following chapters, myriad other government interventions were
introduced in the period between the two hunger censuses – including Mi Famila
Progressa (My Family Progresses, now Mi Bono Seguro), which was designed with the
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express purpose of addressing childhood hunger, maternal health and school attendance –
and the Bolsas Solidarias program (now Mi Bolsa Segura) which was a direct transfer of
cash and basic foodstuffs directed at the poorest families.

Variable
Cron_Hun_Diff

Obs
331

Mean
-7.05

Std. Dev.
5.83

Min
-31.1

Max
9.8

Figure 7: Difference in Childhood Chronic Hunger Rates, 2001-2008

As indicated in the text box above (Figure 7), chronic hunger rates decreased on
average by 7 percentage points in this age group, but significantly different experiences
with chronic hunger, like development more broadly, have persisted across communities.
As Table 11 illustrates, state density is inversely proportional to improvements in chronic
hunger (the positive coefficient of SDI_2009, which is significant with 90 percent
confidence in Models 1 and 5, suggest that an increase in one unit of state density is
correlated with increased hunger rates of as much as 11 percent).97 Though I am careful
to not draw causal inferences from these relationships, the above tests further underscore
a persistent disconnect between state resources, state presence, and desirable public
health outcomes, which is generally unexpected.
Conflict intensity, again, is statistically correlated with those communities that have
regressed, or which, more specifically, have had the most difficulty in tackling chronic
hunger – possibly demonstrating the lingering influences of conflict intensity on social
organization, and coordination for the purposes of development. Denuncias, for example
97

Not displayed is a model that drops electoral alignment. In this model, SDI_2009 has a coefficient of
20.56 that is significant within a 94th percent confidence interval (p=.060).
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(which I argue reflect an element of social organization), are inversely related to conflict
intensity from 30 years before, though this is not statistically significant, and this
relationship is also weak (see Figure 8). More simply, however, it is likely that the most
conflict-affected communities remain Guatemala’s most isolated, and marginalized,
underscoring the country’s failed post-war reconstruction progress, even if open-conflict
in no longer likely.

Denuncias_2012
Conf_Intens
cons

Coef
-.0098382
84.55076

Std. Err
.0178614
5.473345

t
-.55
15.45

P>|t|
0.582
0.000

Figure 8: The Effect of Conflict Intensity on 2012 Denuncias: Bivariate
Regression

Denuncias themselves are also statistically significant again (p<.01 in each of the
models) and their effect is robust – with one additional denunciation per capita associated
with a decrease in chronic hunger rates by as much as 180 percent (Table 11) – a
surprising result that is now consistent across various human development indicators.
3.4 Conclusions
The quantitative component of this study serves an important function. First, it quite
strongly suggests that state density has no bearing on local development outcomes, even
as the state has expanded its development programming and expenditures. In some
instances, state density appears to have a negative impact on local development
outcomes. Though it is unlikely that increased state presences causes negative
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development, the finding certainly underscores the limitations of the state on local
development.98
Local spending on social services, curiously, was also irrelevant. “Social services” are
but a grab bag of potential projects ranging from water and sanitation projects to “gray”
projects that include street surfacing and other small infrastructure projects. It is widely
noted that small communities favor these latter types of projects which cost-effectively
demonstrate “action” and “pro-development” thinking on the part of local mayors, even if
their impact on well-being in the context of hunger and illiteracy is limited.99 The
accuracy of reporting is also questionable, as the transparency of both local income and
spending priorities could engender local protest. Assuming a relative degree of accuracy,
however, then the utter lack of a correlation between local spending and development
outcome forces further examination into what, more precisely, accounts for differences in
development across similar communities.
Finally, two factors that routinely demonstrate statistically significant, and often
strong, positive influences on development outcomes – whether the broad spectrum HDI,
illiteracy or hunger – are conflict intensity and the level of denunciations per population.
In the case of conflict intensity, which has not been calculated at the municipal level
before,100 the violence associated with the civil war clearly precedes contemporary
development outcomes. Nevertheless the direction of causation is unclear, and its

98

Theoretically the relationship could be reflecting endogeneity, where the state is now present in those
communities with the most need. Based on all accounts from development actors and analysts in
Guatemala, however, this is highly unlikely. 2009 state density figures are more likely to reflect both past
and current state densities per community, which are believed to be quite static overall.
99

Interviews.

100

Steinberg et al. (2003) did map massacre-events and municipios before drawing broad correlations.
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influence is, speculatively, either direct – confirming the work of many that the civil war
eroded civic capacity and long-term well-being – or indirect – correlated simply with
what remain the most peripheral communities in Guatemala, which were among those
agitating during the armed conflict. Even in the latter case, the robust relationship at the
community level between conflict and development is striking, and starkly underscores
the inequality that characterizes the country’s post-war development trajectory.
The influence of denunciations is more puzzling. It is consistently significant, and at
times correlated with positive development gains with incredibly strong effect.
Denunciations, as noted earlier, are also not a response to local levels of violence, and are
thus capturing other local dynamics. Though the quantitative analysis is unable to
determine in what way, if any, denunciations relate to development, the consistent
strength of the relationship does suggest that an element of community organization, or
enfranchisement, at least facilitates conditions under which pro-poor development
advances. Appendix F includes post-estimation tests for marginal effects,
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity per model, which were negative. Appendix G
summarizes all variables.
Alas, this chapter unearths dramatic relationships (and a lack of relationships)
between key explanatory variables and multiple development indicators. The results are
generally surprising and in principle eliminate the role of the state in explaining spatial
variation in development. This alone forces further examination into what forces do
influence good and bad outcomes. The following chapters utilize qualitative methods,
discussed in detail, in order to more accurately determine what those factors are. First,
however, the case studies are explored in detail.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROFILES IN GOVERNANCE OF SIX HIGHLAND
COMMUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORIES

This chapter details each of the six communities that form the basis of a qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA), which is expanded upon in Chapter 5. The six communities
span three different but adjoining departments that collectively account for much of
Guatemala’s “Western Highlands” – a mostly rural, indigenously populated region west
of Guatemala City where towns and villages lie between elevations of 1500 and 3000
meters. I profile two paired communities from each department – on the one hand
accounting for ethno-linguistic differences over space (the communities span traditional
K’iche, Kaqchiqel and Tz’utujil Maya territories), but on the other hand controlling for
environmental and even macro-economic conditions that vary from the sugar and palm
plantations of the coastal lowlands to export-oriented industry near Guatemala City (See
Figure 4.1). The highlands economy, outside of the urban centers of Quetzaltenango and
Sololá, and some tourism near Lake Atitlán, is dominated by subsistence milpa
farming101 and some forestry. There is some coffee cultivation near the lake as well.
Tourism and coffee in some ways impact two of the communities under investigation, in
Sololá department, distinguishing them from the more remote communities of Quiché
and Totonicapán where subsistence dominates. The implications of this are discussed in
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Traditional corn farming, endowed with elements of spirituality and Mayan mysticism as well.
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more detail when analyzing the QCA in Chapter 5. The paper proceeds first with a case
selection discussion.
4.1 Case Selection
The six communities were initially chosen from afar, based on the earliest available
data, gathered remotely, reflecting variation in development and after attempting to
control for obvious factors that might explain such discrepancies (see Table 12). I first
controlled for elevation, for example, by including only highlands communities that
varied in their respective heights above sea level within one standard deviation.102
Elevation can drastically affect climactic and thus growing conditions over a short
distance in Guatemala, which could possibly be reflected in health or living condition
indicators.
Table 12. Initial Selection Criteria, Summary

Location (elev in ft)
Santa Catarina Palopó
(5456)
San Pablo la Laguna (6861)
Santa María Chiquimula
(6975)
Santa Lucía la Reforma
(6013)
Patzité (7545)
Zacualpa (4875)

HDI (2005)

SDI (2009)

Sololá Department
.504
.15
.506
.22
Totonicapán Department

Δ Health HDI (20002005)
-.26
+.45

.380

.16

-.024

.427

.16

+.118

Quiché Department
.489
.16
.494
.21

-.453
+.083
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Based on 333 individual observations, the country’s mean elevation is 4197.141 feet above sea level
(ranging from 0 – 10,898 feet) with a standard deviation of 2690.849 feet. The spread between the highest
(Patzité) and lowest (Zacualpa) communities selected is 2,670 feet, or just within one standard deviation.
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This paper does not intend to diminish the daily struggles or difficult experiences of
lowland Guatemalan communities, which indeed are increasingly precarious, but it is the
highland communities under study here that struggle most with poverty and chronic
hunger. As the Guatemala’s Third National Height Census (2009: 10) notes, the three
departments that are represented in this study – Sololá, Quiché and Totonicapán – are the
worst perfomring in the country overall, with rates of chronic hunger, for example, that
affect in excess of 60 percent of schoolchildren.103 One community profiled below, Santa
María Chiquimula, reports a staggering rate of 75.5 percent.
Despite the findings from Chapter Three, “state density” is controlled for as well. I
again limit the spread between lowest and highest to within one standard deviation.104
Though it is already clear that there is no correlation between development outcomes and
state density in Guatemala, I nevertheless wanted to minimize the possibility of its
influence in the case studies, and in order to more robustly compare across only the most
“similar” communities.
Finally, communities were chosen that vary across the dependent variable (human
development, as initially indicated by 2005 HDI scores at the municipality level). Based
on initial data, I chose communities that ranged from high to medium to low. In an effort
to control based on the criteria above, however, several communities were rejected
because, despite low state density and unusually high HDI scores, they were either tourist
destinations, regional economic hubs, or communities well populated by wealthier North
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Quiché (63.9%), Sololá (65.2%), and Totonicapán (69.4%) are listed as suffering from “very high” rates
of chronic hunger officially.
	
  
104
State Density (or the SDI_2009 variable) ranges from .11 to .75 (based on 331 observations) with a
mean of .218 and a standard deviation of .079. The spread between San Pablo la Laguna (.22) and Santa
Catarina Polopó (.15) is .07.
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American ex-patriots near Lake Atitlán (or all three). After finding 1994 HDI scores, also
reported at the municipal level, I used the difference in HDI scores over time as a more
robust criterion for determining variation in my dependent variable (Table 12).

Figure 9. Guatemala Field Site Locations

Despite careful efforts to control across communities as best as possible, however, the
two Lake Atitlán communities arguably benefit in absolute terms from access to
resources and services (as indicated by higher HDI scores, and later, by performance in
combating hunger). This is likely because of their proximity to tourist destinations and
local economic hubs.105 I separately try to control for this phenomenon as well, however,
by dividing the six communities into three nested pairs – or two communities from each
department, but which themselves diverge with respect to development outcomes –
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Santa Catarina Polopó, on the east side of the Lake, is only a 15 minute pick-up drive away from
Panajachel, a popular tourist destination with far more services and income generation than most lakeside
communities. San Pablo la Laguna, on the west side of the Lake, is far grittier, remote, and poorer
compared to other lake communities, but is nevertheless a cheap tuk-tuk ride away from San Pedro, another
regional tourist hub and source of employment. Coffee is also a source of income for Magueyense (what
San Pablo residents call themselves, based on a local plant that grows only around their town) – a cash crop
mostly unavailable to the other communities under study.
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providing both a regional-geographical control while continuing to get variation across
the dependent variable.
After sorting through the selection criteria discussed above, six communities are
isolated that fall within each of the parameters. The result is a collection of case studies
(Figure 7) that, despite their similar elevations and low state densities, have very different
development outcomes according to initial data (Table 12). This chapter profiles each
community, with a special focus on levels of social discord, the role of informal actors in
each community and, more generally, the state of local governance for development.
4.2 Profiles in Governance: Santa María Chiquimula, Totonicapán
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC) is located at 6975 feet (2100 meters) above sea level
in the interior of Totonicapán Department – a remote and infrequently visited region with
a population 98% indigenous (K’iché Mayan). Though it has a population of 35,000, it is
one of the larger municipios area-wise (211 km2) and is therefore largely rural, apart from
a mostly sleepy urban core where the Spanish-built Cathedral dominates the landscape,
and where the municipal offices are located. SMC is both one of the poorest communities
in Guatemala and one of the “hungriest,” making it in essence one of the communities
most affected by chronic hunger in the entire Western hemisphere.
In SMC, or “Chiquimula” as locals frequently abbreviate it, social discord is
increasing, with profound implications. It stems, according to interviews, from two
principle sources: newly generated sectarian religious divisions, and political divisions, or
divisions between party affiliates vying for mostly local offices, and subsequent control
of state-dispersed resources, from money to seeds. Chiquimula is somewhat unique
among my cases in that these two drivers of social discord overlap. The locally dominant
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Unidad Nacional de Esperanza party (National Unity of Hope party, or UNE) and its
leaders are generally Evangelical Protestant, while the affiliates of the President’s party,
Patriota (or PP), remain loyal to the more traditional Catholic church.

Figure 10. Map of Santa María Chiquimula Municipality (as published by USAID as part of a local Peace
Corps Project)

Evangelical Christianity has been steadily gaining in popularity in Guatemala for
decades, according to some thanks to a systematic campaign of recruitment that
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capitalized on mass communication and entertainment, if tinkering with doctrine in the
process (McClearly and Pesina 2011, Kevin O’Neill 2010, Schultze 1992). Evangelical
Christianity has itself been divided from within, however, between Pentecostals and
“Neo-Pentecostals.” Though the division among traditional and new religious sects is the
most obvious, multiple interview participants volunteered that emerging splits between
Evangelical sects have created tensions between families and the community as a whole
as well. The overlap with political identity, it was regularly affirmed, exacerbates these
divisions, and has contributed to increasingly tense community relations and an inability
to collectively address community concerns.
For example, several community events organized by the “Muni” (short hand
terminology for the municipal authorities, which in essence is dominated by the mayor
and his closest compatriots), were intentionally skipped by some families. These people
were less motivated by making a political statement, however, as they were simply
unwilling to associate with people with different religious practices. This practice has
since extended to more mundane events – from community celebrations to sporting
events – that are otherwise apolitical. The Muni, in turn, has increasingly monopolized
the political process of decision-making as best it can.
Formerly influential figures, historically - from alcaldes comunitarios (village
mayors), the respective COCODES of different villages, long-standing NGOs with a
development focus, and even the Tzolojche, or council of elders – have had their power
either systematically usurped by the Muni’s “power of purse,” or have been steadily
squeezed out of the decision-making process. The Muni, itself, and potential jobs in its
various offices, are used increasingly for patronage and to empower family members and
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political supporters at the expense of merit-based practices. One Muni worker I
interviewed was asked to either leave his post, or pay what amounted to several month’s
salary. He was ultimately replaced by a family friend of the Mayor’s, with less education
and experience, according to several witnesses. Meanwhile, the most prominent local
NGO, which had been running a successful maternal education program with help from
the Muni, was bypassed in favor of the Mayor’s daughter, who was given an ad-hoc title
and responsibility for the Muni’s own maternal health program.
Though patronage in local government is common and generally unsurprising, the
increasingly delimited battle lines drawn in SMC have disintegrated traditional patterns
of governance by disempowering formerly influential figures, traditional authorities, and
even the legal systems of decentralization, like the COCODES, designed intentionally to
empower citizen influence over development governance. The result is a Muni that
resembles a mini authoritarian, or “cult of personality” regime, in which dissent is rather
nakedly met with retribution, sometime violent, but more frequently through exclusion.
Underscoring the tensions that exist within SMC, and further undermining
development governance at the local level, key social welfare offices that had been
overseen by the Muni have since been “captured” by Patriota officials, and programs are
now administered unilaterally by a single political party rather than by the local
government. Following Patriota’s electoral loss in SMC in 2011, but simultaneously
bolstered by the party’s presidential victory, the Ministry of Social and Economic
Development (MIDES), and agricultural development ministry (MAGA), in particular,
moved their respective headquarters from the municipal building to different corners of
the town. According to unanimous feedback from citizens in subsequent focus groups,
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basic resources designated for the neediest, and hungriest, families are systematically
distributed with the express purpose of vote-buying and an anti-mayor smear campaign.
Finally, several focus group participants argued that new disparities in income,
largely the result of uneven access to remittances, were further complicating social
divisions in Chiquimula. Newly “prominent” families, and even former residents living
abroad, were said to be using money to influence politics and decisions regarding where
to upgrade roads or access to electricity. On a more basic level, new three-story mansions
with opulent edifices now tower over huts that house large families with few resources.
In contrast to the deep social divisions, Chiquimula arguably has a robust civil
society, at least on the surface. The Development Association of Santa María Chiquimula
(ADESMA), for example, is now twenty years old. The Paroquía runs a popular school,
is well staffed by dedicated Spanish volunteers, and runs its own maternal health and
anti-hunger program.106 Separately, village elders had only one year earlier openly
chastised state officials for their mishandling of a direct transfer program.107 When I
asked the director of ADESMA to list all the organizations that worked in SMC with the
purpose of improving social welfare, she penned a list of over 15 organizations.
But as ADESMA’s own experience demonstrates, the mere existence of different
organizations does not constitute a strong civil society. ADESMA itself had been unable
to find a new foreign donor after the former director was accused of mismanagement and
corruption. It currently glides on the faintest of resources, running a small micro-loans
program, while its core work, including women’s empowerment, has been steadily
106

It was through this program that I was able to visit the more remote aldeas.
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“Gobiernos indígenas contra alcaldes electos en Totonicapán,” El Periodico,
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20120725/pais/215555/ (accessed 7/2013)
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usurped by the Muni, or has been discarded altogether given limited resources. Other
organizations have since folded, or exist only on paper. Finally, the local indigenous
leaders are struggling to find traction among the young (in a country experiencing a
massive youth bubble), and are increasingly squeezed out by the political parties and their
money, which dominates all decision-making.108 Thus SMC’s civil society, despite its
proximity to Totonicapán’s capital, and the highly visible 48 Cantones,109 is minimal, and
ineffective at either mobilizing citizens, or influencing key decisions.
Finally, Santa María clearly does not demonstrate state-local complementarity. Its
internal divisions, authoritative local government, and now the fallout of the 2011
elections which resulted in Patriota-staffed social welfare offices breaking from, and
actively working against local authorities, has obliterated state-society relations. At the
same time, the diminishing influence of traditional authorities – succumbing to youth
disinterest, limited funds, and the pull of Evangelism, in particular – has negated the most
likely opportunity for coherent, coordinated protest of patronage and dysfunctional
governance of development.

108

Unofficially, a young, energetic local youth had managed to begin studying political science in
Quetzaltenango, several hours away. On weekends, he was running a civic leadership course for teenage
boys and girls from the region, and was receiving support and guidance from an influential former
president of the 48 Cantones – the well-financed and capable group centered in Totonicapán, but which had
failed to captivate their fellow K’iché in Chiquimula. As the former president explained to me with a wink,
he was in essence grooming the young man for Mayor, and the would-be start of a revolution from within
that would take back politics for the people, and for the indigenous.
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The 48 Cantones deTotonicapán is the highly visible and well-organized indigenous group based in
Totonicapán’s capital city. They have national clout, and made international news after some members
were shot in a protest in October 2012. But as discussed elsewhere, they have not been effective at
improving development outcomes closer to home.
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4.3 Profiles in Governance: Santa Lucia la Reforma, Totonicapán
Santa Lucía la Reforma (SLR) is located at 6013 feet above sea level (1833 meters) in
Totonicapán department, though its urban center is more easily reached from the
department capital of El Quiché and, given difficult travel, is on the one hand tied more
to Quiché than to the other communities in Toto. However, Santa Lucía is still rather
remote, and was in fact once part of Santa María Chiquimula municipio itself, and thus
shares much in terms of historical, cultural and even familial ties with neighboring
Chiquimula – making this nested pair a particularly compelling case.
In fact, several participants in SMC interviews wondered aloud why smaller Santa
Lucía, a rugged four-hour pick-up truck drive away from SMC’s center, despite
bordering one another, was doing “better” than SMC. They had heard that people in need
there were getting important help, that government was responsive, or at least more so,
and that conditions were improving. It was hard to know what sort of credibility to give
such accounts. But despite higher rates of poverty (an astounding 94.5% according to the
latest figures, versus 87.5% in SMC), extreme poverty (55.4%, versus 35% in SMC), and
equal rates of state density (a very low .16), Santa Lucía has outstripped its neighbor in
every development metric besides income – whether illiteracy, infant mortality, HDI
scores, chronic hunger and even homicides. This has occurred, moreover, despite it
recording four times as many victims of conflict and violence during the civil war (a
statistically significant drag on development as demonstrated in Chapter 3), and more
recently, spending half as much (officially) on social services per inhabitant than its
neighbor.
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These two communities alone underscore the puzzle under investigation, and so I
took the more reliable, if nevertheless touch-and-go option of a bus from SMC to Cuatro
Caminos, another to Totonicapán’s city center, another through its sacred forests and over
mountain passes on the landslide-prone road to Santa Cruz del Quiché, and finally
another micro-bus – jammed to the gills as always – into Santa María’s town square.

Figure 11. Totonicapán Department, scanned from Guatemala's National Geographic Institute. Note the
prximity of Santa María Chiquimula and Santa Lucía la Reforma (center and top right)

120

After a series of interviews with the heads of each different government ministry
represented in town,110 Church leaders, indigenous leaders from around the municipio
fortuitously gathered in the center, the municipal Mayor himself, and finally after
participating in a monthly meeting111 organized by the mayor as part of his
responsibilities under Hambre Cero – the anti-hunger program discussed more in Chapter
Five – which included civil society members, it is clear that SLR is indeed operating
under different conditions than Chiquimula.
Several different experiences during my visits indicate that SLR experiences far less
social discord than SMC. In all of my interviews, participants described how they were
working in conjunction with other offices in order to accomplish specific targets. In a
contentious meeting between village leaders, organized ahead of the main market day and
the monthly COMUSAN meeting with the Mayor and others, leaders hammered out their
position regarding certain policies, and their respective roles in each community vis-à-vis
state actors.
More telling, both the mayor and village leaders described cordial relations, but also
relative independence from one another, compared with SMC where the Mayor had
cowed village leaders in his effort to secure his authority.
Finally, the mayor, and separately the lead Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni Morales,
described very similar experiences in working hard to actively bridge the gap between
traditional church followers and the emerging Pentecostal movement that had permeated
110

MIDES, MAGA, and El Comité Nacional de Alfabetización (CONALFA, the National Literacy
Committee).
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La Comisión de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional, COMUSAN, is held monthly and chaired by the
Mayor in each community that receives Hambre Cero assistance. SMC held COMUSAN meetings as well,
but I was consistently told that the Mayor dominated events and resisted outside input. As I will discuss
later, COMUSAN meetings are not regularly held in other communities.
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even remote Santa Lucía. Cuesta, each told me separately, cuesta mucho… “It’s been
very challenging”… “But,” the mayor added, “there really is no other option.”
It is important to note that the mayor of Santa Lucía is affiliated with Patriota, and so
no conflict arises between those running Hambre Cero, for instance, and local
government, as exists in Chiquimula. In fact a large banner covered the second story of
the municipal offices during my visit, celebrating the mayor’s administration and
declaring him “The Mayor that Works for His People” (El Alcalde que Trabaja por Su
Pueblo), with a photo of the mayor and the President in one corner. Given the degree to
which political parties have exacerbated tensions in Chiquimula, as well as in other
communities, this factor should not be diminished. At the same time, however, the
Totonicapán departmental director of SESAN,112 while acknowledging the challenges he
faces in coordinating events community-to-community, cites SLR as by far the
community in which Hambre Cero had been best received, and where it is making the
most impact.
Indeed, key differences exist between Chiquimula and SLR. Though the number and
influence of locally-based organizations is limited in both places, as is the role of elders
or indigenous organizations, alcaldes comunitarios in SLR are active and invested in
development questions. Alcaldes comunitarios are semi-formal village leaders, from the
aldeas, that represent local interests before the mayor. In one meeting, they discussed
exactly how best to work with the local Hambre Cero coordinator in order to identify
crisis situations, and the families most in need. In another, the local director of RENAP,
or the government entity in charge of registering citizens and issuing new IDs (that are
112

La Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional de la Presidencial de la República (SESAN)
oversees Hambre Cero.
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then used for voting as well), visited the alcaldes and implored them (a truly astounding
site after a month in Chiquimula and Toto) for their help in mobilizing citizens,
alleviating people’s fears, and even helping arrange transportation to the office where
they were digitizing registrations and issuing new identification cards. In subsequent
interviews, it was clear that this was an established role of the alcaldes, who had already
been bringing people to the local health clinic for vaccinations and ante-natal checkups,
and working with state officials in order to build trust. 113

Figure 12. Variation in Total Poverty Levels in Totonicapán (Source: UNDP Guatemala)
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For the sake of transparency and full disclosure, I should also note that, while they were in attendance at
the COMUSAN meeting, several were very intoxicated, even by 9 am, and were admonished by the Mayor
and others for their poor judgment – a reality check before over-romanticizing their influence. They were,
whether reluctantly or not, nevertheless seen as key agents in SLR.
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In stark contrast to Chiquimula, Santa Lucía illustrates a version of state-local
complementarity. Both Mayor Don Francisco, and Roni Morales, the central
government’s representative, remarked separately that they have been actively working in
order build trust and identify key obstacles to implementation.114 The mayor, who again
is Patriota affiliated, dismisses the idea that the state is an object of distrust in his
community, or to be avoided, despite its history of violence during the conflict and more
recent arrests made in the area for marijuana production. He identified, instead, three
contemporary threats to community cohesiveness and effective governance, including
sectarian divisions, political party rivalries and comités, or ad-hoc groups that organize
around single-issues in an uncoordinated fashion. Both the mayor and Roni underscored
the hard work it has taken to try to overcome community divisions, or respond to the
more obstinate local actors. Other state actors, meanwhile – from MAGA and
CONALFA – described a “development-oriented” mayor who had their best interests in
mind, and who was generally supportive of their respective missions.115
The CONALFA representative, for example (who was in fact from Chiquimula
originally), argues that, despite the influence of churches, and no obvious influence by
principals (traditional elders), the community’s well-grounded Maya tradition of
“service” (voluntario institucionál) partly permitted more congenial relations in SLR.
While this concept had frayed in neighboring Chiquimula, he asserted that its influence
remained intact in SLR.
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Based on interviews (October 10th and 11th, 2013)
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Interviews (October 9, 2013)
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Crucially, not everything is perfect. Two of ten villages in the municipio had refused
CONALFA’s overtures, and the administrator lamented being unable to set up his
programs there. Arguably, this is a state failure to penetrate remote corners of its
territory. On the other hand, the representative told me that, without the support of the
local leaders, it was meaningless for him to impose himself. This echoes my experience in
a meeting of the village mayors described earlier, in which the RENAP representative
pleaded for their assistance in mobilizing people in order to register, and to coordinate
transportation (an obvious constraint in the rural, rugged countryside). This degree of
deference to local authorities is highly unusual and highlights differences in de facto
governance practice across two neighboring communities.116
Finally, in the COMUSAN meeting several days later, the mayor and Roni spoke at
length, as did many others about their respective challenges, while the village leaders sat
in attendance, making occasional comments. The meeting was conducted in Spanish and
K’iché, interchangeably (not simultaneously). The key agenda item was how to make
Hambre Cero useful to the locals, by addressing questions of literacy and accessibility. In
this setting, the most traditional, informal actors were in the background, and had no
observable influence over decision-making and implementation (though the semi-formal
role of local leaders was highlighted in the meeting as crucial on separate occasions). In
comparison to the other communities, state actors in SLR are deferring to local wishes
and working thoughtfully through local interlocutors in unprecedented ways.
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In the COMUSAN meeting several days later, however, the CONALFA representative was taken to task
for not doing more to include these communities in his campaign, which on the other hand demonstrates
the unusually high motivation on the part of the governance actors in the room to make positive impacts.
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4.4 Profiles in Governance: Zacualpa, El Quiché
Zacualpa (4875 feet, or 1485 meters, above sea level) is located in the southern flank
of the department of El Quiché. In a sense, it is rather easily reached by bus from the
regional capital of Santa Cruz. Its legacy, however, is one of tragedy. During the civil
war, the army was very active in bombing the hills between Zacualpa and neighboring
Joyabaj in an effort to demolish rebel hideouts. The army also commandeered Zacualpa’s
church grounds, converting them into a detainment and torture center, while
unceremoniously dumping the bodies of victims into the church’s wells. The church
today is in part a shrine to the many victims.
Zacualpa also represents the most divisive community in my study. It is here that an
angry mob attempted to burn down the municipal building after the current mayor, Sr.
Ernesto Calachij, won a contentious third term in 2011. Even before this incident,
tensions turned into violence when pro-mayor and Patriota supporters openly clashed in
the streets of this otherwise out-of-the way and quiet community, resulting in burned cars
and many injured.117 On my visit, many interview participants quietly noted that
unreported incidents of retribution stemming from the election-related violence have
taken place. Meanwhile the Patriota candidate at the time has since been jailed and
convicted for his role in the torture and murder of two opponents, who were also
COCODE members.118
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http://elperiodico.com.gt/es/20110310/pais/192181 and http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/noticias/Turbaquema-edificio-edil_0_553744644.html (accessed September 2013).
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http://www.prensalibre.com.gt/noticias/justicia/Condenan-prision-excandidato-alcaldeZacualpa_0_860914131.html (accessed October 2013).
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Zacualpa municipio,
with its urban center
located at the
bottom.

Patzité

Figure 13. Quiché Department, with field site locations identified (Source: Scanned from National
Geographic Institute)
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These overt and headline-grabbing events have largely given way to more subtle and
daily acts of criminality that underscore the divisions plaguing Zacualpa. A religious
leader from the Catholic Church – whose cathedral faces the Muni across the square in a
seemingly symbolic squaring off of opposing camps – described how she and others from
the paroquía have been stopped by machete-wielding thugs when traveling through
communities widely known to be “pro-Mayor.”119 Her consistent and outspoken position
on what she perceived to be abuse of authority by the mayor has, in essence, made her
persona non grata in “pro-mayor” territory. The Church’s subsequent efforts to support
schools in certain aldeas have been rejected by COCODES under the thumb of the
mayor. She further accused the mayor of violently replacing the staff of certain
government offices with his supporters, and actively drawing battle lines between those
aldeas that supported him electorally, and those that did not – depriving the “opposition”
aldeas of basic resources. Finally, she accused the mayor of recruiting enforcers through
his network of former PAC120 colleagues, further dividing the community along lines that
evoke the civil war, which resulted in over 600 casualties here and egregious human
rights abuses. She concluded our lengthy interview – which was a tragic litany of stories
demonstrating the community’s current turmoils – succinctly: “our social fabric (tejido
social) is broken.”
I witnessed many of these phenomena myself on trips to surrounding aldeas. People
in the Muni, other than the Mayor, were also surprisingly forthcoming about how only
select communities were privy to assistance, and how the Muni’s relationship with
119

Interview with Sister Ana María Alvarez Lopez (October 15, 2013).
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Patrullas de Autodefensas Civiles (PACs, or “civil defense patrols”) were utilized by the army during
the civil war in order to recruit supporters within communities, and in order to divide communities,
weakening rebels and diluting their base of support.
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Patriota and government offices like MIDES and MAGA were cantankerous, if not
downright toxic.121

Figure 14. Variation in Total Poverty In Quiché Department. Note: Zacualpa and Pachalum are mislabled,
and reversed in this image.

Finally, I watched as poor families lined up outside the MIDES office on the outskirts
of Zacualpa’s center, receiving their basic bonos (basic transfers of rice, beans and
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This is based on multiple interviews with various Zacualpense Muni staff, especially in the Women’s
Office (OMM), and subsequently confirmed by the workers in each government office, who confirmed that
relations with the mayor were very bad (October 2013).
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Incanparina122). Multiple people from the neighborhood confirmed that these were
Patriota supporters/supported, who could never expect assistance from the Muni.
Nowhere that I had visited in Guatemala, or would visit yet, were social divisions so
obviously entrenched, daily, and openly acknowledged.
Zacualpa, like Chiquimula, has a superficially robust civil society. Small NGOs, like
ASODINZA123 or ASODEZA,124 work independently to provide resources to farmers and
water to citizens respectively. Others, however, have become part of the wider schism
that affects the community. People at ADIZ,125 for example, which works throughout El
Quiché but has its headquarters in Zacualpa, told me that “the doors at the Muni are
closed to us – they want nothing to do with us.” What they did not tell me initially was
that its director had run for mayor and lost, assuring its place as opposition. In contrast,
trips to aldeas organized by the Woman’s Office126 were funded by NutriSalud127 and
USAID. These groups are independent but rely on local interlocutors to help disseminate
their maternal health education package, which includes a video and presentation. The
OMM, openly hostile to communities seen as in opposition to Mayor Calachij,128
provided the local Nutri-Salud coordinator the means with which to reach rural hamlets.
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A cheap high-protein food made of cottonseed, sorghum flours, maize, yeast, etc. used to prevent
protein-deficiency diseases. See: http://www.incaparina.com/
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Asociacion de Desarrollo Intergral Zacaulpense
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Asociacion de Desarrollo de Zacualpa
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Asociacion de Desarrollo Integral Zacualpenese
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Oficina de la Mujer (OMM)
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http://www.urc-chs.com/news?newsItemID=295

128

In multiple interviews with the OMM director, I was candidly told that the Mayor’s office, and its
resources, won’t be wasted on ungrateful communities. “If they won’t help us, then why should we help
them,” she told me in English (she lived in Rhode Island for 10 years).
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The OMM then invited additional groups, like ACOMQUI (or the Quiché Association of
Comudronas, or birthing assistants) to attend and nominally support the program.
The program itself was deftly run by a young Nutri-Salud coordinator, and was both
well attended and engaging. But separately the program became a mini-rally for the
mayor, his party, and even his church, and of course actively excluded the participation
of some community members. The mayor made a surprise visit to one presentation,
extolling his administration, party and even his evangelical church (though he also made
a point to present and welcome me).
Though partly inadvertent, some local civil society groups had hitched their wagon to
the mayor’s and are now perceived as being on one side of the divide that increasingly
divides the community. More remotely, even well-regarded, internationally funded NGOs
and aid agencies, despite sophisticated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, are
funding a campaign of political division and exclusion at the local level.
Finally, though Zacualpa does have an alcadía indígena, with headquarters only
blocks from the Muni, its influence is limited and generally relegated to questions of
culture and identity, not development policy or distribution of resources. También,
también, the distinguished elder who is the current Alacdía Indígena told me – “we also
do that” – when I asked if the Alcadía concerned itself with hunger, or poverty, or
worked with the COCODES.129 But in the villages themselves, people mostly smiled at
my naïveté, and explained that, “sure we have an alcadía…but this is not what he’s
for…he cannot affect these matters…”
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June 2013 interviews.
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Figure 15. Zacualpa Municipality Map with Local Field Sites Identified (Source: Scanned from map at city
offices)

Nowhere in this study are the relations between state actors and local government
officials so transparently toxic. As the local MIDES official told me, “Zacualpa is slowly
dying because of the mayor.” “The mayor and his reign of terror are causing a sickness.”
She went on to claim harassment, including death threats, and having been shut out of
visiting certain communities by the mayor’s supporters. Other government officials were
not quite as vitriolic, but acknowledged the deadlock. Meanwhile it is clear that Patriota,
for its part, actively smears the mayor and has stirred the pot, though it is unclear whether
it is responsible for directly organizing violent protests.
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Development, meanwhile, outside minor improvements at the health clinic,130 is
virtually at a standstill in Zacualpa. There are informal actors – including madres guías
and comudronas (birthing assistants that have slowly gained additional training in recent
years)131 – contributing to maternal and infant health in the remotest aldeas. But they do
not coordinate in any fashion with state actors.
Alas, Zacualpa is void of the complementarity that permeated state-society relations
in SLR. Its development trajectory, on paper, is positive, but outside the city center,
hunger and poverty remains widespread. Arguably, incremental increases in health
service in rural areas, including those by informal actors like traditional midwives, have
had some impact. More likely, according to interviews both from within and outside
Zacualpa, is that a somewhat famous influx of remittances to Zacaulpa has bolstered
livelihoods in and around the city center.132 Indeed, Zacualpa appears on the surface more
prosperous than either Chiquimula or SLR. But given this prosperity, then, development
indicators are remarkably low. Governance-for-development, meanwhile, is non-existent.
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This is based on interviews with physicians at the local clinic (October 18, 2013). They acknowledge
modest improvements in Zacualpa thanks to improved staffing in the most rural puestos de salud (health
outposts), increased awareness amongst young mothers, and improved vaccination rates. They largely
credit previous central governments for these changes and try to stay mostly aloof from local political
dynamics.
131

A local NGO – La Asociacion de Comudronas de Quiché – has trained 152 birthing assistants over the
last 12 years, and work with village leaders to convince them to accept their presence. They claim to have
improved conditions for young mothers and infants in the countryside. They do not, however, coordinate
with any state actors (October 16, 2013 interviews).
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Interviewees with policymakers and academics in Guatemala City were aware of Zacualpa because of a
perception that it has prospered, in a relative sense, especially through remittances. The effects of large
flows of remittances on northern communities in El Quiché – mostly negative by encouraging household
debt – is discussed by anthropologist David Stoll in El Norte or Bust (2013).
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4.5 Profiles in Governance: Patzité, El Quiché
Patzité, at a temperate 7545 feet above sea level (2300 meters), is an obscure
destination for visitors in southern El Quiché department, located down bumpy secondary
roads that climb slowly out of the regional capital of Santa Cruz. It largely avoided the
worst of the civil war, but unlike nearby communities, like Chichicastenango in
particular, neither traditional forms of leadership nor indigenous identity play a
significant role in local politics. Here, the more formal system of COCODES is intact and
influential, while the mayor’s office dominates.
This small community has rather quietly grappled with its development questions in
isolation. In a nested pair with Zacualpa, Patzité would initially appear to be the
underperformer, with a precipitous drop in its reported HDI scores from the late 1990s to
2005. But a more systematic look across a suite of indicators muddies the waters. On the
one hand, Patzité has historically better education indicators (including the disaggregated
HDI education indicator, as well as better illiteracy numbers, and improvements in
illiteracy over time). On the other hand, it has higher chronic hunger rates (74.7% versus
57.4% in Zacualpa), but with much greater improvements in hunger over time (-6.8%
versus -1.4% in Zacualpa), and far superior infant mortality rates (18 per 100,000 versus
38 in Zacualpa).
After surveying more obscure indicators from Guatemala’s National Statistics
Institute (INE), the development landscape shifts more in favor of Patzité. Despite
potable water being the hallmark of the Calachij administration in Zacualpa,133 for
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The Mayor mentioned potable water to me on several occasions as proof that he puts development first
in his community, citing several projects that he spearheaded.
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example, far more houses in Zacualpa report lacking permanent access to plumbing than
in Patzité. These differences occur, moreover, despite almost identical poverty and
extreme poverty rates between the two communities. Similarly, over three times as many
houses in Zacualpa report lacking any form of permanent facility for the “disposal of
excrement.” Finally, the more holistic indicator of “unsatisfied basic needs,” a composite
index of well-being intended to capture subnational variation in access to basic resources
(Hyman 2006), is far greater in Zacualpa (83.24 versus 69.33) than in Patzité. Thus in
most respects, Patzité has demonstrated more robust development performance over the
last decade.
Interviews with different actors134 – from the mayor and his volunteer committee
members to health workers, the justice of peace, and central government actors among
others – were generally positive about the direction of the most basic programs, even if
most acknowledged significant challenges still. Though the mayor, when asked, hinted at
the possibility of periodic political wrangling, most other interview participants
diminished the influence of political conflict on their respective work. After my time in
Zacualpa, this was somewhat surprising, especially since the mayor in Patzité is affiliated
with the UNE party, like Chiquimula’s mayor, rather than Patriota. Overall, despite
somewhat inevitable tensions between political parties, Patzité has avoided the deep
social divisions that plague Zacualpa and Chiquimula.
Relative to these communities in fact, Patzité appears remarkably “developmentoriented,” with a mayor and council seemingly dedicated to improving the conditions of
local people – with a particular focus on education. But there is limited evidence of
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November 2013.
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complementarity as seen in SLR. Emblematic of a more typical disconnect between state
resources and local needs is the arrival of a used ambulance to the local clinic, but
inadequate fuel keeps it grounded most days. As well, in interviews with MIDES and
MINEDUC (Ministry of Education), staff were reluctant but nevertheless hinted at
tension between their offices and the mayor’s. However, the regional director of SESAN
in Santa Cruz views Patzité very favorably compared to Zacualpa with respect to his
efforts at implementing Hambre Cero. In interviews he noted that, despite the Mayor of
Patzité being from another party, he, himself, is able to work with the mayor effectively
to help implement Hambre Cero – though I did not witness the active, and purposeful
degree of cooperation as is evident in SLR. Separately, the director of CORSADEC,135 a
Guatemalan NGO active in the region, also spoke well of Patzité’s mayor, and his general
support for CORSADEC programs, and the development trajectory of Patzité more
generally. But explicit cooperation with, or the use of, local, informal interlocutors by
either state actors or NGOs is done on only an ad-hoc basis, if at all.
4.6 Profiles in Governance: Santa Catarina Palopó, Sololá
Santa Catarina Palopó, or SCP hereafter, is a beautiful village sandwiched between
steep hillsides and Lake Atitlán, in the department of Sololá (5456 feet or 1663 meters).
It is a very small, sleepy community with three aldeas. Because of its topography, the
municipio as a whole is disjointed, even if physically contiguous by map. Steep cliffs
separate the coastal center and the uphill aldeas, requiring as much as an hour’s drive to
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http://corsadec.org/actividades-importantes/
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connect them. Though hunger emergencies are not uncommon still,136 SCP’s proximity to
the tourist center of Panajachel has allowed for more steady employment opportunities
and access to services than the case studies in Totonicapán and Quiché, discussed below.
This is reflected by a relatively high 2005 HDI score (.504), though this had fallen
considerably since the initial 1994 calculation and poverty remains high (Table 12).

Figure 16. Sololá Department Map (Source: Scan of National Geogrphic Institute map)

The Sololá region in which SCP is located is largely Kaqchikel Maya, and the seat of
one of the most-well organized and dynamic forms of indigenous leadership in
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Interviews with local clinic personnel, and further substantiated by interviews with Hambre Cero
personnel (November and December 2013).

137

Guatemala, the Alcadía Indígena of Sololá municipality (Klick 2013). Sololá more
generally has been site of some of the most overt resistance to state influence both during
and after the civil war (centered in Santiago Atitlán, especially, to the West along the
lake). But despite the relative proximity of these communities to SCP, each lakeside
community, it is clear, has a distinct culture and unique historical experiences. Likewise,
the influence of indigenous forms of government, and state-society relations, varies
wildly across space. SCP, for example, was largely unaffected by the war in a direct
sense (as measured by my calculations of violent events using CEH 1999).
With respect to social discord specifically, one phenomenon dominates all others in
SCP. In interview after interview, everyone told me that if I wanted to know more about
development, or anything regarding SCP for that matter, I needed to speak with el exalcalde, or the former mayor, Mariano Lopez. Even the current mayor seemed at a loss
during our interview with how to govern SCP – expressing frustration as leaned far back
in his chair and covered his forehead, broadly admitting to being unable to affect change.
Hambre Cero, he further told me, simply does not exist. COMUSAN meetings have since
ended as well.
Don Mariano, it seems, has a stranglehold on all development resources – including
official state resources that are owed to the Muni – and uses them, in his own words “for
the good of my community.” He claims only to be helping the central government
distribute resources more equitably, while avoiding the “corrupt” current mayor and his
“gang of thugs” (who were democratically elected only two years previously, but who are
affiliated with UNE, not Patriota). After a health worker confirmed, unprompted, that
Don Mariano maneja todos los programas (is in charge of all the assistance programs),
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and after witnessing the current mayor’s own frustrations, it is clear that this community
was divided between two distinct, political cleavages.
Palopó presents a conundrum regarding the complementarity thesis. On the one hand,
the state is utilizing what is arguably the most influential actor it the community to
distribute resources. On the other hand, the state is largely absent, with little oversight
given that it has none of the permanent offices that the other communities have,137 and
cannot guarantee equitable or appropriate distribution of critical resources (if it is not
already actively exacerbating the political rift crippling the Muni). Informal leadership in
Palopó, which consists exclusively of Maya shaman, are largely in the background –
periodically intervening to urge a family to go to the hospital in the case of a hunger
emergency, but on other occasions resisting the influence of the state and avoiding health
officials’ pleas.138
Santa Catarina Palopó therefore demonstrates a perverse form of complementarity –
one in which state and local forces merge, but simultaneously undermine official
governance, and underscore political tensions and discord in the community. This
importantly demonstrates that complementarity is not simply a function of social capital,
not always a force for good. Complementarity hinges, as is becoming clear and as will be
discussed more in Chapter Five, on “brokers” in the community, and their networks, with
implications for future efforts to cultivate complementarity for development as a policy
tool.
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MIDES, MAGA, etc. are based in Sololá and perform site visits, according to the departmental SESAN
office personnel (multiple interviews over November and December 2013).
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Interviews with SESAN’s Sololá personnel.
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Figure 17. Total Poverty Rates in Sololá (UNDP)

4.7 Profiles in Governance: San Pablo la Laguna, Sololá
San Pablo la Laguna (6861 feet, 2091meters) is on the northwestern side of the lake,
but set back more than other lakeside communities, perched somewhat precariously on a
sloping plateau. It is, according to locals, the only place on the lake where the Maguey
plant (agave) grows, which is used for making ropes and other crafts locally, and now a
symbol of unity for the community. The local language is Tz’utujil, which is similar but
distinct from Kaq’chikel as is spoken in SCP.
San Pablo’s history with social discord is somewhat more peculiar than in other sites.
Focus groups and interview participants acknowledge, and indeed mostly accept as given,
140

that Patriota workers support party loyalists first, including with bonos and other
resources intended for the poorest or hungriest. Similarly, the mayor (from the rather
obscure and partly religiously oriented Victoria party) would naturally help his most
ardent supporters first. Unlike in Zacaulpa, however, the mayor’s role seems mostly
symbolic, and is not the focal point of frustration or citizen grievances. Moreover, as
interviews mounted, the political party–patronage system that is now entrenched in
Chiquimula and Zacualpa, appears more theater in San Pablo, and more rhetorical, than
systematic.
Many interviewees noted that, in an emergency, they would seek the help of either
family members, or the mayor, first, who has on more than once occasion personally
driven sick community members to the hospital in Sololá, an hour-plus drive through
switchbacks and mountain passes. The mayor, himself, after a lengthy explanation of
how his finances worked (or rather how they did not, given that they largely evaporated
after paying for the most basic services, salaries and overhead) characterized his own role
as one of a friendly patriarch, embodying the pride and aspirations of San Pablo more
than a leader with real levers with which to change its living conditions.139
Grievances were mostly directed at an amorphous state ideal, over the insecurity of
employment, and over the relative gains witnessed in nearby tourist communities like San
Juan and San Pedro at the expense of San Pablo, or so it is perceived. And while
healthcare seems to have improved for children, with increased access to vaccinations for
139

This, I should note, is a common refrain of people from across the country in their respective villages –
that things are in some ways immutable, and that life is more a battle for survival under the given
conditions, in which politicians steal, the rich dominate politics, and where poverty is inevitable. It is a
cultural reality that, in focus groups in particular (versus with heads of NGOs who are indeed committed to
change), made my work challenging, as my initial questions were met with a shrug. Even more basic
questions dominated their lives, whereas political questions were a luxury not yet afforded time.
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example, the local clinic is otherwise unable to treat adults regularly given limited
resources. In contrast to every other community, however, interview participants
routinely evoked the notion of “solidarity” within the community, and then connected
this directly to the meaning of development.140
This was striking. Despite their grievances, people from San Pablo fiercely
distinguished themselves from neighboring communities. Only in San Pablo (and
Santiago across the lake), I was told, do sacerdotes Mayas (or traditional healers) play a
visible role in village society. I trekked through coffee fields to visit Santa Ana – a
peculiar rock outcropping that resembled a pregnant woman that serves as the patron
saint of comudronas throughout Guatemala, but for which San Pablo residents are
especially proud. I also visited Mayan altars that are in still regular use, and of special
significance in the daily lives of residents. Finally, more than one participant
distinguished the political culture of San Pablo from other communities – especially
wealth-driven San Juan only a few minutes away – as one of socialismo. “We fight for
the poor here,” explained my young, local assistant who had helped arrange many
interviews for me, before dropping me off in front of a large mural dedicated to former
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.
San Pablo in some ways represents the de-facto model of governance that is
emblematic of many communities and their experiences. Traditional and informal actors
have a significant influence over the beliefs and religious practices of citizens, but are
otherwise not the flag bearers of indigenous resistance that might be assumed. Though
different in their respective roles – whether environmental stewards, or healers – in each
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Multiple interview and focus group participants evoked “solidarity” when asked, first, how they defined
“development.” This response diverged considerably from the other five field sites.
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community the most traditional forms of authority and leadership have sunk back into the
shadows, their leaders loathe to take part in petty political wranglings – which is a form
of resistance in itself, however passive. But in the context of limited statehood and
limited funding, but immediate need, formal actors like the mayor govern less and
respond more – taking ad-hoc measures to help community members when they can, and
meeting with state actors as needed. Governance itself, then, becomes more symbolic
than productive, with development less the result of any government’s intention, and
more the temporary fortune of its people – of a good crop, of a motivated NGO, or of a
new source of income –whether from remittances, work along the Pacific lowland coast,
or access to a touristic hub.
4.8 Conclusions: Spatial Variability in Governance and Development
The purpose of this chapter is principally to introduce the six case studies that
constitute this study. As is already evident, mostly similar communities – with respect to
demographics, state presence and local economies – diverge considerably along
development outcomes as well as in systems of local governance. How these factors are
linked is the focus of the following chapters, which more systematically explore the
causal pathways through which governance influences development.
As was noted earlier, none of the communities are particularly thriving, per se. But
some communities, like Santa Lucía la Reforma in particular, are making considerable
progress along basics development indicators, even if poverty rates remain staggeringly
high, and despite a tragic legacy of conflict. How past conflict continues to affect
communities today is still uncertain, though Zacualpa provides some insight: There, new
political divisions and rivalries stem from the mayor’s past participation with civilian
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patrols – pitting local ladinos (non-indigenous Guatemalans) against indigenous
opponents, and evoking thirty year old social cleavages formed during the civil war.
More common across all communities is some element of religious cleavage, between
traditional Catholic affiliations and the growing wave of Evangelical Protestantism,
which either overlaps with, or deepens, emerging social cleavages. Much of the local
social division, however, stems from what is unanimously recognized by citizens as the
growing prominence of political party affiliation. Political party affiliation has created
deep divisions within otherwise harmonious communities, and usurped the influence of
informal indigenous leaders, who only recently retained great influence over local
decision-making and implementation of development projects.
Making sense of the above requires a more systematic approach, however. The
following chapter demonstrates how a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of all six
communities assists in deconstructing the links between governance and development.
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CHAPTER FIVE: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of SIX
HIGHLAND COMMUNITIES
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has been employed in social science research
as a means to systematically compare across an intermediate amount of cases in order to
test the necessity and sufficiency of carefully coded causal conditions. Its main purpose is
to allow for such comparisons, “while at the same time giving justice to within-case
complexity” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: xviii, as quoted in Speer 2011).
Specifically, QCA methods account for multi-causality (or “equifinality”) – the
possibility of unobservable interactions between explanatory variables, and limitations in
a researcher’s ability to adequately make perfectly controlled comparisons (George and
Bennett 2005). Equifinality is of particular concern to social science research, and small
n-case study research especially, where case selection and omitted variables can skew
causal inferences, resulting in spurious conclusions.
QCA allows the investigator to more finely detect the presence of not only multiple
causal conditions (or independent variables), but configurations of causal conditions and
even multiple configurations and how they interact. Using QCA to reveal otherwise
unclear configurations of causal conditions also provides insight into the more nuanced
and relative influence of individual conditions, including the presence or absence of
conditions that are necessary, sufficient, both or neither, and still more complex
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combinations (or INUS causes – insufficient but necessary parts of a configuration that is
unnecessary but sufficient).141

Table 13. QCA Coding per Variable

Presence of:

Coding Criteria:

Social Spending?
(A=high, a=low)

ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total
budget per inhabitant spent on “social functions” = above (high)
or below (low) mean (234.54 Quetzales/person)

“Strong” local civil
society?
(B=high, b=low)

Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the presence and
density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or traditional
authority? More crucially, can these organizations affect change,
mobilize citizens, and spur deference by other actors.

Social discord?
(C=high, c=low)

Qualitative observations and interviews: What is the extent and
nature of social divisions within a community, if any? How do they
manifest?

Conflictaffectedness?
(D=high, d=low)

Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below
(low) the mean conflict intensity “score” (96 victims/community).
This is augmented by qualitative data gained through interviews.

Complementarity
(E =high, e=low)

Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working,
or not, with government officials to implement anti-hunger
program elements.

Improvements in
Hunger? (DV)

Beginning with the difference between Guatemala’s 2 and 3
“hunger census” (which measures stunting) scores, differences are
calculated as a percentage and compared across communities

Δ Illiteracy (DV)

Changes in illiteracy rates between 2009 and 2011 based on
official statistics and compared with mean (-1.6%) and SD (5%).
Greater than 2 SDs = “High”

Infant Mortality
Rates (2009) (DV)

Compared with mean (36.0) and SD (30.5). Differences beyond 1
SD are coded as “High,” within 1 SD = “Med”, and below the
mean = “Low”

Δ HDI 20052011(DV)

Using the extrapolated HDI score representing 2011, change in
HDI is calculated as percentage and, besides direction (+/-), is
compared with the mean difference (.067)

HDI 2011 (DV)

Absolute values extrapolated from difference between 2000 and
2005 figures.

nd

141

See fn 76.
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Table 13 presents the key independent variables under investigation in this study’s
qualitative component, and how their presence or absence was established,
methodologically. Different proxies for development that serve as dependent variables
are reiterated in Table 13 as well.
This strict coding criteria is essential for deciphering the presence or absence of key
variables. Naturally, variables are present to different degrees, and “medium” cases of
anything are more difficult to interpret. In these cases, however, the coding criteria allows
for a firm decision with respect to the presence and absence of variables. Fortunately, and
in the cases selected here, the coding criteria did not conflict with cases or force a
(potentially biased) judgment call, and instead allowed for more precise coding and
subsequent analysis.
5.1 Communities in Conflict: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Human
Development in Rural Guatemala
This section systematically analyzes the presence or absence of each independent
variable, determined by qualitative observations from all six communities with
quantitative metrics where applicable, in order to build a “truth table” representing how
different variables correlate with varying development outcomes in each community.
From field site visits discussed above, and the combination of key-informant interviews
and focus groups in the most remote aldeas, a combination of thick description and
process tracing (discussed in Chapter 6) is used to code each variable. The qualitative
component allows for more exploration into the presence and influence of variables that
could not be tested in the quantitative component, including “social discord,” and,
crucially, “complementarity.”
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5.1.1 – Social Discord
In the quantitative analysis component of this project (Chapter 3), no clear metric can
capture the degree to which a community is internally divided, or “cohesive” for that
matter (though I attempted to at least crudely capture an element of this phenomenon
through homicide rates and numbers of official denuncias). Yet literature – ranging from
political science to anthropology and even legal studies – frequently observes varying
levels of community division in Mayan Guatemala, linking such social breakdown to the
armed conflict and its legacy, or as the result of a state-dominant (and culturally ignorant)
punitive legal system. Divisions have also resulted from a clash between traditional
Mayan values, including concepts of Mayan authority rooted in the cofradía system,142
and the modern political system that biases the wealthy and educated candidate, and
which values national priorities over local matters, further undermining tradition and
traditional governance (Hawkings, McDonald and Adams 2013, International Crisis
Group 2013, personal interviews in Totonicapán).
Scholars have since linked social divisions within Mayan communities to a rash of
extra-legal “lynchings”143 – or cases of violent, sometimes lethal reprisals conducted by
citizens as punishment for what are frequently minor crimes by neighbors (Godoy 2006;
Hawkins, McDonald and Adams 2013; Sieder 2010). Certain Mayan communities more
effectively organize themselves, however, either to deploy a collective system of Mayan
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This is the now mostly defunct system of a council of elders that elects a single leader based on
leadership and demonstrated contributions to community well-being. It had, until recently, been a
significant honor, and came with important responsibilities. It also carried, frequently, far more importance
at the village level than elected government.
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Though some would argue that lynchings represent an attempt, however misguided, by communities to
reclaim what is a constitutionally-recognized local authority of Mayan law over criminal matters
(Hessbruegge and Ochoa García 2011).
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law in conjunction with state officials and the national police, or to self-police without
the use of violence and in pursuit of greater autonomy (Sieder 2010, Hawkins, McDonald
and Adams 2013, International Crisis Group 2013, personal interviews in Totonicapán
with 48 Cantones leadership).
The most organized – like the 48 Cantones de Totonicapán – can evoke traditional
indigenous mores, and an entrenched desire for autonomy, to mobilize citizens in protest
of anything from taxes to electricity prices. The organization’s leadership – generally
well-educated in legal matters and public policy – has a tense relationship with central
authorities, who have deferred to Canton leadership in times of crisis, but otherwise
dismiss their legitimacy. Their legitimacy, nevertheless, grants the organization
tremendous influence locally, which has been used to stem violence, self-police, and to
organize mass, peaceful public protest.
Peculiarly, however, the organization has not been able to convert this authority into
development gains. The Totonicapán community as a whole has made only minimal gains
in combating hunger (with current rates of 65 percent). Meanwhile outlying communities
of the municipality, but still under the purview of the Cantons, were reporting rates of
acute hunger among schoolchildren of 100 percent as late as October 2013.144
In the six communities under focus in this study, social discord is widely prominent,
but varies across space and manifests in different ways. Based on fieldwork described in
Chapter 4, each community’s experience with social discord is subsequently coded as
either “high” or “low.” This judgment is based on the degree to which social divisions are
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This is based on interviews with the department’s head of Hambre Cero, who shared with me original
data from the program’s monitoring and evaluation program. Small communities were still reporting
extremely high rates of hunger emergencies, particular amongst the youngest, in Totonicapán municipio,
which is among the most well-organized indigenous communities.
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reflected in the distribution of public health resources, violence and electoral violence,
and more subjectively the degree to which such divisions permeated my interviews with
participants (ie., participants volunteered an unspecified level, or type, of social discord
as an important factor complicating development in that community). The results of this
tabulation, to be incorporated into the greater QCA truth table in Section 5.3, are located
below in Table 14.
Table 14. Summary Table of Social Discord Across Six Guatemala Field Sites

Social
discord?

What are the extent and nature of social divisions within a community, if
any? How do they manifest?

Community →
Presence of ↓
Social
discord?

Sta María
Chiquimula
(6975’)

Sta Lucia la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

High

Low

Low

High

High

Low

5.1.2 Civil Society
This section is dedicated to exploring the scope and strength of civil society in each
community, including locally-based organizations (like development-oriented NGOs) and
informal institutions like Mayan principales (elders), alcadías indígenas (indigenous
mayors) and semi-formal community leaders. Foreign NGOs were almost entirely absent
from these six communities.
Literature has already noted the influence of different local institutions on violence
and justice, as well as the ambitions of some more organized institutions to carve out
local autonomy, or rebuff what is perceived to be an intrusive state and a statebuilding
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project that divides indigenous groups and erodes their culture. Theoretically, therefore,
different organizational capacity should influence development governance.
In the six communities of this project, however, civil society takes different forms but
is largely absent from the development discourse. Even the most culturally relevant
institutions in very remote, conservative communities – which have at times bargained
with, or confronted, the state – have been relegated in this respect. Most indigenous
leaders acknowledge their limitations vis-à-vis political parties, while others have simply
not taken up the pro-development mantle – seeing themselves as keepers of language,
tradition and leaders on topics including the protection of forests or rivers rather than the
murkier, state-led questions of education, hunger and development.
In meetings with various participants, many described a more subtle, behind-thescenes influence of indigenous leaders. It may not be systematic, or overt, but from Santa
María Chiquimula in the highlands to Santa Catarína Palopó on the shores of Lago
Atitlán, interview participants delicately reminded me that, even if they were not
necessarily at the proverbial table, indigenous leaders retained important influence at the
local level – intervening, for example, in order to urge a family to take their sick child to
the hospital, or to quell a heated political rivalry that threatened to spillover into violence.
These events, despite my efforts, are harder to catalogue, and systematically code, and
are a reminder of the mysteriousness that, while drawing me to Guatemala in the first
place, limit the outside investigator’s task of unveiling the “Truth” behind phenomena in
a social environment as complex as Guatemala’s,
Thus despite the lore of traditional leadership, legal plurality, and strong, locallyresonant informal institutions, these phenomena appear rare, with limited overall affect
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on development planning or outcomes. Though individual cases – like the
aforementioned 48 Cantones in Totonicapán, or Solola’s well-established Alcadía
Indígena – are compelling, and indeed influence local governance and even outcomes,145
their influence outside of their own community context is limited. Most communities
(including remote, traditional villages), meanwhile, proceed with a COCODE system that
is dysfunctional, coopted, or that is disbanded and re-formed by the mayor at his will.146
In the communities under study here, political parties and electoral competition has
crowded out more pragmatic discussions of development, and limited the scope of
stakeholder participation in governance. One exception is Santa Lucía la Reforma, where
semi-formal community leaders from outlying aldeas meet routinely, and are directly
involved in the distribution of resources and program implementation, and decisionmaking.

Table 15. Civil Society Synopsis From Six Guatemala Field Sites

“Strong” local
civil society?
Community→
Presence of

↓
“Strong” local
civil society?
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What is the presence and density of locally-resonant forms of civil society or
traditional authority? More crucially, can these organizations affect
change, mobilize citizens, and spur deference by other actors?
Sta María
Chiquimula
(6975’)

Sta Lucia la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Though this influence does not extend to development matters broadly, as noted (Klick 2013).
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Several interview participants in government offices in Quiché’s capital, Santa Cruz, shared personal
frustration with the Zacualpa case, and noted that a bad precedent was set when Guatemala City’s mayor,
Alvaro Arzú, when he formed additional COCODES in order to circumvent the existing ones that were
opposing his policies. This tactic was subsequently supported by the Constitutional Court, and is now used
regularly throughout the country by mayors.
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I therefore judge civil society not on its “thickness” in terms of registered NGOs or
supposed “density,” which would likely be misleading in many of these communities, but
rather on the observed role, scope and influence of community organizations, however
roughly organized, including traditional forms of collective action.
5.1.3 Conflict and Municipal Spending
Both conflict and municipal spending are determined by quantitative metrics, and
borrowed from Chapter Three. Only in Zacualpa, which was gruesomely impacted, did
some interview participants draw direct links from events that took place during the civil
war to the social discord that permeates village life today. I should also note that, despite
only Santa Lucía la Reforma and Zacualpa being recorded as “highly” conflict affected, it
is unclear how even a small number of violent events might resonate today.
Methodologically, communities can receive the same “score” of conflict intensity, while
suffering differently – either because the nature of the crimes themselves were different,
or by being the victim of 2 or 3 massacres, for example, versus sustained, low-intensity
violence, likely influencing perceptions of state violence differently.
Finally, it is also important to note again that such calculations have likely never been
done at the municipal level for the entire country, as has been done for this study.
Therefore while Totonicapán as a department is frequently dismissed as having suffered
very little from the civil war – which partly explains why conservative, and even
militaristic groups can still do well there electorally (International Crisis Group 2013),
this study reveals a more nuanced experience in which some communities in the
department indeed suffered great violence while others suffered more than is
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conventionally acknowledged. The results from quantitative metrics have been added to
Table 16 (below).
Table 16. Spending and Conflict Across Six Guatemala Field Sites

Social
Spending?

ICEFI/USAID “Atlas del Gasto Social Municipal”: % of total budget per
inhabitant spent on “social functions” = above (high) or below (low) mean
(234.54 Quetzales/person)

Conflict
affected?

Historical experiences with the civil war: Above (high) or below (low) the
mean conflict intensity “score” (96 victims/community). This is augmented by
qualitative data gained through interviews.

Community →

Sta María
Chiquimula
(6975’)

Sta Lucia
la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

Social
Spending?

Low

Low

High

Low

High

High

Conflict
affected?

Low

High

Low

High

Low

Low

Presence of ↓

5.1.4 Complementarity
Finally, I attempt to capture through fieldwork whether my proposed theoretical
explanatory variable has any bearing on development outcomes in these six communities.
I argue that it does, though its effects are frequently muted by other variables, and that its
presence is generally rare. Moreover, perverse forms of complementarity can arise, in
which development at the community level is complicated by the role of actors working
with the state to undermine local government, though for the QCA I focus on the positive
forms of complementarity.
Complementarity, as defined in the introduction, is the process through which state
actors, with important resources (from food aid and medicine to cash), work in harmony
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with more locally-trusted trusted non-state actors in order to deliver basic services more
equitably, or to distribute resources (Klick 2013). The idea is borrowed from Helmke and
Levitsky (2004) who argue that informal institutions – or the unwritten rules of expected
behavior, or uncodified patterns of behavior – can either accommodate, substitute,
compete, or complement formal systems of constitutional governance.
  
Table 17. Complementarity Across Six Guatemala Field Sites

Complementarity
(E =high, e=low)
Community →
Presence of ↓
Complementarity

Process tracing: Observation of lead civil society actors working, or not,
with government officials to implement anti-hunger program elements.
Sta María
Chiquimula
(6975’)

Sta Lucia
la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

More recently, work has emerged exploring whether “informal local governance
institutions” (ILGIs) complement or compete with the formal state at the local level, and
its implications for governance and service delivery, specifically (Mohmand et al.
forthcoming, Cheema and Naseer 2010, Institute of Development Studies 2010, Klick
2013). This project continues this emerging trend by attempting to add analytical rigor
and nuance to our understanding of informal, local governance, while also – in the case
of Guatemala – exploring the resilience of local institutions under conditions of
increasing political party and top-down statebuilding pressures. Though I code
complementarity separately from other variables, it is indeed likely that there is a
relationship between other indicators – like whether or not there is party alignment
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between local and state offices, or the degree of within-community social discord, for
example – and complementarity itself. By separating these concepts in the QCA
component, this project can explore how these factors intertwine or not, and also explore
the implications of unexpected “types” of complementarity, discussed more below.

5.2 QCA Results: Seeking Causal Links
When the results from this chapter are tabulated in a “truth table” (Table 18), one can
begin to decipher whether relationships exist between variables themselves, and whether
the presence or absence of different conditions correlate with outcomes in each
community.
I coded whether each condition discussed above was “high” or “low” in each of the
six communities, followed by multiple indicators of human development – including
rates of chronic hunger, infant mortality, illiteracy, the extrapolated HDI scores
(representing 2010 scores) and changes in HDI between 2005 and 2010.
Using this version of the truth table (Table 18, page 157), results are somewhat
ambiguous, with perhaps the exception of local social spending (A), which diverges from
the quantitative work in Chapter Three and which, here, generally corresponds to the
better development outcomes. Though even here, the community with arguably the most
impressive development gains (SLR) has low social spending. Another potentially
important variable, as discussed earlier, is whether the community experienced high
levels of conflict intensity (D). Low levels (d) correlate with better outcomes, like
changes in illiteracy (see Figure 18, page 157). Again, however, Santa Lucía la Reforma,
which in fact had very high gains in their battle against illiteracy, suffered
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disproportionately during the armed conflict. In fact a broader view of the ΔIlliteracy
variable reveals very inconsistent results (Figure 18).

Table 18. QCA Truth Table

Santa
María
Chiquimula
(6975’)

Santa
Lucía la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta
Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

Social Spending?
(A=high, a=low)

a

a

A

a

A

A

“Strong” local
civil society?
(B=high, b=low)

b

B

b

b

b

b

Social discord?
(C=high, c=low)

C

c

c

C

C

c

Conflict affected?
(D=high, d=low)

d

D

d

D

d

d

Complementarity
(E =high, e=low)

e

E

e

e

e

e

-1.7% (Low)

-3%
(Med)

-6.8%
(Med)

-1.4%
(Low)

-22.8%
(High)

-21.8%
(High)

-9.5%
(Med)

-20%
(High)

-7%
(Med)

-.2%
(Low)

-10%
(Med)

-2%
(Low)

75.8 (High)

53.0
(Med)

18.1
(Low)

38.1
(Med)

21.9
(Low)

43.7
(Med)

.403

.486

.371

.523

.439

.705

+.023 (6.4%)

+.059
(16%)

-.118
(-24.1%)

+.029
(7%)

-.065
(-13%)

+.199
(39%)

Community →
Presence of ↓

Δ Chronic
Hunger
Δ Illiteracy
Mean=-1.6%, S.D. =
5.0%

Infant Mortality
Mean = 36.0, S.D. =
30.5

HDI (2011
extrapolated)
Δ HDI (20052011)(% change)
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Chronic Hunger
abCde
Low
abCDe
aBcDE
AbCde
Med/High AbCde
Abcde

Δ Illiteracy
abCDe
Low
Abcde
abCde
Abcde
Med/High AbCde
aBcDE

Figure 18. Initial QCA Results, Chronic Hunger and Changes in Illiteracy

This ambiguity arises in part because of confusion over how to interpret absolute HDI
numbers, conflicting results across dependent variables (like strong improvements in
huger but low changes in literacy for example), and finally inconsistency in the results of
the QCA itself, with no clear patterns among variables.
I thus simplify the QCA (Table 19, page 159) in order to compare across the most
similar communities in my set and by dropping those dependent variables that are either
difficult-to-interpret absolute values, or development indicators that include an income
metric (like HDI and ΔHDI).
The lakeside communities, for example, far outstrip their counterparts in the interior
highlands in combating chronic hunger. But it was only after fieldwork that I observed
the degree to which both enjoy greater access to income opportunities (between tourism
and cash crops like coffee and chocolate), and even services (particularly for SCP).
Though my work there still provides valuable observations, their inclusion into the QCA
complicates interpretations.
Similarly, since HDI scores include an income component, larger communities like
Zacualpa, holding all else equal, are likely to have higher absolute HDI values. In sum, I
have reduced the QCA’s scope to the four communities in Totonicapán and El Quiché,
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which have no viable tourist economies and which further share very similar ethnolinguistic identities. Relative changes between these communities are more compelling
and more accurately test my hypothesis. Results are compelling as well (Figure 19,
below).
Table 19. Revised QCA

Community → Sta María
Chiquimula
(6975’)
Presence of ↓

Sta
Lucia la
Reforma
(6013’)

Patzité
(7545’)

Zacualpa
(4875’)

Sta
Cta
Palopó
(5456’)

San
Pablo
(6861’)

Social Spending?
(A=high, a=low)

a

a

A

a

A

A

“Strong” local
civil society?
(B=high, b=low)

b

B

b

b

b

b

Social discord?
(C=high, c=low)

C

c

c

C

C

c

Conflict affected?
(D=high, d=low)

d

D

d

D

d

d

Complementarity
(E =high, e=low)

e

E

e

e

e

e

Δ Chronic
Hunger

-1.7% (Low)

-3%
(Med)

-6.8%
(Med)

-1.4%
(Low)

-22.8%
(High)

-21.8%
(High)

Δ Illiteracy

-9.5%
(Med)

-20%
(High)

-7%
(Med)

-.2%
(Low)

-10%
(Med)

-2%
(Low)

Infant Mortality

75.8

53.0

18.1

38.1

21.9

43.7

HDI (2011
extrapolated)

.403

.486

.371

.523

.439

.705

+.023 (6.4%)

+.059
(16%)

-.118
(-24.1%)

+.029
(7%)

-.065
(-13%)

+.199
(39%)

Δ HDI (20052011)(% change)

Utilizing the revised QCA, more distinct patterns emerge from the data than before.
First focusing on changes in chronic hunger over time (top left in Figure 19), the most
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obvious pattern is that those communities experiencing high levels of internal social
discord (C) have made the least progress. Those communities isolated as having made
medium progress (no communities made high progress on hunger) experience low levels
of social discord uniformly. Social spending (A) is less obviously important, though the
only community with high levels of social spending did indeed make greater headway in
combating hunger. Similar results are yielded by the civil society variable (B), in that the
only instance of more highly-organized civil society corresponds with better results. The
role of conflict intensity (D) is unimportant here, as conflict intensity is evenly distributed
across better and worse cases. Finally, complementarity’s influence (E) is not dramatic,
but like civil society and social spending, appears only among those communities doing
better – a necessary if insufficient condition for better outcomes.

Chronic Hunger
ab C de
Low
ab C De
aB c DE
Med/High
Ab c de

Δ Illiteracy
Low
abCDe
abCde
Med/High Abcde
aBcDE
Chronic Hunger and Illiteracy
Combined
abCde
Low
abCDe
abCDe
aBcDE
Abcde
Med/High
abCde
Abcde
aBcDE
Figure 19. Combining QCA Results
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Analyzing the results with respect to changes in illiteracy (top right, Figure 19),
results are generally similar. Since more communities did better in this respect over time,
however, results shift slightly. The effects of social spending (A), civil society (B), social
discord (C) and complementarity (E) all diminish slightly, while the influence of low
levels of civil war conflict intensity gain in strength.
Results of the QCA are most compelling when hunger and illiteracy are combined
(bottom of Figure 19), which creates a truncated, but nevertheless more robust indicator
of human development by combining both a key health and key education indicator. In
this instance, the most consistent results are apparent among the worst performing
communities – where limited social spending (a), an anemic civil society (b) and high
social discord (C) are each 100 percent consistent across communities. An absence of
complementarity is also consistent across all poor performing communities.
Amongst the better performing communities, results are less consistent, but
nevertheless suggestive. Higher social spending (A) and a “strong” civil society (B)
reappear (being present in two out of five communities). Only one community, of the five
doing better across both hunger and illiteracy, exhibits observable social discord (C).
Conflict (D) is again distributed evenly across both poor and better performing
communities, making it a surprisingly non-relevant variable in determining current
development outcomes. Finally, like social spending and social discord, complementarity
(E) reappears, twice among the five better-performing communities, and only among
those communities doing well. As well, the only community with a “High” performance
in any of the development metrics (Santa Lucía la Reforma reports a 20 percent reduction
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in illiteracy) exhibits clear state-local complementarity, despite higher rates of poverty
and extreme poverty than any of the other communities.
5.4 Conclusions
The QCA component, by utilizing extensive fieldwork in order to code variables that
are otherwise difficult to capture quantitatively, adds needed nuance to our understanding
of what influences spatial variation in development across similar communities. This
chapter has begun to probe the inner-workings of small, mostly remote communities
operating under conditions of limited statehood in Guatemala. The governance that
results, and by whom it is captured, affects the likelihood of development progress. The
process that defines governance, however, is highly contentious, and subject to local
contestation.
I initially anticipated that contestation would be largely driven by a local desire for
autonomy, led by any number of the potential indigenous authority structures, contra state
actors driven to undermine this authority. As Chapter Four and this chapter demonstrate
collectively, however, indigenous leaders are only very subtly influencing outcomes,
while their role in development, specifically, is negligible. This finding clashes with a
suite of literature emerging from Guatemala citing the importance of traditional values on
local political outcomes. In reality, informal or indigenous influence over local outcomes
should be differentiated between questions regarding the “lawful” use of violence and
policing, on the one hand, to protection of the environment and development matters like
health and education on the other. The scope and power of indigenous and informal
institutions vary, in other words, according to the issue, and it is especially constrained
with respect to development.
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In most communities, where a strong, well-organized indigenous NGO (like the 48
Cantones for example) is absent, contestation has increasingly pitted local formal
authorities, like the mayor, against state actors, with lines ardently being drawn between
political parties.147 In this scenario the role of indigenous and informal authorities is
crowded out, as both principle parties in the conflict utilize, and cultivate, patronage
networks in a battle for votes and control.
One result is that development fails to materialize in any coherent sense. On the one
hand, the parties in conflict distribute feeble resources along patronage lines. It is ad-hoc,
inconsistent and arbitrarily dispersed with respect to need. On the other hand, such
conflict can create more deleterious outcomes when one party of the conflict “punishes”
his adversaries by depriving them of critical resources, whether from what Hambre Cero
might provide, to potable water, or new schools. In this case, political decisions are
directly influencing the daily caloric intake of children suffering from chronic hunger.
This chapter, through the use of the QCA component, most clearly demonstrates that
social discord at the community level limits development possibilities – the mechanisms
of which are explored in greater detail in Chapter Six. These internal divisions, and
emerging political rivalries within small, rural, and ethnically-homogenous communities,
have been largely overlooked by literature, and have virtually no bearing on
contemporary development policymaking.
With respect to complementarity, the QCA does not reveal its clear deterministic
function in bettering outcomes. This is no surprise, however, given the complexity of
local conditions – whether environmental, social, cultural, or political, and competing and
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It was confirmed unanimously across my interviews, from Guatemala City to rural hinterlands, that this
phenomenon has steadily increased over the last 10-15 years.
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as yet unobserved variables influencing local outcomes. The QCA, after all, is only a
snapshot that, while adding needed nuance to the quantitative section, is unable to
demonstrate causality per se (which will be taken up in Chapter Six). Nevertheless, the
QCA component has teased out the role of complementarity – along with local social
spending and the strength of locally-based civil society – as a potentially critical
facilitating condition, or in other words, a necessary if insufficient condition, that results
in development-oriented governance and improved outcomes at the village level.
The case of Santa Lucía la Reforma is especially compelling. It is remote, very poor
and was directly impacted by the armed conflict, and yet it has outperformed its
immediate neighbor, Chiquimula, across an entire range of development indicators,
including chronic hunger, despite measurably greater challenges. It is also the community
with the best gains in illiteracy amongst the four communities of the interior highlands –
another unexpected outcome. In this case, the complementary between semi-formal
village mayors and state actors, partly coordinated and “blessed” by the mayor, is
striking. Its occurrence is harder to explain. Why does Santa Lucía have active village
mayors, while Patzité does not? Why do state actors, like Roni in Santa Lucía, among
others, work energetically to unite disparate forces in town, and work with the village
leaders in order to distribute key resources, while in other communities they do not?
Party alignment may indeed be one factor, and I cannot dismiss its influence outright.
But women from more obscure state offices (like RENAP), with little material influence,
were also engaging the village mayors. Moreover, as the development indicators
themselves suggest, Santa Lucía has been making these gains consistently for years,
through different parties and different mayors. These questions are also explored in
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greater detail in Chapter Six, where I endeavor to uncover the causal chain that links
social discord, on the one hand, and complementarity on the other, to variation in
development outcomes.
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CHAPTER SIX: SEEKING CAUSAL PATHWAYS FROM GOVERNANCE TO
DEVELOPMENT
The previous two chapters have, in order, discarded the most basic notions of
statebuilding for development before then raising suggestive links between key variables
and development outcomes. Most notably, at the community level, the degree of social
discord and a lack of viable civil society, along with other potential conditions like local
social spending, are linked with worse development outcomes in a sample of similar
communities. Complementarity is rarely observed, but is present in the best performing
community – Santa Lucía la Reforma. How variables and outcomes are connected,
however, is still unclear.
This chapter explicitly examines how the centrally-planned and initiated anti-hunger
program El Pacto Hambre Cero (“The Zero Hunger Pact”) – which has been lauded by
external development agencies for its design and scale148 – is implemented at the
community level. By specifically observing how a single government program is
implemented across the different case study communities – which were each designated
“priority communities” by the government and thus privy to the same level of
government response and resources – this component of the study specifies the causal
pathways and agent-to-agent linkages that connect governance and development
outcomes. Though, at the time of fieldwork, Hambre Cero was too young to have
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See footnote 11, page 6.
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impacted chronic hunger systematically, interviews with both regional and local directors
of the program provided early data regarding acute hunger emergencies, as well as the
intended design and scope of the program at the local level. Comparing differences in
Hambre Cero’s implementation across communities therefore yields crucial insight into
the empirical nature of development governance at the local level – including key actors,
their coordination and oversight roles, and the dispersion of resources like food aid, seeds
and cash. I interpret these findings as representative of the nature of governance that
characterizes each community.
Table 20. Interview and Focus Group Summary

Community Name, and aldeas in each
municipality
Santa María Chiquimula (SMC)
Xecaxelaj
Xesana
Xesana I
Pajojchiyats
Joesefina
Centro
Zacualpa
Pasajoc I
Chuchuca (Chuchuca is site location, with
attendees from the following: Xejoc,
Xextorian, Xemosche, Chojiomquiej)
San Pablo la Laguna
Center*
Total

Number of non-elite interviews and/or
focus group participants
n=54
7
10
10
12
5
10
n=81
25
56
n=24
24
n=159

Process tracing, as noted earlier, is “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a
temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011: 823). The method requires
significant time and dedication in order to appropriately document the micro-level, or
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“agent-to-agent” linkages, in a potentially vast series of events in a causal chain that
connects independent and dependent variables (Checkel 2005).
As noted before, process tracing is central to field work methodology in each of the
six field sites, for coding the QCA variables and gauging local governance. In three
communities, however – Chiquimula, Zacualpa and San Pablo – interviews and focus
groups with non-elites augment key informant interviews, providing additional
observations in those communities with respect to how the program influenced the most
remote households, and to gain the perspective of the recipients of Hambre Cero
assistance (Table 20). This chapter is organized by theme, highlighting the key obstacles
to development across space, as well as the drivers of best outcomes based on findings
from process tracing Hambre Cero implementation.
6.1 Internal Political Divisions and Development Stagnation
Political divisions within small, ethnically homogenous communities severely
handicap the coordination and implementation of government services, including the
implementation of Hambre Cero. According to interviews in each community, divisions
based on party affiliation and candidate support have dramatically increased over the last
ten years, undermining traditional forms of authority and community influence over
politics and decision-making.149
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Almost uniformly, this phenomenon took the form of the elevated role of the alcalde comunitario at the
expense of alcaldes auxiliaries, or more informal, traditional leaders. The alcalde comunitarios are often
COCODE representatives, and frequently hand-picked by the mayor as well.
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6.1.1 COCODES
In rural focus groups, participants widely eschewed political activity themselves, but
the affiliation of their local development council (COCODE) leaders had important
consequences nevertheless. In each of the communities, the COCODE system was either
defunct, or had been nakedly usurped by the mayor to reflect his politics and priorities. In
Patzité, the COCODE remains the principal outlet for community participation in
development governance, but this comes at the expense of traditional systems of
governance, and its role is nevertheless symbolic more than effective. The mayor and his
voluntary advisory board are in charge of day-to-day decision-making. The mayor in
Patzité, as interviews revealed, is “development-oriented” and conscientious of local
needs, which likely explains some of Patzité’s “medium” development gains, compared
to the worst cases, and even to Zacualpa. But with limited stakeholder involvement, there
is no coordination between government services and local programs. Interventions are adhoc, and as my interview with government officials in the community suggest, their own
interventions, and distribution of basic resources, was limited outside the community
center, or to those who took the initiative to arrive at the offices and file for their bonos.
The COCODE system, which is the cornerstone of the state’s decentralization efforts
stemming from the Peace Accords, has been heralded for its potential to augment
participatory development and citizen oversight of development priorities.150 The
COCODE system, however, has no bearing on development outcomes in any of the
communities under study. In fact, in multiple interviews, including those with non-elite
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For an example, see the World Bank’s programs to promote the COCODE system:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/CMUDLP/0,,contentMDK:2076
5268~menuPK:461794~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461754,00.html
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community members who most objectively observe its role, the COCODE system was
isolated as the source of mismanagement, corruption and feeble development response. It
has also been used to perpetuate growing community divisions.
In Zacualpa (Quiché department), for example, the mayor has identified which aldeas
are considered zones of electoral support, and which ones are not, based on previous
elections.151 Zones of support have received new schools and water projects stemming
from municipal funds, while opposition zones are intentionally neglected.152 The
COCODE system has been reconstituted locally to reflect the mayor’s prerogatives,
rather than community’s. Even foreign-assisted programs, including a health education
program partly funded by USAID, are controlled and restricted as to where they can
participate. By deferring to the municipal government and seeking local cooperation,
externally-funded programs inadvertently (and unbeknownst to their organizers) exclude
those rural areas now type-cast as “opposition” by the mayor – restricting the program’s
outreach and impact. In much the same way, but in reverse, Hambre Cero
implementation is corrupted.
In the aldeas of Pasajoc I, Chuchuca, Xejoc, Xextorian, Xemosche and Chojiomquiej,
which are entrenched zones of mayoral support, not one of 84 participants had knowledge
of Hambre Cero, or had participated in any government assistance program, despite the
anti-hunger program’s identification of Zacualpa as a “priority community,” and despite
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This is widely understood and confirmed by many interviews (November and December 2013).
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I witnessed the recent construction of these facilities, complete with plaques recognizing the mayor.
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extremely high rates of chronic hunger in these same, hilly, remote aldeas.153 “Aquí, no
hay,” with a wave of the finger, was a emphatic refrain in all of my visits to remote
aldeas … “That (government assistance) simply doesn’t exist here!”
6.1.2 Political and Confessional Divisions
State actors claim, in contrast, that they are forced to distribute their limited supplies
– consisting of seeds, flour and vitamin-rich cereal – to whomever they can access, which
is limited because of the mayor’s anti-(central) government policies in Zacualpa. But
many citizen interviewees, in private, readily acknowledged the purposeful maldistribution of resources, which took place openly at a ramshackle government office on
the edge of Zacualpa’s city center during my visits. There, poor families amassed in a
line awaiting a simple package of basic food supplies. Other interviewees confirmed that,
in turn, the expectation was one of electoral support for Patriota (the current president’s
party), or for participation in future anti-mayor protests, several of which had already
rocked the town.
These divisions – between state actors and their electoral bases, and the Mayor’s base
– have since become entrenched in Zacualpa. Other non-governmental development
assistance intended for the poorest families, stemming from the Catholic Church most
notably, has been turned away by vigilante groups. On more than one occasion, a car
containing Church officials was blocked by armed civilians who support the mayor in
rural aldeas, wary of the Church officials who have been openly critical of the mayor and
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Chronic hunger rates for the whole municipality are approximately 57 percent, with rates in the more
remote, hilly aldeas that I visited estimated to be 10-20 points higher, as suggested by one area health
specialist in interviews.

171

his politics, further entrenching the community’s political divisions.154 Political divisions
are now spilling over and creating social divisions, as evident by the rash of violent
outbursts in town over the last several years.
Finally, a central component of Hambre Cero implementation is the holding of
monthly meetings of the municipal-level Food and Nutritional Security Commission (La
Comisión Municipal de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional, or COMUSAN). This
meeting is designed to be coordinated by the mayor, and to include all stakeholders –
from church leaders and local NGOs to the different state offices responsible for
distributing food, health, education and agricultural resources (see Figure 20 for a
blueprint of Hambre Cero’s institutional design). It reflects an attempt at decentralization
of the national program itself, and an effort to cultivate ownership by local authorities. As
noted in Chapter Five, Santa Lucía’s anti-hunger, and now wider development discourse,
is organized around COMUSAN meetings, held in conjunction with local market days in
order to facilitate the participation of rural leaders. In Zacualpa, the mayor has refused to
hold the COMUSAN meetings, and at this point, there is no viable Hambre Cero
implementation.
There are informal actors in Zacualpa – including madres guías and comadronas (the
birthing assistants that have slowly gained additional training in recent years)155 –
contributing to maternal and infant health in the remotest aldeas. But they do not
coordinate in any fashion with state actors. The local alcadía indígena’s role, meanwhile,
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Interviews in Zacualpa (November and December 2013).
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A local NGO – La Asociación de Comodronas de Quiché – has trained 152 birthing assistants over the
last 12 years, and works with village leaders to convince them to accept their presence. They claim to have
improved conditions for young mothers and infants in the countryside. They do not, however, coordinate
with any state actors (October 16, 2013 interviews).
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has been reduced to a merely symbolic one, with no influence on development decisionmaking. Development projects are devised and implemented on an ad-hoc basic, with the
most basic resources distributed on purely patronage lines, versus need.

Figure 20. Hambre Cero Institutional Design

The governance of development, meanwhile, reflects more conflict across political
divisions than it does coordination and inclusion. The municipalities “medium”
development performance is difficult to interpret in light of the overt breakdown in
development governance. Likely factors include the robust flow of remittances to city
center inhabitants, but any positive outcomes may also reflect some increased access to
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health services in remote health outposts,156 and the work of the more organized
comadronas of Southern Quiché. In the delivery of basic services, however, Patzité –
spared the worst of the political conflict dividing Zacualpa – has far outstripped larger
Zacualpa in development outcomes as discussed in Chapter Five – from access to clean
water and sanitation to lower infant mortality rates, even if complementarity is otherwise
absent.
In Santa María Chiquimula, as well, where hunger rates are among the highest in
Guatemala, internal divisions are grievous. Here, party affiliation overlaps with church
affiliation (Catholic versus Evangelical, broadly), splitting the town in two and making
even basic governance dysfunctional. Feeling under threat from the well-organized and
well-funded Patriota Party, the mayor has reacted by attempting to monopolize
development decision-making – actively shutting out long-standing local NGOs, as well
as the once important elders (prinicpales or T’zolojche’). Low-ranking government
officials in charge of Hambre Cero, meanwhile, have isolated themselves across town
and infrequently, if at all, distribute the designated assistance packages.
In the aldeas, which suffer from some of the highest rates of chronic hunger
anywhere in Guatemala, and in turn the Western Hemisphere, not one of 54 focus group
and non-elite interview participants had received any form of official assistance, at any
point. Only the local Jesuit diocese provides material assistance in these areas currently,
though its staff too reports an awkward, tense relationship with the mayor. Interviews
with church officials in Chiquimula confirmed the divisive splits in town, and the
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For roughly one year, however, there were no health services in these aldeas because of a dispute
between the health NGO contracted by the government to provide services, and the central government
itself.

174

increase in political party activity. Likewise Hambre Cero’s Totonicapán director
confirmed the increase in religious divisions to be one of his biggest obstacles to
communicating with local officials, building trust, and implementation more generally.
On the other hand, government officials charged with Hambre Cero’s implementation in
the community itself complained that shipments of the life-saving bonos were sporadic
and inadequate.
Though social and political rifts are not always so divisive, internal divisions in very
small, remote communities, stemming from either church or party affiliation most
frequently, commonly trump an indigenous or a broader community self-identity. This
pervasive phenomenon, which complicates the conventional narrative of indigenous
communities pitted against state forces, dramatically inhibits the most basic
implementation of Hambe Cero in Chiquimula and Zacualpa, in particular. Crucially,
historically important informal authorities in each Zacaualpa and Chiquimula – whether
elders or the alcadía indígena – have been undermined by these changes, making their
influence on outcomes virtually nonexistent. These divisions create greater space for both
corruption and clientelism, in turn stalling, as in Zacualpa, if not reversing, in
Chiquimula, human development.
6.2 Street-Level Bureaucrats
In individual cases, mayors, ex-mayors, or committed “street-level” state actors in the
community determine development efficacy.157 In San Pablo la Laguna, for example, the
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The “street-level bureaucrat” concept originates from U.S. public policy literature (Lipsky 1980,
Maynard-Moony and Musheno 2003). It assigns special agency and influence to public officials ultimately
charged with implementing specific programs, arguing that their own discretion influences outcomes more
than has been conventionally recognized.
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Hambre Cero coordinator for the community, based in the regional SESAN office
(Secretaria de Seguridad de Alimentaría y Nutricional) in Sololá city, is from San Pablo,
and he and the mayor have worked in conjunction to try and secure basic funds and
resources, which nevertheless remain intermittent and unreliable.158 Regardless, the
intimacy of the community and informal family networks led to a level of informal
cooperation between the mayor and the state actor in this case. This cooperation takes
place, moreover, despite different party affiliations.
The mayor also took it upon himself to bring sick and injured community members to
the hospital in the regional capital – a several hour journey through rugged terrain. This
type of “reactive” governance, in which the mayor acted as more of a symbol of goodwill
and community unity, differs considerably from Zacaulpa and Chiquimula, but
nevertheless netted only marginal gains in development. The mayor, himself, in
interviews, confirmed these limitations: “My job,” he noted, “is to pay the bills. And after
that, all I can do is help people in whatever way I can, like anybody else.”159
Across the lake, meanwhile, it is the ex-mayor who, in collaboration with government
actors, monopolizes development resources including basic supplies. From interviews
with diverse community actors – whether in the small community health clinic, municipal
offices, and even with the current mayor – it was confirmed that the ex-mayor had total
control of any development-related resources, and total discretion with respect to its
disbursement. The ex-mayor, himself, claims to be more honestly distributing resources,
and that the central government approached him in order to avoid coordinating with the
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Indeed, none of the focus group participants had participated in Hambre Cero, or had received any
governmental assistance.
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Interview December 12, 2013 (San Pablo la Laguna, Guatemala)
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“corrupt” current mayor. Santa Catarína, like San Pablo, has made modest, if mixed
development gains according to official statistics, which likely result in part because of
its proximity to the major lakeside tourist hub of Panajachel, a short drive away over
paved roads. On the other hand, raw data obtained from the regional Minister of Public
Health’s office reveals that six infants from Santa Catarína Palopó had been hospitalized
(as of November 18th) in 2013 for acute hunger emergencies, as to San Pablo’s one.160 In
neither case is coherent development governance in place. In Palopó, however, the exmayor’s monopoly of resources and decision-making, reminiscent of the political
divisions created in SMC and Zacualpa, further erodes responsiveness and oversight.
In Santa Lucía – the mayor and a very energetic government health worker named
Roni are key to the program’s success. As principal Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni
spurs the participation of younger workers from other government offices, works in
conjunction with the mayor to bring the local churches together, and helps organize the
monthly meetings of area stakeholders that is required by Hambre Cero, but which, as
noted above, is rarely fulfilled in the other communities. Critically, these meetings also
incorporate the participation of semi-formal indigenous leaders from outlying aldeas as
discussed in Chapter Five. Given that Santa Lucía is one of the least likely cases to
demonstrate robust governance – given persistently high rates of poverty, and a legacy of
violence from the civil war that surpasses its neighbors, including SMC – the pivotal role
of individual actors is a key component of improvements in service delivery there.
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A data specialist with the Department’s central office emailed me Microsoft Excel spreadsheets of raw
data on acute hunger emergencies that are otherwise unpublished and unavailable.
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6.3 State-Local Complementarity
Roni161 works closely with the mayor to prioritize Hambre Cero. But Roni also has a
special rapport with local, indigenous authorities, with whom he coordinated family visits
in the case of a hunger emergency, aid distribution and transportation for families to the
local clinic (for vaccinations and pre-natal care for example).
In Santa Lucía, other state actors in fact relied on local, informal leaders for help. The
local coordinator of Registro Nacional de las Personas (RENAP), which is in charge of
registering citizens and issuing new, fraud-resistant identification cards, spontaneously
visited a meeting held by the indigenous leaders on market day, and ahead of the coming
day’s COMUSAN meeting. She spoke before the small group of mostly middle-aged and
elderly men, imploring them to help mobilize reluctant or especially remote citizens. She
conceded, in a subsequent interview, that her scope of influence as a state actor, alone, is
limited, and that in reality it was only through these informal interlocutors that she could
make measurable headway with her work.162
This echoes the experience of the young Comité Nacional de Alfabetización
(CONALFA) employee, charged with monitoring and improving literacy rates. He
admitted that two communities within the municipio had held out, and that its leaders
were reluctant to coordinate with him regarding a new literacy campaign, itself tied to
Hambre Cero. In turn, the CONALFA worker felt that, without the authority of local
leaders on his side, he was unable to proceed there. At the next day’s COMUSAN
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As Hambre Cero coordinator, Roni represents Partido Patriota, which is the same party as the mayor’s.
Cynically, this would explain the coordination between actors, but not the energy with which Roni
conducts his work, nor the extent to which both Roni and the Mayor work to overcome church divisions,
and include informal actors.
162

October 9, 2013 (Santa Lucía la Reforma)
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meeting, however, he was pressed by colleagues, including Roni, as to why these
communities were still not enrolled, underscoring the determination with which Hambre
Cero implementation was taken seriously.
The very visible and overt display of trust between informal and formal actors in
Santa Lucía is striking, and in stark contrast to the divisions that plague its neighbor,
Chiquimula. Both the mayor and Roni argue that these traits are long-standing in Santa
Lucía – in part explaining the community’s surprising headway among basic
development indicators, despite low incomes and the history of violent conflict during the
civil war. Both acknowledged challenges in separate interviews, and remaining
challenges, from poverty to incipient church divisions like in other communities, but they
also both thanked the other for their transparency and commitment.
The CONALFA worker, meanwhile, who is originally from neighboring Chiquimula,
argues that Santa Lucía distinguishes itself by its lingering commitment to Mayan
costumbre (customary beliefs and practice), including a commitment to service and
community. This concept was evoked by leaders in other Totonicapán communities, but
was simultaneously subverted by political divisions, and otherwise rhetorical at most. In
the COMUSAN meeting, another state worker referred to this same idea as voluntario
institucionál, as she committed herself to work more with local leaders.
Separately, the regional coordinator of Hambre Cero based in Totonicapán city, Esaú
Guerra Samayoa, confirmed that Santa Lucía is out in front of its regional counterparts in
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terms of implementation, and positive intervention, based on both internal statistics and
his personal experience.163
The phenomenon of state-local complementarity is, as suggested above, incredibly
rare, and itself rests in part on other factors isolated above, from local trust of state
authorities to internal political and social divisions. Underscoring its importance,
however, are the results of additional interviews in government offices from Totonicapán
to Santa Cruz del Quiché. Officials from the Instituto del Fomento Municipal (INFOM)
regional offices admitted that, despite their mission to help “modernize” local
government, political divisions, political parties, truculent mayors and corrupt
COCODES prevent their engagement with local municipalities. At this stage, INFOM
has been forced to adapt to local conditions, and has converted itself into an organization
principally dedicated to assisting communities resolve potable water issues, at least on a
case-by-case basis, regardless of its original mission.164 Similarly, Quiché’s SESAN
director, Sergio Gonzales, agreed that, if he is unable to work with a mayor or
COCODES, as in Zacualpa, he is in essence unable to push Hambre Cero
implementation in any meaningful way.
Complementarity is therefore less an independent variable by itself, but the product of
multiple facilitating conditions that include committed street-level bureaucrats, a
component of social cohesion – in Santa Lucía’s case by a more robust commitment to
costumbre and service than was evident in other communities, and a growing two-way
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Based on multiple Interviews with Don Esaú in both Quetzaltenango and Totonicapán (September and
October 2013).
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Interviews with Freddy Argueta and Gilberto Barrios. November 14, 2013 (Santa Cruz del Quiché).
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trust between rural, indigenous leaders and state actors (which itself hinges to some
degree on the charisma of street-level bureaucrats again).
The role, influence and presence of community indigenous leaders itself is a
facilitating condition in that such clout is muted or altogether absent in many
communities, including some in these communities. In a recent exploration of community
managed schools (CMS) in Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, and Honduras, for example, the
role of traditional forms of indigenous leadership had no bearing on the political learning
outcomes under scrutiny (Altschuler and Corrales 2013). In contrast, and much like in
this study, the role of mayors, patronage networks, and political networks linking villages
with the state are key influences on CMS viability (Ibid).
As Palopó suggests, however, complementarity can also be a perverse political
outcome, in which government resources are channeled through a trusted interlocutor, but
one whose actions and presence (as ex-Mayor in this case) actively erodes community
cohesion, and diminishes the participation of other actors – whether the COCODEs,
sitting mayor, or more traditional leaders.
For policymaking, and for harnessing complementarity for good, this means first
identifying the central “broker” at both the village and state level through which
complementarity can emerge, and second, utilize his/her networks for distribution and
empowerment. In the Palopó case, however, this will be especially difficult, pointing to a
“dark complementarity” that reinforces local patronage cleavages and village level social
discord, while eroding the scope and influence of the formal authorities. Dark
complementarity – arguably of long-standing form in Guatemala where cafetales
dominated local labor practices and inhibited land reforms with government’s blessing,
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while providing a modicum of (inadequate) social service delivery – is on the one hand
much harder to subvert given the reinforcing role of the state and/or political parties and
well-established patronage networks. On the other, even in Palopó the presence of a
broker like the ex-mayor provides and opportunity for outside donor to utilize informal
networks for service delivery, so long as it is an equal opportunity exploiter – utilizing
the local formal channels to the same degree. The implications of complementarity for
development are discussed more in the Conclusions.
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CONCLUSIONS and DISCUSSION

This study is a response to the puzzle of spatial variation in human development in
otherwise similar communities in rural Guatemala. Why have some communities, despite
persistently low-incomes, made strides across different development indicators, whether
chronic hunger, literacy or infant mortality? Given widespread variation in state density –
or the presence of the state in health, education and administration – at the community
level, a plausible hypothesis is that state density and development outcomes vary in
parallel: The state’s presence, in other words, especially given its presence in health and
educational services that are at the core of human development – according to Sen and
the UNDP since – should explain this variation in development, and that those
communities performing poorly would benefit from more state presence.
The Guatemalan state is notoriously weak, however, so any outside intervention for
development should, according to the wisdom of conventional statebuilding logic, aid in
building centralized institutions and administrative capacity – the “strength” of a state
according to Fukuyama (2004: 6). State “scope” is more complex, but decentralization of
development decision-making, as the COCODE system reflects, should theoretically
encourage both the democratic participation of citizens – enhancing the legitimacy of the
central state institutions – and more efficiently allocate resources to communities.
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From the earliest regressions, however, it became clear that state density and
development outcomes – whether reflected by HDI scores, HDI scores over time, or by
robustness checks including literacy, infant mortality and chronic hunger and changes in
hunger and literacy over time – are completely divorced in Guatemala. The most peculiar
results reveal inverse relationships between literacy and state presence, underscoring just
how ineffective state resources are currently translated into development performance at
the community level. Top-down statebuilding, even after twenty years of post-war
experimentation and outside assistance in Guatemala, does not bring development.
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, literature has increasingly recalculated, both
theoretically and empirically, the feasibility of state-led reform for post-war development.
The most critical scholars, including hybridity advocates, argue that the OECD-dominant
normative foundations of statebuilding is a square peg of neo-classical economics,
electoral reform and liberal institutionalism being pounded into the round hole of local
context. This context – consisting of non-Western mores, alternate perceptions of
authority and informal local institutions that are more resonant with local populations
than imposed western institutions – trumps the technocratic fixes of outsiders. What
results is either a hybrid system, in which local populations subtly resist top-down
statebuilding, or more plainly, broken legal-formal systems of governance. This
dissertation generally embraces this premise – that local conditions, including traditional
forms of leadership as exist in Guatemala, along with a history of state distrust, result in a
patchwork of governance realities at the local level. Indeed, anthropologists and
historians of Guatemala have cited the influence of traditional leadership, or customary
beliefs as critical variables affecting state incursion, or even levels (and types) of crime at
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the village level. But this paper is concerned with a more rich sense of human
development that prioritizes access to education and health, and not only with crime. This
muddies the otherwise neat distinctions between state and society.
The agency of local actors, however crucial to the story of Guatemalan state-society
relations, is insufficient to address development needs. Local actors, no matter how
autonomous, or governed by local customs, are unable to martial the resources necessary
to reverse trends preventable childhood death, or reverse decades of staggering chronic
hunger. The state, meanwhile, is indeed but one actor among many that vie for influence,
and which struggle to shape outcomes. Development outcomes, I argue here, hinge
instead on these shifting local ecosystems of governance.
Development, by its very nature, is a complex phenomenon, and no one factor will be
enough to reverse the situation in rural Guatemala from one of frustration to one of rich,
emancipatory prosperity – in which freedom to choose a course of livelihood, or freedom
from preventable sickness or injury – is taken for granted. Indeed, as the grinding poverty
rates in even the most “successful” cases in this project illustrate, none of the
communities are positioned to truly prosper from a human development perspective.
After triangulating three overlapping methods, however, this paper demonstrates that
locally-based forces are in fact critical to the implementation of centrally-articulated
development programs and that, in the context of limited statehood that characterizes
many rural communities in Guatemala, state-local complementarity is a fundamental
component of what separates those communities making strides against basic health and
education deficiencies, from those where chronic hunger, illiteracy, and infant mortality
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persist at crippling rates. This chapter summarizes some of the key findings and their
significance.
On Statebuilding and Human Development
First, this project adds to a growing literature that underscores the influence of local
political dynamics, including informal actors and institutions, over a range of state-led
programs despite international efforts to consolidate post-war states. In fact, given
Guatemala’s nearly two decades of post-war economic growth, and the absence of armed
militant groups or the risk of a renewed conflict, the Guatemalan state’s weakness is
arguably more illustrative of the limitations of top-down statebuilding than even more
recent cases of post-war statebuilding, whose outcomes remains in doubt given only
recent conflict or political setbacks.
This paper, unlike hybridity claims for instance, acknowledges that “strong,” capable
states with the capacity to distribute resources efficiently, adjudicate disputes fairly, and
provide citizens with security will more likely support prosperous, healthy citizens than
their weak-state counterparts. What is in doubt, instead, is the likelihood that such a statedominant system of governance can be replicated in Guatemala, or that such a system is
truly viable. It is even less likely a possibility in the even more complex cases of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, or Libya, as examples. But even in less
conflict-prone regions, from Central America to Central Asia, local political dynamics,
and the legitimacy of locally-resonant forms of governance, from clan networks to tribal
leadership, resist, even if passively, the encroachment of state authority. This has
profound implications for peacebuilding and development policymaking that, with very
little adjustment, centers on the premise of centrally-consolidated states. Such efforts, this
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dissertation argues, are unlikely to generate the desired outcomes that are sought.
Guatemala’s ongoing crisis with criminality, and emigration, are but small examples of
statebuilding’s ineffectiveness. But this is not the end of the story.
Unlike the vast majority of the literature preoccupied with local political dynamics,
this project demonstrates the importance of the state, whatever its capacity. The state,
along with locally-based formal and informal actors, is one stakeholder in a melting pot
that, collectively, influences governance. Whether or not the state’s heft is enough to
subsume the influence of traditional leaders, the state still cannot be ignored. And
crucially, while local actors might be central to conflict resolution in Colombia, or
community policing in Mexico, they are unable to build schools, pay teacher salaries,
stock clinics with medicine, nor reverse decades old trends in chronic hunger. This
requires resources that the state can provide, and as is normatively well established,
should provide. Two important points stem from this observation.
First, by making the dependent variable human development, versus something more
minimal – like a negative peace or even homicide rates – this project embraces a more
complex but arguably more realistic understanding of post-conflict societies which, long
after conflict ceases, continue to struggle to sustainably improve well-being and welfare.
As the quantitative component of this study demonstrates, those communities that were
most affected by violence during the armed conflict remain most likely to suffer from
poor human development performance – measured across a range of variables. From
simple regressions, it is unclear whether causation lies in the path dependency of weak
development stemming from conflict, or whether this reflects more simply the fact that
those communities that agitated during the civil war were among the poorest then, and
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remain so today in the country’s radically unequal socio-economic topography.
Regardless, the most conflict-affected communities have been unable to progress away
from poor human development, despite two decades of official democracy and outsideassisted statebuilding.
Making human development the dependent variable thus requires, on some level, an
acknowledgment of the myriad actors and social forces that interact to influence
outcomes, including the role of non-state actors. It is unclear why more post-conflict
peacebuilding literature does not consider development, specifically, or more intensively,
but remains focused instead on more minimal definitions of post-war reconstruction
“success,” like reduction in violent events, or even GDP growth, etc.
Second, though the state is a critical factor in determining either better, or worse,
outcomes, this paper does not absolve the state of its failings. Apart from the obvious
shortcomings of the Guatemalan state – from an anemic legislature and broken judiciary
system to corruption and situational civil liberties – this project demonstrates how streetlevel state actors in most communities under focus engage in petty local politics, place
political party above objectives, and more generally lack training and experience. But
nevertheless, the actions of even these low-ranking government officials have important
consequences for village life, and as is argued here, longer-term development trajectories.
State-Local Complementarity and its Components
Guatemala will never prosper without drastic wholesale reforms that augment tax
revenues, and redistribute investment in poor regions, but in the near future these changes
are unlikely. It is exactly under these conditions, however – those that dominate the
reality of so many developing countries – that spatial variation in development is so
188

puzzling. Why are some communities managing to fare better along basic development
indicators?
As this project makes clear, on some level better outcomes require what is referred to
here as state-local “complementarity.” It might seem obvious that the best outcomes in
the study are in great part the result of a marriage between state resources and local-level
leadership. But, as the many case study communities which continue to struggle attest,
such a harmonious relationship is anything but obvious to state and local actors on the
ground. Indeed, cultivating complementarity is challenging in the context of deep-seated
distrust and the growing influence of political parties, which makes turning public
resources into club goods for patronage a readily-available, low-risk, default option.
Indeed, complementarity itself requires that several other factors be resolved.
Principally, an embedded distrust of state intentions by local leaders, whether formal or
informal, is pervasive. This distrust stems from various factors, however. Santa Lucía la
Reforma was affected far more during the civil war than other communities, yet local
leaders, including semi-formal indigenous leaders, cooperate with state actors
constructively. Zacualpa was also impacted severely, but there the legacy of civil patrols
(in which the current mayor participated) and ladino-indigenous identity and divisions
still resonate, complicating alliances and thwarting cooperation. Finally, some of the
most well organized communities – including Totonicapán city, which has wellestablished, highly-trained indigenous leaders – are unable to convert their resources,
human capital and local influence into development gains. In “Toto,” indigenous
leadership is organized around resistance to the state, explicitly, and the goal of increased
autonomy from state influence, despite being relatively unscathed during the civil
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conflict. Alas, this distrust, which stems not from the civil war, makes state-local
complementarity impossible in Toto, even if its indigenous leadership is arguably better
positioned to make a difference in this regard. Here, local leadership “competes” rather
than “complements” state services. In summary, though conflict intensity demonstrates a
strong statistical correlation with development outcomes, state-local complementarity can
overcome this legacy.
One other cause of distrust is political party affiliation of local formal authorities.
This is inconsistent as well, however. Indeed, Santa Lucía’s mayor is from the same
political party that controls the central government, facilitating cooperation between state
and local actors compared with communities where local mayors from distinct parties
(like those in Santa María Chiquimula, Zacualpa or Santa Catarina Palopó) attempt to
carve out autonomy from central authorities, or demonstrate the superiority of their
party’s patronage over that of the President’s party.
Party non-alignment is particularly relevant to Zacualpa and Chiquimula, where the
mayor’s have increasing consolidated local power and openly pitted themselves against
state actors, who in turn wield their modest access to food packages for vote-buying, or
organize protests. But party non-alignment in Patzité and San Pablo is less important, and
multiple state actors from the regional level, and the mayors themselves, reported fruitful
relations, and modest improvements in development outcomes. In these communities, the
factor most absent, however, is the presence and influence of indigenous or village-level
leaders. The increasing influence of political parties, campaigning, and even outside
money on local elections does not just create state-local distrust, but also creates divisions
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within small, rural communities, and crowds out the influence of traditional leaders on
local governance. Another socially divisive factor is church affiliation.
In virtually every community visited, divisions between traditional Catholic affiliates
and evangelical Protestants are central to political and familial rivalries within the
community. Where church and political affiliation overlap explicitly, as it does in
Chiquimula especially, governance is utterly dysfunctional. Alas, overcoming this
sectarian divide is yet another piece of the state-local complementarity puzzle, and
underscores how local political dynamics which vary over space can thwart centrallyarticulated programs. The degree to which small, otherwise homogeneous communities
remain divided is a key obstacle to state-local complementarity, and more effective
development-oriented local governance.
Once again, where the best development outcomes are observed, state and local actors
coordinate in order to bridge sectarian divisions – not without hardship, but nevertheless
with far more success than is observed anywhere else. As a result, this paper recommends
an approach to post-war development policy – from global to local – that is “contextsensitive.” Context-sensitive statebuilding strips central authorities of their normative
imperative to dominate all state territory, removing from the state the burden of state
imposition, freeing it instead to honor local interlocutors with the responsibility of both
development governance, but also resource distribution. As Altschuler and Corrales
concluded after their study of community-managed schools in Central America, “to
expand the scope of spillovers from (participatory governance) would require a concerted
state effort that is both hands-on and hands-off” (2013: 181, emphasis added). The active
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role of the state should vary from context to context, in inverse proportion to the strength,
desire and autonomy of local, frequently informal, leaders.
To make sense of the variety of outcomes and to guide policymaking with respect to
complementarity, I put forth the following theoretical typology of complementarity. As
discussed, complementarity hinges in some ways, first, on the degree of local autonomy,
which in turn allows for the sustained influence of traditional leaders, which in turn
shapes even the role of mayors, regardless of political affiliation.

The State Broker’s Role

Degree of
Local
Autonomy

High: Which allows for
mayoral independence,
and the influence of
traditional actors.
Low: Which allows for
increased political party
influence, the crowding
out of traditional leaders
and the influence of
patronage.

Engage

Disengage

Complementarity (SLR)

Resistance (Toto) or
Competition (Zacualpa)

Political Domination
(SMC)

Dark Complementarity
(SCP)

Figure 21: Explaining The Presence or Absence of Complementarity and its Alternatives

Policymakers can utilize complementary political arrangements at the village level to
augment service delivery, and make innovations in service delivery more sustainable.
They can simultaneously avoid, as happened in Zacualpa, making local political tensions
worse by inadvertently using local networks that actively deprived communities of
resources. Crucially, outside actors can engage with both state and local actors, after
identifying key brokers, to systematically build, through mediation or similar means, the
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complementarity that results in the development building blocks witnessed in Santa
Lucía.
Remaining Puzzles and Future Research
From the quantitative component of this study, the “denunciations” variable is among
those most consistently correlated with better development outcomes. As noted in
Chapter Three, denunciations were included as a crude measurement of social cohesion,
or in the very least as an attempt to capture some community level effect. Specifically,
this paper assumes, a greater number of reported human rights abuses per population
demonstrates an element of mobilization and solidarity that facilitates this reporting,
rather than an actual increase in human rights abuses at the local level. Does social
cohesion influence development? Or, do denunciations capture something else?
The strength of this relationship is surprising, but alone it is not enough to explain
human development. Alas, like trust, and internal divisions along party or sectarian lines,
social cohesion can be another facilitating condition to state-local complementarity. More
unclear, however, is how development and social “organization,” as it is labeled in this
study, are related, and which comes first. The quantitative component is unable to
determine whether the health and well-being of citizens, first, permits protest and social
organization, or whether an inherent social cohesion permits development. The latter is
more likely. Regardless, and in keeping with Fine (2010), social cohesion alone is unable
to explain development, and as was observed, manifests in ways that inhibit development
as well.
Finally, this dissertation highlights an important disconnect between economic
growth and human development, with further important policy implications. The concept
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of human development and the human development index itself, developed by
economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, is grounded by the idea that economic
prosperity alone does not automatically translate into individual well-being, as the means
and ends of development are confused. As is already well documented, Guatemala’s
entrenched social inequalities have in turn prevented the country’s generally strong
economic performance from improving the well-being and opportunities of rural
Guatemalans, and particularly its large indigenous populations. What is unique from this
study, however, is the finding that some communities – remote, with a tragic history of
conflict, and with shockingly high rates of poverty (and thus extremely low incomes) –
have made marked improvements in literacy, infant mortality and chronic hunger.
It is uncertain, without improvements in income over time, whether such strides are
sustainable, or whether current trends will translate into intergenerational social mobility.
Guatemala, make no mistake, has a long road ahead. But this finding alone underscores
the necessity of policy that makes access to basic services, with a special emphasis on
health and education, the backbone of national development policy. Crucially, in a
developing country context, and/or under conditions of limited statehood that is the
empirical reality of much of the rural developing world, this will require coordination
with local, and frequently non-state actors if it is to be effective. As it stands today, the
children of one community in rural Guatemala, Santa Lucía, will have a greater capability
set – or tool box with which to survive illness, pursue further educational opportunities,
or be an informed and healthy parent someday – than their neighbors. The framers of the
emerging Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which continue to overlook local and
participatory governance mechanisms, should take notice.
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APPENDIX A. List of Interview and Focus Group Participants.

Date
7/8
7/9
7/9
7/10
7/10
7/10
7/10
7/10
7/11
9/4
9/4
9/4

Name
Dr. Carlos Enrique Lix
Socop
Brendan Halloran
Artruro Matute
Marcel Arévalo
Gustavo Arriola
Edelberto Torres-Rivas
Petrona García
María Reyes
“Mari”
“David”
“Juan Carlos”

9/4

Don Pedro

9/5
9/5
9/5
9/5

Padre Naxto
Helena
Augustín
Karina

9/5

Augusto Santos Norato

9/6
9/6
9/6
9/7

Giovanni
Garcia
Juan Tzoy Calel
Esaú Guerra Samayoa
Armando

Organization/Title

Type

Location

Health Minister

Interview

Guatemala City

USAID
Universidad del Valle
FLACSO
UNDP
UNDP
Muni, Zacualpa
OMM, Zacualpa
Alcadía Indígena
ADESMA
ADESMA
student
T’zolojche’ / Ancestral
Authorities
Jesuit Dioces, SMC
Citizen
Citizen
ADESMA
48 Cantons of
Totonicapán
MIDES
INGEP
Muncipality, Alcalde

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

Guatemala City
Guatemala City
Guatemala City
Guatemala City
Guatemala City
Zacualpa
Zacualpa
Zacualpa
SMC
SMC
SMC

Interview

SMC

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

SMC
SMC
SMC
SMC

Interview

SMC

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Focus
Group
Interview
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Interview

SMC
SMC
SMC
Xela
SMC

Interview

Phone

Interview
Interview

Totonicapán
Totonicapán

SESAN

9/9

6 women

Citizens

9/9
9/9
9/9
9/10
9/10
9/10
9/11

Ana María
10 women
10 women
12 women
5 men and women
10 mean and women
Julia M. Asturias

9/13

Dr. Peter Rohloff

10/4
10/6

Esaú Guerra Samayoa
Augusto Santos Norato

Government Health Post
Citizens
Citizens
Citizens
Citizens
Citizens
USAID
Wuku Kawoq’ / Harvard
Medical
SESAN
48 Cantons
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Xecaxelaj (SMC)
Xecaxelaj (SMC)
Xesana (SMC)
Xesana I (SMC)
Pajojchiyats (SMC)
Josefina (SMC)
Centro (SMC)
Guatemala City

10/16

Dr. Carlos Enrique Lix
Socop
José
Rodrigo
Carlos
Norma
10 men
Roni Morales
Don Francisco
María Reyes
Petrona García
Victor
Alejandra, Mateo, and
Rolando
Ernesto Calachij Riz
“Lucy”
Hermana Ana María Alvarez
Lopez
13 men, 12 women

10/16

Lorenzo Alvarado Ti-Paz

10/17
10/17
10/17

2 Unidentified Workers
Dora
Unidentified Worker
56 men and women from 5
different aldeas

10/7
10/8
10/8
10/8
10/8
10/9
10/10
10/11
10/14
10/14
10/14
10/14
10/15
10/15
10/15

10/17

Minister of Health

Interview

MAGA
CONALFA
Elections
RENAP
Alcaldes Comunitarios
SESAN
Alcalde
OMM, Zacualpa
Muni, Zacualpa
MAGA

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

Santa Cruz del
Quiché
SLLR
SLLR
SLLR
SLLR
SLLR
SLLR
SLLR
Zacualpa
Zacualpa
Zacualpa

MIDES

Interview

Zacualpa

Alcalde
ADIZ

Interview
Interview

Zacualpa
Zacualpa

Catholic Church

Interview

Zacualpa

Citzens
Defensoría Indígena
Wajxaqib’ Noj
ASODINZA
ACOMQUI
ASODEZA

Focus

Pasajoc I, Zacualpa

Interview

Pasajoc I, Zacualpa

Interview
Interview
Interview

Citizens

Focus

Zacualpa
Zacualpa
Zacualpa
Chuchuca,
Zacualpa

10/18

Roberto

10/18
11/14
11/14
11/14
11/14

María
Mayor and associates
Harvi
Diego
Yolanda

11/14

Mike

11/14

Evelyn

11/14
11/14
11/14
11/14

Judge and Assistant
Jorge Santiago
Unknown
Unknown

Doctor at Center’s
Health Clinic
Citizen
Local Government
MIDES
MAGA
OMM
Oficina de la Protección
de la Niñez y
Adolescencia
Physician, Health Clinic
(CAP)
Justice of Peace
MINEDUC
Agricultural Worker
Agricultural Worker

11/15

Sergio Gonzales

SESAN

Interview

11/15

Diego Hernández

CORSADEC

Interview

11/15

Freddy Oscar Lee Argueta
Merida, Gilberto E. Barrios
M.

INFOM

Interview

11/16

Ruben

11/18

Consejos de Pueblos
K’iché
Mayor
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Interview

Zacualpa

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

Zacualpa
Patzité
Patzité
Patzité
Patzité

Interview

Patzité

Interview

Patzité

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

Patzité
Patzité
Patzité
Patzité
Santa Cruz del
Quiché
Santa Cruz del
Quiché

Interview
Interview

Santa Cruz del
Quiché
Santa Cruz del
Quiché
Santa Catarína

Palopó (SCP)
Interview
SCP
Interview
SCP
Interview
Sololá
Interview
Sololá
Interview
Sololá
Interview
Sololá
Interview
Sololá
Interview
Sololá
Interview
SCP
Interview
Guatemala City
Interview
Guatemala City
Interview
Guatemala City
Interview
Via email
Interview
San Pablo
Interview
San Pablo
Interview
San Pablo
Focus
12/11
San Pablo
Group
12/12
San Pablo Mayor
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Luis Felipe Lejá Quiacam
Young worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Vicenta
El Hospitalito, Santiago
Interview
San Pedro
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Agricultural Worker
Interview
San Pablo
12/12 Maureen
Peace Corps/SESAN
Interview
Sololá
12/15 Juan Carlos Mendez
DeviTech
Interview
Guatemala
Total: 254 interview and focus group participants (251 individuals, 146 focus group participants, 107
discrete interviews)
11/18
11/18
11/18
11/19
11/19
11/19
11/19
11/19
11/20
11/21
11/21
11/22
12/4
12/10
12/10
12/10

Health Worker
Anonymous
Anonymous
Leadership
Data Specialist
Marvin
Maureen Herman
Dr. Diego Hernández
Don Mariano
Jonathan Menkos
Angel
Dr. Walter Flores
Hirma Osorio
Ernesto
Muni Worker
Bartolo Sojven Ujpan
12 women (names available
as needed)

Community Clinic
OMM
SOSEP
Sololá Alcadía Indígena
Minister of Health
SESAN/ Hambre Cero
Peace Corps / SESAN
Director, Área de Salud
Former Mayor
ICEFI
USAID
CEGGS
Nutri Salud (Zacualpa)
Physician, Health Post
OMM
CONALFA
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APPENDIX B. State Density Index calculation, borrowed and translated from UNDP
Guatemala 2010

Components
a. Presence of
state
dependents
b. Bureaucracy
(per
population)
c. Budget (per
capita)
Sub-indices

Health

Other

SubInidices

Coverage

Level of service

Numer of
“dependants”

ia=µ(x1j)

Teachers

Personnel, Minister of Public
Health and Social Services
(MSPAS)

Employees

ib=µ(x2j)

Q / person

Q / person

Q / person

ic=µ(x3j)

iedu= µ(xi1)

isal= µ(xi2)

iotr= µ(xi3)

IDE=
µ(xij)

Education
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APPENDIX C. Percentage of Total Rural Poverty per Municipality (adapted from Mapas
de Pobreza Rural en Guatemala 2011)
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APPENDIX D. “Quality of Life” Scores per Municipality (as reported in the report
titled, Vulnerbailidades de Muncipios y la Calidad de Vida de Sus Habitantes)
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APPENDIX E. Invitation to the official commemoration of the October 4, 2012 shooting
by police of six Totonicapán residents.

LAS COMUNIDADES ORGANIZADORAS DE LA CONMEMORACIÓN DEL
PRIMER ANIVERSARIO DE LA MUERTE DE LAS VÍCTIMAS DE LA
MASACRE DEL 4 DE OCTUBRE DEL AÑO 2012
JUNTA DIRECTIVA DEL CONSEJO DE ALCALDES COMUNALES DE LOS 48
CANTONES DE TOTONICAPÁN

CONVOCAN
A todos los pueblos y organizaciones indígenas de Guatemala, a las organizaciones
sociales e instituciones solidarias nacionales e internacionales a participar en la
conmemoración del primer aniversario de la masacre de los mártires del pueblo de
Totonicapán a realizarse el día 4 de octubre del presente año a partir de las 08:00 de
la  mañana  en  el  lugar  denominado  “La  Cumbre  de  Alaska,  Kilómetro  169,  de  la  
Carretera  Interamericana”.
LOS MÁRTIRES DEL 4 DE OCTUBRE DEL AÑO 2012, NO ESTÁN MUERTOS,
SIGUEN VIBRANDO EN NUESTRO CORAZONES Y LUCHAREMOS PORQUE SE LES
HAGA JUSTICIA
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APPENDIX F. Post-estimation Tests for Marginal Effects, Multicollinearity and
Heteroskedasticity per Model
Table 6 (P. 92): Variation in HDI_extrap
Model 1
Marginal
Effects at
means*
(ey/ex)
.2300021
.0095439
-.0126931
.01221914
.0028438

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

Multicollinearity**
VIF
1.03
1.21
1.03
1.22
1.03

* Stata Command: mfx compute, eyex
** Stata Command: estat vif

0

.1

.2

Density
.3

.4

.5

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals***

-4

-2

0
Studentized residuals

2

4

***Stata: predict rstu1, rstu;
Histogram rstu1, norm

.4

.5

Fitted values
.7
.6

.8

Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI

2.5

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5

214

Table 7 (p. 96): HDI_extrap When Population <25,000
Model 1
Marginal
Effects at
Means
(ey/ex)
-.3739102
.0279199
-.0100656
.0194039
.0048091

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

Multicollinearity
(VIF)
1.25
1.16
1.15
1.03
1.02

0

.1

Density
.2

.3

.4

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals

-4

-2

0
Studentized residuals

2

4

0

.2

Fitted values
.4

.6

.8

Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI

2.5

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5

215

Table 8 (p. 97): 2011 Guatemalan Municipal-Level Illiteracy Rates
Model 1
Marginal Effects at
means (ey/ex)
-.494517
-.0099134
.043518
-.057991
-.0023829

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

Multicollinearity
(VIF)
1.01
1.12
1.03
1.12
1.02

0

.1

.2

Density
.3

.4

.5

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals

-4

-2

0
Studentized residuals

2

4

0

20

Fitted values
40

60

80

Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI

2.5

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5
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Table 9 (p. 98): 2011 Illiteracy Rates where Population < 25,000
Model 1
Marginal Effects at
means (ey/ex)
.3486531
-.0117906
.0343491
-.0810317
.0114377

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

Multicollinearity
(VIF)
1.09
1.14
1.03
1.06
1.01

0

.1

Density
.2

.3

.4

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals

-6

-4

-2
Studentized residuals

0

2

0

50

Fitted values

100

150
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2.5

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5
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Table 10 (p. 99): Change in Illiteracy (2000-2011)
Model 1
Marginal
Effects at
means
(ey/ex)

Multicollinearity
(VIF)

y=-1.6495 < 0,
eyex not avail

1.01

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

1.12
1.03
1.12
1.02

-6

-4

Fitted values
0
-2

2

4

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals

2.5

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5

0

.1

.2

Density
.3

.4

.5

Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI

-10

-5

0

5

Studentized residuals
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Table 11 (p. 101): Difference in Chronic Hunger (2002-2008)
Model 1
Marginal Effects at
means (ey/ex)
y=-7.1427 < 0, eyex
not available

CoVariate
log_SDI
Gasto_Mun
Conf_Intens
Denperpop
Elect_Align

0
-5
Fitted values
-10
-15
-20

3

3.5
log_SDI

4

4.5

0

.1

.2

Density
.3

.4

.5

Marginal Effects: Fitted Values of HDI_extrap Across log_SDI

-4

1.03
1.21
1.03
1.22
1.03

Heteroskedasticity: Distribution of residuals

2.5

Multicollinearity
(VIF)

-2

0
Studentized residuals

2

4
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APPENDIX G. Summary Statistics of Variables Under Examination

Variable
SDI_2009
log_SDI
IVs

Gasto_Mun
Elect_Align
Denuncias_2012
DenperPop
elev
Analf_DIFF

DV
s

HDI_extrap
Cron_Hun_2008
Cron_Hun_Diff

N

Mean

min

max

sd

331
331
283
334
332
332
333

.2185
3.0403
234.54
.3533
86.61
4.2743
4197.14

.11
2.40
0
0
0
0
0

.75
4.32
2886.7
1
1190.38
81.75
10898

.0794
.2719
282.70
.4787
111.25
7.20
2690.85

303
330
332
331

-1.5818
.6578
44.8837
-7.05

-43.81
.277
10.1
-31.1

19.79
.915
91.4
9.8

4.98
.1076
17.81
5.83
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